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Arguing that narrative serves as a powerful tool for university administration, my 
dissertation provides new rhetoric and composition professionals with an analytical 
framework for understanding how to navigate university life. Because our current 
academic climate of accountability requires universities and their individual academic 
units to offer narrative accounts that demonstrate institutional effectiveness, narrative is a 
useful lens for navigating the intricacies of institutional relations among individual 
academic units and among units within the university at large. On a practical note, most 
of the work we do in the institution, from grading to annual reports to faculty governance, 
relies on narrative. Narrative shapes our understanding of the institution and also 
comprises a majority of the artifacts we associate with it. However, unlike these artifacts, 
narratives are not static; they are living, changing entities, just like people. From this 
perspective, writing program administrators can understand the institution and their role 
within it in a synergetic way and begin to imagine how to direct and redirect the 
consequences of narratives. I term this process narrative logic, and I offer classical 
pragmatism as a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between 
narrative and consequences. Through a case study of a mid-sized liberal arts school in the 
South, I isolates narrative’s role in institutional assessment, programmatic change, and 
disciplinary identity in order to show how narrative effects material change. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
After completing my doctoral coursework in rhetoric and composition, I accepted 
a full-time administrative position at a mid-sized comprehensive liberal arts university. 
While groomed for the job market and knowledgeable on effective interviewing skills, I 
had little to no training in navigating the personalities and politics of university life. No 
doubt, I was an active graduate student in a Right to Work state. I attended faculty 
meetings regularly (when possible), served on departmental committees, and organized 
with fellow classmates for better representation and wages. In addition, I listened 
carefully to the subtexts of my professors’ lectures and attended as many conference 
presentations and professional meetings as I could on the “state” of the field in order to 
develop an informed understanding of how the university works. I knew I wanted to 
direct a writing program and eventually chair a department, but I was clueless about the 
day-to-day life of these positions.  
With regard to my identity as a rhetorician, I considered myself something like a 
Marxist pragmatist with a structuralist bent and a feminist hue. Influenced by the 
Birmingham tradition, motivated by rhetorical pragmatism, and disheartened by the 
postmodern movement, much of my research developed ameliorative methodologies that 
provided ways to reconcile polarized positions on topics such as disciplinarity, 
institutional action, academic freedom, political judgment, and feminist theory. While 
researching these issues, I was introduced to a variety of perspectives on institutional 
structures and disciplinary formation, and I believed firmly that oppressive structures 
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could change. The university, for example, was not a fixed set of relations but an 
unstable, dynamic set of relationships that merely needed a researcher with the right 
analytical framework to change its behaviors. As a result, I believed, like many graduate 
students, that my research was important and that my ideas would be the catalyst inciting 
others to action. Plain and simple: my academic telos was action; discourse was the 
means. The particulars of its implementation were simply unimportant.  
Unsurprisingly, my graduate student idealism and attendance at 
professionalization workshops did not adequately prepare me for the experiences I would 
face as a university administrator and instructor. I never imagined institutional 
participation to be unpredictable. I thought, if you have the right argument and the right 
ethics, you could wield institutional power to obtain the ends you desired. I thought, if 
you mobilize your colleagues and build solidarity, your demands for institutional change 
would be delivered. What I eventually learned, however, is that, if one knows the right 
people, if it’s the right time, and if the stakeholders overseeing funding are complicit, one 
has the power to change parts of the institution, at least superficially.  
This perspective is a far cry from the activist agenda guiding the teaching 
assistant courses that oriented me to the writing classroom and to the field of rhetoric and 
composition. Because, as many believe, the teaching of writing is inherently political, the 
development of writing skills inherently civic, and the interplay of the two inherently 
ethical, many graduate educators train teaching assistants (TAs) to consider writing 
instruction and administration as activist enterprises that work locally to change the 
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institution globally. Although many new rhetoric and composition instructors might not 
be able to recount James Berlin’s taxonomy of rhetorics in full, most will be able to recite 
at least one quotation from Pedagogy of the Oppressed or Teaching to Transgress. In 
fact, my own personal keeper is bell hooks’ notion that, in a classroom where education 
is the practice of freedom, “I do not expect students to take any risks that I would not 
take” (21).  
As many scholars have noted, this approach to TA training offers future educators 
and their students a false sense of daily institutional life.1 More importantly, this 
perspective distracts TAs from what happens behind the scenes. Let’s face it: not all 
students want to learn, not all administrators support writing, not all universities value 
education. Moreover, only in recent TA training syllabi has writing program 
administration (WPA) literature carved out a distinct niche. There are several reasons for 
this. To begin, the course material necessary for any good introduction to rhetoric and 
composition pedagogy and theory is so vast—covering a range of topics both theoretical 
and practical—that articles on how writing programs operate within institutions do not 
always make the cut. Second, one primary purpose of these courses is to help TAs 
develop the practical materials they need to enter the classroom. Syllabi and course 
activities take precedence because there is a pragmatic need for their development. Third, 
professionalization for the job market is a key concern in training courses; as such, 
statements of teaching philosophies and teaching portfolios are essential components of a 
successful course. As any rhetoric and composition professor teaching these courses can 
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attest, there is simply too much to do. Assisting TAs in the process of developing a 
teaching persona and a pedagogical philosophy, then, provides one coherent solution.  
“Too much to do” is a familiar state of being for most graduate students, no 
matter the discipline. In my experiences as both a graduate student and a graduate 
educator, “too much to do” preempts institutional naivety. Expected to excel equally in 
teaching, scholarship, and student-hood, graduate students are limited in the level of 
participation they can accept with regard to institutional and departmental decision-
making. These expectations, combined with the transient nature of the position, keep 
graduate students at the gates of the institution, able to see inside but with no clear point 
of view. When I was in grad school, many of my colleagues enjoyed this position. After 
all, if you believe that you can make a difference in students’ lives by teaching writing, 
secure a tenure-track and eventually a tenured position, gain institutional power by 
demonstrating your right to belong, then you will finish your dissertation, publish it, and 
establish yourself in the field. If you believe none of those ideas, the gated perspective 
gives you two options: get lost or break and enter.  
When I accepted my new writing center position, I found myself somewhere in 
between. For every professor who gave me a “reason to believe,” I had another take it 
away.2 French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu would say that I experienced a loss of illusio. 
According to the theories he develops in Pascalian Meditations, working for the 
university (which belongs to the “field” of education) is similar to playing a game. 
Necessary for participation in the game is illusio, the mechanism by which participants 
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remain unaware that they are playing a game.  This belief allows them to play the game 
specifically in accordance with the field’s self-regulating rules (151). Under the influence 
of a field’s illusion, participants cannot understand the field except as a member of the 
field and thus within the confines of the field. In this model, participants are responsible 
for the field’s self-preservation and continuity.  
When illusions are broken, participants have choices: recognize the game qua 
game, agree, and continue. Recognize the game, disagree, and retreat. Or, recognize the 
game, take a position, and play consciously with the intention of influencing the rules of 
the game itself. I respectfully blame Jean Baudrillard for breaking the illusion of rhetoric 
and composition and sincerely thank Pierre Bourdieu for helping me understand why the 
illusion needed to be broken. The sentimental and empowering narratives offered in my 
TA training courses allowed me to believe in the game before developing full knowledge 
of the game’s rules, the actors who play it, and how the winner(s) is determined. 
Although I maintained an invested interest in writing program administration, 
disciplinary critique, and labor studies alongside my required courses, I was paralyzed 
when I attended my first faculty meeting as an insider. I did not know who to listen to, 
what institutional history was necessary to know, or how to claim rhetorical space among 
such disparate voices. As an administrator, I did not know the direct and indirect channels 
for acquiring more resources, developing persuasive internal reports, or disciplining staff 
effectively. Like most people, a handful of dedicated allies and experience were my 
teachers. Consequently, the empowerment narratives that underscored my graduate 
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experiences proved antithetical to the administrative savvy I needed to be a successful 
member of a university. 
Although I am grateful for my experiences, the frustration accompanying them 
led to the development of this project. The theories I embraced as a graduate student 
provided cursory assistance at best when I became a “professional,” and I had to develop 
my own tentative theories on the ground, in the messy space of practice, while 
abandoning the sentimental narratives provided in the field. As a writing center 
administrator, I learned very quickly that I needed to develop institutional literacy outside 
of my skill set in order to advocate for my academic unit, and I learned that the most 
useful currency at my institution took narrative form. From assessment to faculty 
governance, university change hinged upon the degree to which an individual or an 
individual unit’s narrative aligned with the university’s narrative in the joint purpose of 
advancing the university’s agenda. In my experience, how you told your story, to whom, 
and when determined success more so than the event and/or subject the narrative 
represents.  
It took a couple of years for me to draw these conclusions. As pragmatist John 
Dewey reminds us, “the institutional life of mankind is marked by disorganization” (Art 
as Experience 20). I had to experience this disorganization to understand, on a limited 
basis, some of the ways in which the university is organized, and I consider myself lucky 
to have received a job whose primary responsibility was administrative rather than 
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pedagogical because, as our comrades in K-12 have learned, the line the between two is 
faint in the age of standards-based accountability.  
This dissertation illustrates my journey toward institutional literacy, and in the 
chapters that follow, I describe the analytical framework (termed “narrative logic”) that 
enabled me to navigate the structures at my university so that I could be an active 
participant. For new instructors entering the university (both contingent and tenure-
track)—instructors who might not have developed a perspective on university politics, 
disciplinarity, and university membership—this dissertation offers only one perspective. 
And while materialists such as Marc Bousquet or Nancy Welch might argue that my 
framework is simply a self-constructed illusion, once I was able to name the game I was 
experiencing, I found ways to participate in the university game with the deliberate 
intention of influencing decision-making processes toward equitable ends.  
I share this dissertation not to advance a closed, abstract system but to offer a 
method for testing belief against experience. My basic premise is this: to change the way 
universities are organized, one has to identify the underlying principles guiding the 
organization. At my institution, narrative proved an invaluable lens for understanding the 
ethics (i.e., the answer to the question “How do I act?”) relating universities and their 
varied constituents. I encourage all newcomers to the field to pose the same question to 
their universities: How does this university act in the game of education, and how does 
my role specifically as adjunct/faculty/administrator/staff need to act in order to actively 
participate in the game? 
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NOTES 
1. To understand how this narrative developed, one need only look at the 
pedagogical trajectory of the 1980s and 1990s in which liberatory/critical pedagogy 
resituated student-writers as ideologically oppressed cogs in need of a radical professor 
who would, like Moses, set them free. While I particularly value the work of Paulo 
Freire, bell hooks, and Ira Shor in his or her own political context, I do not believe that 
“radical pedagogy” is the panacea to student oppression. For a wonderful explication of 
the activist narrative inspired by critical pedagogy, see Anne Bramblett’s “My Imagined 
Community” in What to Expect When You’re Expected to Teach (2002). See also Stanley 
Fish’s New York Times op-ed piece “Tips for Professors: Just Do Your Job” (October 22, 
2006), Marc Bousquet’s How the University Works (2008), and Kelly Ritter’s Who Owns 
Schools: Authority, Students, and Online Discourse (2010).  
2. I take this phrase from Kate Ronald and Hepsie Roskelly’s publication of the 
same name. I had the privilege of studying with Hepsie who believes in the institution of 
education with such profound conviction that I spent much of my time at the University 
of North Carolina Greensboro believing in her power to believe.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: BUILDING A NARRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1. From Story to Agency 
This dissertation examines the relationship between institutional narratives and 
writing program administration (WPA), and I offer new WPAs a framework for 
analyzing institutional structures. My argument is straightforward: narratives underpin 
university governance and function as cognitive structures by which individuals make 
decisions and develop institutional identities. Narratives are both institution and 
discipline-specific. In order to set the scene for this investigation, I begin with a literary 
example that presents, simplistically, the kinds of questions I explore in my analysis of 
institutional narratives. This example serves to frame the reader’s mind on the 
relationships among narrative, action, agency, and consequences.  
 In the fictional memoir An Arsonist’s Guide to Writers’ Homes in New England, 
protagonist and narrator Sam Pulsifer has just finished serving a fifteen-year sentence for 
accidentally burning down the historical Emily Dickinson house and thereby killing two 
young lovers who were hiding there. Shortly after he returns home to live with his 
parents, he recounts his trial, during which the judge asked him a series of questions 
about the relationship between stories and action in order to consider precisely who (or 
what) is responsible for the deaths of the young lovers. The judge questions, 
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Can a story be good only if it produces an effect? If the effect is a bad one, but 
intended, has the story done its job? Is it then a good story? If the story produces 
an effect other than the intended one, is it then a bad story? Can a story be said to 
produce an effect at all? Should we expect it to? Can we blame the story for 
anything? Can a story actually do anything at all? (Clarke 71) 
 
 
The judge poses these questions to Sam after listening to the attorney’s defense. We are 
informed that, when Sam was a child, his mother told him stories about the Dickinson 
house, including one in which Dickinson’s corpse rose from the dead on the night of a 
full moon. Further, we are told that at fourteen Sam, driven by his curiosity about the 
house’s lore, decided to break in to the Dickinson house during a full moon. While there, 
he lit a cigarette and began recounting the stories his mother had told him. He had not 
been at the house for very long before he was startled by an unfamiliar sound coming 
from a nearby room. The combination of his mother’s stories and the strange noise sent 
Sam running from the house, inattentive to the fact that, during his panic, he dropped the 
lit cigarette, causing a fire that led to the killings.  
 During his trial, Sam does not tell the judge about the cigarette. Instead, Sam 
shares information only about his mother’s stories, which is why the judge questions 
whether or not stories can produce consequences; that is, whether or not the stories are to 
blame for the deaths. As a reader, we can consider the judge’s questions. Yes, the stories 
produced an effect: they caused Sam to visit the house, where he became petrified by a 
noise and, consequently, neglected a burning cigarette as he fled in fright. Because Sam 
was thinking about his mother’s stories precisely when he dropped the cigarette, we can 
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suppose that the stories are, indeed, responsible. But, we can also argue that other 
variables are to blame. We can blame Sam’s mother since she shared the stories and 
struck Sam’s curiosity in the first place. We can blame the cigarette since its flame 
actually caused the fire that led to the deaths. We can blame Sam for making all of the 
events come together. In the courtroom, however, the judge blames Sam, and while 
interested in how the stories influenced Sam’s actions, the judge poses the questions 
purely for philosophical purposes, not for legal ones—the questions are not meant to 
affect the outcome of the trial. 
 Despite their merely illustrative function during the trial, Sam does not consider 
the questions seriously until after he serves his sentence. While eavesdropping one 
afternoon on a conversation at the Book Warehouse, a local bookstore near his parents’ 
home, Sam decides that   
 
books were useful, they could produce a direct effect—of course they could. Why 
else would people read them if they could not? Was it that some books were 
useful and some were not and weren’t doing anyone any good and so why not get 
rid of them? Clearly mother had read the wrong books. But I would not make that 
same mistake. (87) 
 
 
With this declaration, Sam advances several claims about stories: they produce effects, 
good and bad, intended and unintended. Furthermore, a story’s value is determined by its 
usefulness—its ability to produce an effect. When a story is useless, it should be 
discarded.  
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By suggesting that his mother had read the wrong stories, Sam points to a familiar 
human experience: sometimes, the stories we encounter do not help us to make sense of 
our current world; that is, they do not provide useful knowledge for the conditions we 
might face. In these circumstances, we should give up the useless stories in favor of ones 
we can use. Otherwise, we stagnate. These useful stories come to us from a variety of 
sources: obviously books, but they also come from family and cultural lore, official 
documents such as laws and statutes, and even news and other popular media outlets. As 
receivers of these stories, we have a variety from which to choose the ones we find the 
most useful.  
Although Sam’s reflections on stories are speculative and the stories he discusses 
are themselves fictional, I present his realizations here because they articulate, with 
simplicity, a key premise underlying the arguments I develop in this project: stories 
produce consequences. In Sam Pulsifer’s case, his mother’s stories enabled the 
conditions that led to the accidental crimes, and the stories actively influenced the 
material world constructed within the novel. Without his mother’s stories, Sam may have 
never visited the Dickinson house, but because of his curiosity and his desire to know 
whether or not the stories were true, Sam unintentionally committed arson and 
manslaughter, which, in turn, led him to reflect on the relationship between stories and 
consequences in the book he writes for us to read. His mother’s stories, then, proved 
useful, allowing him to write An Arsonist’s Guide.  
 
 
5 
2. The Web of Agency and Consequences 
As a literary example, An Arsonist’s Guide offers a theoretical perspective on 
agency that takes into account the complexity of identifying the “agent” and, 
consequently, the “act.” However, I would modify the judge’s questions in this fashion: 
the question is not, “Can stories act?” Of course they can. The important question, I 
suggest, is “How has a story acted?” We can answer this question only after examining a 
story’s consequences and then considering the process that led to those consequences. 
When we consider Sam’s crime, our backward gaze suggests that, although his mother’s 
stories did have agency, they were not sole agents in the crime. We have to take into 
account, Sam, his mother, the cigarette, the full moon, and even the young couple. All of 
these agents influenced the consequences. In this way, the “agent” of the crime is not 
easily identifiable and is better understood as a nexus of people, events, and chance.  
From this analysis, I derive two important premises for this dissertation: (1) 
stories have agency because their telling produces direct effects/consequences, but (2) 
this agency cannot be located solely within the stories themselves because a number of 
factors, events, and actors enable stories to produce consequences. In this way, agency is 
not a concrete thing to be examined. Instead, it is a nebulous, emergent process that can 
be fully theorized only by its complicated web of actors, an understanding I take from 
organizational theorist Barbara Czarniawska.  
Even though a story has agency because it produces effects, its agency is 
dependent upon the story’s interactions with other agents, both human and non-human. 
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Let us consider a benign example to anchor the reader’s frame of reference. Rhetoric and 
composition (RC) administrators are likely to agree that stories matter. When requesting 
resources for programmatic development, for example, the stories WPAs offer upper-
level administrators influence whether administrators decide to honor or deny WPAs’ 
requests. Typically, WPAs present their case in a similar form: Because of X, my unit 
cannot function optimally; therefore, I need additional resources. (Here’s the situation; 
we can improve it; grant my request.) Obviously, the key variable here is X. If X refers to 
additional staffing in order to cover courses, the extension, more than likely, will be 
granted, whereas if X refers to funding for a staff retreat in an exotic, secluded location, 
the request will most likely not be granted.  
In the case of a WPA requesting additional funding for professional development 
(i.e., a visiting scholar or funding for conferences), however, the outcome is less 
predictable, depending upon the institution’s expectations for faculty performance and 
competence, the institution’s timeline for granting such funding, and institutional 
priorities for writing programs particularly. For example, if an upper-level administrator 
has the flexibility to allocate funding to various academic units for activities such as 
professional development, a WPA will have more success securing funding if the 
administrator values the institution’s writing program(s). Sympathetic to the importance 
of writing on campus, the administrator may allocate the funding with little pause for 
thought. In this instance, the WPA’s story produces a favorable consequence.  
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Of course, unfavorable consequences could occur just as easily if the conditions 
change. An administrator who does not value the institution’s writing program, for 
whatever reason, might not consider the WPA’s request a priority and could thereby deny 
funding, especially if the administrator felt certain that other programs are more lucrative 
to the institution’s success. Or, a university code stating that teaching and service are the 
primary responsibility of full-time faculty could lead upper-level administration to deny 
the request even if they were sympathetic to the WPA’s request.  
Should the administrator grant the request for professional development funding, 
then, the WPA’s success cannot be pinpointed to the story, the administrator, or to the 
WPA. Instead, the story is contingent upon the administrator, WPA, and the university’s 
policies, the latter of which is contingent upon the accrediting body and that upon federal 
guidelines. The consequences—the granting of the funding— emerge from the 
interactions among the WPA’s story, the administrator’s story, the university’s story, the 
accrediting body’s story, and the nation’s story. In the instance where faculty’s primary 
responsibility is teaching and service, as opposed to scholarly development, the WPA’s 
failure to obtain an extension is not the result of university policy alone, even though it 
appears to be upon first glance. Since policies are effective only when they are enacted, 
they cannot be said to have agency aside from the actors who either uphold or go against 
them. In both cases, the “agent” does not exist as a single entity. To speak of “agency,” 
then, proves difficult until we consider the effects of the WPA’s story and work 
backward to identify how they were produced. From there we can generate the web of 
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actors, events, and other variables that led to the administrator’s deliverance of a “yes” or 
“no.”  
I raise this point for an instructive purpose: we can ascribe agency to the WPA’s 
story insofar as the story acts as an agent alongside other agents (i.e., university policy, 
upper-level administration, etc.). Oftentimes rhetorical and philosophical speculations 
about agency (i.e., the ability to act) divorce agents (i.e., those who act) from the 
networks in which they are embedded and fail to take into account the people, conditions, 
and other variables that coordinated the agent’s actions in the first place. A philosophical 
perspective of this kind promotes an unrealistic vision of agency, one that is free from 
social and temporal influences and thus one that is free of context. This project takes a 
different approach by acknowledging foremost that agency—the ability to act—cannot be 
ascribed to one particular actor but to many, all of which are grounded in a particular 
time and place. Put simply, agency is not pre-determined, nor is it self-determined. 
Agency is a consequence of action.  
Now, we may arrive at the conclusion of this project:  
(1) Stories produce consequences.  
(2) In this way, they have agency, but the contextual web in which the stories 
arise limits this agency.   
(3) In addition to agency, stories have value, which is determined by their 
usefulness.  
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(4) Therefore, the stories we believe, circulate, and act upon affect our material 
world; they are useful if they produce favorable consequences. When the 
consequences are not favorable, we should seek new stories.  
3. Narratives and Human Agency 
Keeping in mind that stories, which I will refer to as narratives, do not act in 
isolation, my goal in this dissertation is to develop a limited theory of how narrative 
influences human action. I consider narrative just one of many factors guiding human 
behavior and, thus, one of many sources that allows us to conceptualize human agency. I 
view narrative as a tool we use for making sense of our world and consequently for 
knowing how to act in our world. We create meaning from our experiences through the 
stories we tell ourselves about our lives. In these stories, we often reach for closure; when 
something unexpected happens, we work to make the situation adjust to our previous 
narrative so that we can put our world back together and carry on as normal—however 
we perceive “normal” to be. In this sense, our narratives change so that we can adapt to 
our experiences. This change is usually sparked when narratives no longer prove useful.  
 For example, as a writing teacher, I formulate a way of thinking about 
developmental writers—a narrative based upon research that I believe to be true about 
that particular demographic. These beliefs derive from a variety of sources: from my 
experience as a teacher, from theoretical texts that I have read on basic writing, from the 
guidance I was given by professors who trained me as a teacher, and from the lore that 
circulates about these students.  
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But, if I work with a student who does not exemplify the narratives I believe to be 
true about basic writers, I am placed into a position where my narratives have to change: 
even though most basic writers share X features, this writer is different. Therefore, I 
cannot rely on Y techniques, which have proven useful for other basic writers. Instead, I 
must develop Z techniques so that I am an effective teacher. In other words, I have to 
reformulate my relationship with basic writers, change the stories that I tell myself about 
who they are and how I can help them improve as writers, in order to adapt to the 
teaching moment at hand.  
 The problem is that too many educators deny experience in order to maintain 
grand narratives that have reified over time. This refusal is often rooted in humans’ 
resistance to change, for change unsettles belief. When faced with new experiences, 
changing my story—my narrative—enables me to respond to a situation and to develop 
new beliefs. In order for me to believe something that I consider “true” about basic 
writers, I develop a story to attach to it, a story that provides justification for the belief so 
that the belief makes sense to me. In this way, my beliefs dictate my actions, and I make 
my beliefs useful to myself by crafting narratives to support them. These narratives guide 
my interactions with others as well, and when I dialogue with other writing teachers, I 
compare my narratives with others’ narratives in order to ascertain whether or not we 
share the same beliefs about teaching.  
 These narratives, then, have agency; they influence my actions and produce 
consequences. If the consequences prove useful, in the sense that they help me to act 
 
11 
competently in a given situation, then the narratives are valuable. If they prove useless, 
they must be reformulated so that they have use.  
4. The Narrative Turn and A Story’s Use 
The key terms examined throughout this project—agency, consequences, 
narrative, and story—are familiar to most readers in RC. Story, for example, is obviously 
a fictional literary mode often used synonymously with narrative. Beginning in the late 
1960s, however, rhetorical and critical theorists alike developed an interest in the term 
narrative aside from its strict literary usage. French theorists Roland Barthes and Paul 
Ricoeur extrapolated narrative from the written text to the (not always written) texts of 
everyday life, weakening narrative’s association with literature proper. For many fields, 
this shift is known as the “narrative turn,” and I explore its implications fully in Chapter 
II.   
In the humanities more broadly, historian Hayden White adopted the term 
narrative to describe the actual substance of historical accounts, which influenced 
communication scholar Walter Fisher as he developed an entire schema for human 
communication, termed the “narrative paradigm,” in 1987 (Fisher 62). Cultural theorist 
Jean-François Lyotard simultaneously denounced and defended narrative for its 
epistemological value when he published The Postmodern Condition in 1979. 
Organization theory, which includes disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences, 
began developing narrative methodologies to study organizational behavior in the 1980s, 
a growing body of literature that continues to grow in the twenty-first century. In the mid-
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1990s, postcolonial theory embraced narrative for its analytical value, as it provided a 
way to demonstrate how discourse, both written and spoken, advanced the nation-state. 
Finally, in the twenty-first century, RC scholars recognize the inherent role that narrative 
plays in accounting for writing program administration and, especially, in effecting 
programmatic and institutional change. 
For this dissertation, I use the term narrative in instances where other RC scholars 
choose story. Partially because “to tell a story” means to “to tell a lie” and partially 
because “story” has etymological roots in “history,” I prefer the term narrative because it 
captures its nominal, active, and cognitive implications. As a result, I do not reject 
narrative’s common definitions, the retelling of events and the structure of literary/extra-
literary texts, but I extend narrative’s meaning to include the cognitive structures that 
shape our beliefs. Beyond a literary mode, narrative is a tool we use for making sense of 
our world, and narrative guides our behaviors.  
 We can think about mainstream media in this way, particularly: one of the reasons 
major media outlets are so powerful is because they circulate short, quick narratives 
about events or people, narratives which viewers understand, internalize, and act upon. 
For example, when then Senator Barack Obama ran for president in 2008, the narrative 
pundits circulated was that he was too inexperienced to make foreign policy decisions. 
This narrative, “Obama is inexperienced,” led to a widespread belief that he should not be 
president because he would make uninformed presidential decisions. As conservative 
media outlets repeated this Obama narrative over and over, many voters began to believe 
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that Obama was, indeed, too inexperienced. This belief swayed people’s minds. For 
example, a poll published by the Pew Research Center just three months before the 
election reported that 43% of voters who supported Obama “moderately” were most 
concerned about his “personal abilities” and “experiences,” compared with 32% who 
strongly supported Obama. In both populations of voters, “experience” was undoubtedly 
a concern, despite the fact that only 22 previous presidents had more experience than 
Obama when elected to office (Wilson). In the end, the narrative about Obama’s 
inexperience fell short of causing an effect, as he is now our president; at the same time, 
the narrative persuaded many people to vote for John McCain simply because, in a 
chronological sense, McCain had more “experience.”  
 The above example demonstrates that narratives serve a logical purpose. The 
narrative that “Obama is inexperienced” does not appear to be a narrative because (1) it 
does not recount an event (i.e., tell a story), (2) it does not name a textual genre, and (3) it 
does not appear to be a belief but instead a fact. However, if one agrees with the 
statement “Obama is too inexperienced,” one agrees with the following syllogism:  
 
 Successful presidents have significant foreign policy experience.   
 Senator Obama has very little foreign policy experience. 
 Therefore, Senator Obama will not be a successful president.  
 
 
With the declaration of a simple statement such as “Obama is inexperienced,” 
conservative media outlets created an entire belief system about what makes successful 
and unsuccessful presidents. Even further, voters who believed the narrative during the 
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2008 campaign used it to make their voting decisions. In this way, the narrative offered 
such convincing logic that it influenced voter actions. I refer to this linguistic 
phenomenon as narrative logic, which, for now, the reader should consider the process 
by which people use narratives to make decisions and to justify their beliefs.  
 Journalists make good use of the power of narrative communication (Bird and 
Dardenne 335). It is commonplace to hear reporters discuss “the circulating narratives” 
and even more common to hear reporters argue against news outlets that advance or 
control particular narratives (MSNBC and Fox News come to mind, particularly). For this 
project, I am interested in the logical underbelly of narratives, particularly how they 
reveal insight to people’s beliefs and interpretive processes. I am also concerned with the 
exchange and circulation of narratives, especially those that express syllogistic 
relationships, because they offer, in many cases, shallow lines of reasoning that, when 
believed without reflection, supplant sophisticated and/or well-researched ideas.  
 I firmly believe that, when pushed to consider the narrative logic that guides 
action, people can begin to recognize how their narratives operate and how they 
contribute to decision-making. This contemplation enables us to make conscious 
decisions about which narratives we should believe and which narratives we should give 
up. However, this choice is not always available.  
5. Narrative as an Analytical Framework  
 Narrative logic is a mechanism by which people can be persuaded to make 
decisions, one that provides a framework for analyzing our world. Further, narrative logic 
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is a cognitive process during which we juxtapose various narratives in our minds to 
determine which narrative is ultimately better for our present circumstance. In everyday 
discourse, this process appears natural and intuitive—it is invisible.  
Often, when we are placed into a situation where a decision needs to be made, 
conscious deliberation is unnecessary. In these circumstances, narrative logic acts in the 
place of our conscious deliberation, as we saw in the example above with the WPA’s 
request for additional funding. In fact, often we are aware of narrative logic only in 
processes where we are able to invent narratives of our own or when we see narratives 
break down, and because of this fact, my project investigates narrative of invention and 
change. That is, narratives that must be created in response to unfamiliar situations and 
narratives that must be revised in order to adapt to a set of circumstances.  
 My analysis of narrative focuses on the twenty-first century university. I use for 
my main example the University of North Carolina system. In my experience, almost 
every form of communication in the university takes narrative form. From grades to 
departmental policies, decision-making to student feedback, assessment documents to 
course proposals: universities use narratives to “carry out the daily work of the 
institution” (Linde, “Narrative” 518). For example, as a professor, when I respond to a 
student’s text, I am guided by a series of concurrent narratives: the narratives of my 
discipline, the narratives of the institution, the narratives of the state, and the narratives of 
my personal experiences. These narratives influence the way I structure my feedback, 
conditioning what I write. This process is cognitive.  
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When a student reads this feedback, he is also guided by a series of concurrent 
narratives that affect his interpretation of my feedback. Ideally, our narratives overlap, 
and we communicate effectively. The reality, though, is that, when I write a statement 
such as “Do you need this phrase?” on a student’s paper, he, not understanding that the 
question is a sincere request for consideration, undoubtedly omits the phrase in his future 
draft. Why? Because, when a teacher calls attention to a selection of writing, no matter 
what, the writing must be wrong. In this case, competing narratives result in a student’s 
unnecessary revision.   
 The question, “Do you need this phrase?” relays a particular logic to the student: 
“You do not need this phrase” (despite my original intentions). The student internalizes 
this logic and, most likely, will choose to omit the phrase. This example captures the 
essence of how narrative logic works. Narratives are cognitive structures that mold our 
interpretations, but they have a semiological function because, when presented in speech 
or text, they emit a logical expression, such as “I am asking you if you need this phrase 
because you obviously don’t need this phrase. At the same time, I want you to think the 
decision to change the phrase is yours.” The semiological and cognitive elements of 
narrative are explored in Chapter II because these elements help explain how narratives 
are constructed, who participates in their construction, and how they can be redirected.  
To understand narrative as something that can be redirected is to understand 
narrative as pragmatist. American Pragmatism argues that new, or novel, experiences 
challenge us to confront our beliefs. When we experience something that goes against our 
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beliefs, we have to reform them, based on the experience, and change our approach to 
that experience in the future. This perspective implies that beliefs and experiences are not 
static, but open to revision. We can apply this view to narrative logic: our narratives 
change as our experience changes, and thus our beliefs (which are justified by narrative) 
also change.  
Many people do not view the institution this way, and I understand why. 
Sometimes, institutional change, no matter how hard we fight for it, does not happen. 
Rigid structures stay in place, preventing change. At the same time, institutional 
structures are living, changing entities, just like people. We fall into an educational 
institution’s narrative when we enter it as a student, educator, or administrator. This 
narrative is variegated and textured, with many mini-narratives organizing the 
overarching narrative. The challenge is figuring out how to construct the institution at the 
same time it constructs us. I argue that narrative is our primary means for doing so. A 
pragmatist view of narrative helps us to understand this possibility because central to the 
philosophy is deep-seated belief that, through persistence and commitment, exclusionary 
narratives can be challenged.  
VI. Chapter Summaries 
 The institution as an object of study is ambitious. In order to make my arguments 
tangible, my analysis starts small and then grows. First, I define my terms, examining the 
ways in which postmodern thought anchored narrative as a foundational medium of 
knowledge. From postmodernism, I derive narrative logic. To illuminate its import and 
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application for the twenty-first century, I examine narrative logic alongside American 
pragmatism in order to create a cohesive methodology for institutional participation. I 
term this methodology pragmatist narrative, and I apply it to writing center assessment in 
order to investigate the narrative relationships among an individual institution, its 
academic units, and accreditation standards. This investigation frames an important 
discussion about the interconnections among an individual institution, its smaller 
academic units, and academic disciplinarity—interconnections that, when examined, 
reveal an institution’s fragility and instability. I offer pragmatist narrative as a way to 
isolate this fragility and to recognize possibilities for change.  
 To support my claims, I develop a case study of Appalachian State University, 
focusing on two very different sites of exploration. First, I examine an assessment 
initiative developed by the University Writing Center in order to map out the narratives 
affecting any given academic unit within a university setting. Second, I investigate a 
departmental proposal to relocate a university program from one academic unit to another 
because the proposal captures the confluence of university, departmental, and disciplinary 
narratives that influence decision-making processes. Admitting that I am a former 
employee of the university, these cases are what we might consider “Open 
Ethnographies.” All of the information presented in this dissertation is considered “public 
knowledge,” available for anyone to see. I deliberately chose this approach so that my 
readership can, if prompted to, investigate the issues on its own. In other words, my 
dissertation methodology models the kind of information gathering available to anyone 
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seeking the same questions. In this way, my ethnography attempts to by-pass the typical 
insider-outside dichotomy that plagues most ethnographers, although I realize the 
impossibility of objective observation and assessment.  
 In Chapter II, “Narrative, Logic, and Pragmatism,” I explore the aftermath of the 
postmodern devastation on academic thought at the turn of the century, arguing that 
narrative is the most important development of postmodernism. Although postmodern 
philosophy is devoid of functionality, as its telos provides no guidance on everyday 
interactions, it sutured a credible relationship between narrative and knowledge. 
Expanding these developments through the lens of pragmatism, this chapter develops a 
theory of narrative logic, which I define as a cognitive mechanism that guides our 
everyday actions, telling us how to act. Specifically, I consider narrative logic as a 
descriptive term for understanding how narrative influences our decisions by providing a 
logic or “rule of conduct” for action. Narrative logic is one way we create knowledge 
about the world, others, and ourselves, and we enact narrative logic when we consciously 
select facts/events and put them in narrative form. Narratives serve to justify our beliefs; 
consequently, we make choices as we develop them, choosing some facts over others. In 
this way, the presentation of a narrative reflects our perception and gives it a logical 
structure. It is a means for describing how we discern available choices for action in 
relation to their consequences so that we are actively participating in our world.  
I apply this framework to the university setting in Chapter III, relying on scholars 
from rhetoric and the social sciences. I outline scholars’ contributions to the current 
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debate on institutional narratives and then offer pragmatist narrative as a way to navigate 
and understand the kind of narrative work required by institutional life. I argue that, if 
narrative drives the work of the institution, then narrative is the most transformative tool 
we have for acting in the institution.  
After all, from postmodernism we learn that even seemingly hegemonic narratives 
are coupled with counter-hegemonic narratives. As linguist Charlotte Linde states, 
“hegemonic discourse is rarely if ever successful” (“Narrative in Institutions” 531). I 
explore the relationship between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse in order to 
consider the possible points of entry into institutional narratives. Furthermore, I discuss 
the function of agency as it applies to institutional participation. Drawing on the works of 
C.S. Peirce, Barbara Czarniawska, and Linde, particularly, this chapter focuses on a 
pragmatist narrative approach to agency that teaches us how to act with institutional 
structures so that we understand institutional structures as dynamic processes that 
construct the individual but are also constructed by the individual. To make this leap in 
logic, though, requires a pragmatist approach, à la Peirce, in order to consider when we 
might interact with institutional structures differently.  
 To demonstrate what a narrative understanding of the institution looks like, 
Chapter IV, “The Narrative Logic of Assessment,” explores how the development of an 
assessment plan forces a narrative understanding of institutional relationships, as well as 
disciplinary and national relationships, all of which influence the execution of a simple 
assessment plan. Turning my focus to debates among RC scholars such as Brian Hout, 
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Linda Adler-Kassner, Brent Fabor, Jim Porter, Peggy O’Neill, and Marc Bousquet, I 
argue that writing assessment is significantly responsible for shifting WPAs’ perspectives 
on institutional change from a possibility to a reality. Bousquet, particularly, critiques RC 
for naively assuming that institutional change can occur from a top-down administrative 
model. Rather than agree with Bousquet or disagree with Adler-Kassner and Porter, 
particularly, I offer pragmatist narrative as a way to accomplish institutional change from 
the top-down and bottom-up simultaneously. In others words, narrative offers a 
generative possibility for understanding institutional change, and by studying assessment, 
I show, first, why RC WPAs advocate for institutional change and, second, how this 
change is possible. But, I do not end up on one side of the debate. As a pragmatist, 
ameliorative solutions constitute the telos of debate.  
Using Appalachian State’s University Writing Center’s assessment plan to show 
where these changes are possible, I offer a conceptual map of the narratives at work 
within the institution. Appalachian is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges 
and School (SACS), which requires universities in the University of North Carolina 
system to develop strategic and assessment plans. In addition, all individual academic 
units on campus must develop their own plans, and these must align with the overall 
plans of the university. SACS’ initiatives were influenced by the Spellings Commission’s 
final report from 2006. The intricate web of mandates, regulations, and requirements, all 
in an effort to promote university transparency, crafts a complicated web of relationships. 
To me, these relationships are best understood as narratives, and I articulate the narrative 
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logic of Appalachian State through the lens of assessment. My intention is to re-direct the 
major arguments that many in RC have begun in order to focus our understanding of 
institutional change.  
 Chapter V, “The Narrative Logic of Institutional Change,” moves from a 
particular university initiative on assessment to the university organizational structure of 
academic units. My primary concern in this chapter is to develop a cohesive perspective 
on how change becomes possible with in the university. Focusing on Appalachian State’s 
Composition Program’s initiative to re-locate from the English Department to University 
College, a structure that houses academic support services and inter-disciplinary 
programs, I investigate the role of narrative logic, creating a typology of the narratives 
that emerged from the institutional game of change. For example, narratives of history, 
resistance, procedure, and disciplinarity came into play when Appalachian State’s 
English Department debated the change. These kinds of narratives are important to 
anticipate if one wants to actively engage in institutional debate because they influence 
people’s perspectives, as well as their tendency to agree or disagree with particular 
initiatives. Analyzing the seventy-page report released by the Rhetoric and Composition 
Task Force in 2010, I develop a schema for understanding the narrative logic of 
institutional change.  
 Of course, once the narratives are laid out, and once the analytical framework is 
constructed, like a good researcher, I must begin the process of deconstruction. If 
narratives are extractable—able to be analyzed—when do they misbehave? In other 
 
23 
words, how do narratives exceed the limits of conceptualization? This question is taken in 
the conclusion “Understanding What Narratives (Un)Do.” Pragmatist narrative, as I 
develop it, provides a different way to think about the interpretive nature of policies and 
law, which, upon first glance, seem nonnegotiable. Because laws are typically understood 
as “concrete,” we have seen over and over again how they can be manipulated for one’s 
own purposes. Given the means through which narrative is used to legitimate laws and 
other forms of discourse, as we see in our standards-based accountability systems in 
education, there is much work to be done. Through narrative, institutions have the power 
to control public perceptions of its work through the dissemination of narratives that 
serve, on the one hand, as external signifiers supporting the structure’s mission and also 
serve, on the other hand, as empty referents. The ability of institutions to hide the 
emptiness behind these narratives rests in the institution’s ability to mask the fact that the 
narratives are only narratives, not transcendental truths or accurate experiential 
observations. In other words, a structural hermeneutic posits itself; narratives both 
“conceal” and “do,” and they garner legitimacy if they are believed. I call this process 
discursive legitimacy, which captures the direction in which I would like my project to 
go. I rely on Jean-François Lyotard to make this claim and offer directions for future 
research.  
For now, let us keep in mind that narrative is a cognitive tool for granting 
significance to our world. When we make meaning, we craft stories. Every time we 
engage with new situations or learn new information, we add more details to our stories. 
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If the information does not fit in with our existing story, we must either reject it or 
reframe our original story to make space for the new information. This process is 
narrative logic. When we externalize our stories to others, our narratives convey a 
particular kind of logic—a web of associations—and this logic guides our actions and 
interactions in the world. As a result, the narratives we believe matter. They influence 
material conditions.  
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CHAPTER II 
NARRATIVE, LOGIC, AND PRAGMATISM 
 
Narrative organization is causal; in narrative accounts it is not only sequence that is 
important but, crucially, consequence. Indeed, causality is what distinguishes a plot from 
a mere story. –Haridimos Tsoukas and Mary Jo Hatch, “Complex Thinking, Complex 
Practice” (1001) 
 
The stories (or narratives) that circulate among writing instructors ... often emanate from 
different interpretations, different frames, than those circulating outside the field.  
   Furthermore—and probably most importantly—these stories have consequences.  
–Lisa Adler-Kassner, The Activist WPA (18) 
 
 Derived from the Latin word gnārus “knowing” and most commonly defined as to 
“give an account of,” narrative is a critical term that has attracted scholarly consideration 
from disciplines in both the sciences and the humanities (Ayto 360). The term’s trajectory 
is anything but linear. Different fields at different times have appropriated, 
re-appropriated, or reinvented the concept of narrative, sometimes advancing new ideas 
and sometimes repeating old ones. As a result, mapping narrative’s history either as an 
object of study or as an epistemological framework forces scholars to recognize its 
trans-temporal dimensions and to resist confining it to one school of thought. For this 
project, it is precisely narrative’s service to multiple fields that underscores its value as a 
site of critical inquiry. Narrative is a literary mode in English studies, a means for identity 
construction in psychology and linguistics, an organizational structure in management 
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theory, a cognitive process in communication studies, an analytical framework in history, 
a political tactic in postcolonial studies, a mechanism of ideology in postmodern theory, 
and, most profoundly, an essential quality of human constitution in philosophy.1 In short, 
narrative is endemic to most academic disciplines. 
 In the second half of the twentieth century, particularly, the scope of narrative’s 
focus expanded uncontrollably, leading French theorist Roland Barthes to claim in 1966 
that narrative “is present at all times, in all places, in all societies” (237). For Barthes, 
narrative is a historical underpinning of human development, and “[l]ike life itself, it is 
there....” Upon first glance, Barthes’ assertion demands a furrowed brow: if narrative is as 
natural as life itself, then it is not a product of humanity but an ontological given: “In the 
beginning, there was narrative.” As such, narrative achieves the platitude of familiar 
terms like being, language, communication, or even oxygen, all of which most people 
would say, with conviction, are existentially verifiable. Furrowed brow aside, I think 
Barthes’ argument is also dead-on, for narrative is as intrinsic to human communication 
as communication is to thought as thought is to consciousness, and as consciousness is to 
evolutionary life. My objection to Barthes’ grand statement is not the dispute of 
narrative’s centrality to human organization as much as it the simplification of narrative 
as everywhere. Such a move casts narrative as an imprecise term. If narrative is 
everywhere, it is nowhere. We are always located within a story, a collection of events, 
people, and temporal locations; however, we selectively construct narratives to give 
meaning to our experiences. We also interpret others’ narratives. In this way, narrative is 
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not just “there” in the world waiting to be found. Instead, narrative is both an ends and a 
means for cognition; as a result, narrative requires an agent.  
 I raise this point to demonstrate how we, as critics, tend to over-apply our 
concepts to a point where discerning what they are becomes impossible. My project 
seems to be on the same path, as I make claims about narrative that are particular and 
universal, historical and a-historical, temporal and a-temporal, unique and everyday. My 
theses, however, are very simple. Narrative is a form of knowledge through which 
humans make sense of the world; narrative guides our everyday actions. It has a logical 
structure, defined later as narrative logic, which is the use of narrative to justify beliefs; 
and finally, it is a tool for understanding our communication with others.  
For writing program administrators (WPAs), narrative is a vehicle for articulating 
a program’s history, defining its development, and recognizing its potential for growth. 
Narrative is also the most powerful tool WPAs have to share their lived experiences with 
their peers. As a principle mode for rhetoric and composition (RC) scholars, narrative 
enables WPAs to participate in shaping the discipline’s future and to rethink its history.2 
Because RC’s origins are dependent upon whose perspective one considers, be it 
Aristotle’s, Gerald Graff’s, or Louise Wetherbee Phelps’, metadiscourse on narratives 
and counter-narratives innervates the field, stimulating scholarly desire for disciplinary 
identification. Working beside and against narratives of disciplinary identification are 
institutional narratives, which contextualize writing programs and steep WPAs in a 
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particular institution’s values. The narratives influencing WPAs, as a result, are within 
and beyond the institution.   
How to ascertain and synthesize these narratives, however, is rarely a key 
emphasis in RC graduate programs that serve to introduce and indoctrinate PhDs into the 
academic club. This study attempts to correct this problem. I explore how narrative 
provides insight into the way we engage with institutions because narrative develops a 
useful lens for navigating the intricacies of institutional relations among individual 
academic units and among units within the university at large. This chapter draws 
connections between narrative and logic by connecting classical rhetoric with postmodern 
rhetoric. My intention is to develop a richer theory of narrative-as-knowing by first 
explaining narrative’s logical function and then by demonstrating how postmodernism 
created the possibility for my concept of narrative logic. Though postmodernism 
presented a specific set of problems with regard to agency and epistemology, it cultured a 
landscape for narrative to thrive. After observing narrative in a postmodern context, I 
argue for narrative logic as a necessary tool for understanding institutional engagement.  
1. The Case for Narrative Logic 
Narrative originates in classical rhetoric through the work of Corax of Syracuse, 
who developed the first taxonomical approach to rhetoric within a legal context (Corbett 
and Connors 492). Concerned with the ability of ordinary citizens to plead their cases in 
court, Corax set the stage for Cicero’s later identification of six parts of a compelling 
defense: exordium (introduction), narratio (retelling of events), divisio (outline), 
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confirmatio (logical arguments), confutatio (refutation), and conclusio (conclusion). This 
taxonomy influenced rhetoricians, including his student Quintilian, who deemed narratio 
“the most important department of rhetoric in actual practice” (2.1.10). Because narratio 
prepares an audience for the presentation of logical proofs and delimits which arguments 
are possible, effective orators must be skilled in its delivery.  
 For Quintilian, narratio and confirmatio are inseparable; one depends upon the 
other, with the varying degree located in the actual order of presentation. In The Institutio 
of Oratoria, Quintilian asks the reader, “[W]hat difference is there between a proof and a 
statement of facts save that the latter is a proof put forward in continuous form, while a 
proof is a verification of the facts as put forward in the statement?” (4.2.79). In this 
formulation, narratio and proof cohere in the process of persuasion. Proof confirms 
narratio, at the same time narratio conditions proof. The two depend upon each other. As 
rhetorical theorist John D. O’Banion asserts, Quintilian viewed narratio and proof as “two 
modes of instruction”:  
 
Proof was the “congruent” or logical version of the narratio, and narratio was the 
“continuous” or narratival version of the proposition (to be defended in the proof). 
Narratio was one’s case proffered in the form of a story, a continuous form that 
emphasized the sequence of events constituting the case; confirmado or probado 
was one’s case proffered in the form of logically organized facts, a series of 
coherent “proofs” that emphasized the logical implications more or less embedded 
in the narratio. (328) 
 
The distinction in this quotation between narratio and proof lies in the function of each. 
Narratio is inherently logical in the sense that it presents a series of events as a 
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continuous story for a particular reason. The logical proofs that follow narratio allow for 
the congruency of the narratio—the proofs serve as justification for the presentation of 
events. The converse is also true: logical proofs, when paired with a narrative series of 
events, are granted continuity. Proofs are given a context in which they can be rendered 
logical. Without a narrative structure present, proofs are simply a collection of arguments 
disconnected from time and space. Narrative provides the means through which logic 
assumes purpose (O’Banian 351).  
 This view, combined with the term’s etymological history, grants narrative 
epistemological value. To narrate is to present our understanding of the world through the 
recounting of events, either to ourselves or to an audience. This process, while appearing 
utterly subjective to the individual, is bound to logic, in the sense that a series of logical 
proofs, which we make explicit or not, serves as a basis for our narrative constructions. 
As Quintilian makes clear, narrative sets the conditions for which arguments are or are 
not possible in the courtroom—that is, for what we can or cannot prove. A lawyer cannot 
develop arguments outside of the facts presented to the court; if so, she runs the risk of 
committing a rhetorical fallacy, petitio prinicipii. With this in mind, the presentation of 
narrative serves a logical function. If narrative conditions the possible interpretations that 
follow from it, it simultaneously expresses the logic that allowed its presentation in the 
first place. As rhetorical critic Martin Kreiswirth argues, “[n]arrative … is both 
presentation and [the] presented,” in the sense that narrative is the telling of events as 
well as the actual event as told (303). To examine narrative as told is to examine the 
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mental frameworks that construct the narrative’s telling—to discern the narrative’s logic. 
Communication scholar John Rodden develops a “logic of narrative” to highlight the 
connection between narrative and logic. Rodden distinguishes grammar, meaning “right 
order,” from logic, meaning “right order with significance” (150). From this perspective, 
logic underpins narrative because the speaker deliberately selects facts and presents them. 
By examining the facts presented in a narrative, the audience gains insight to the 
frameworks shaping a narrative’s development—that is, to the speaker’s view of 
significance with regard to the arrangement of events.  
For example, if I were to recount the story of how RC emerged as a discipline, I 
have several options. First, I could begin with an origin story: Rhetoric was first theorized 
in Ancient Greece, most notably by Plato, Isocrates, Gorgias, and Aristotle. Then, I could 
detail the evolution of the field: Throughout the Middle Ages, rhetoric served an 
important function for understanding the persuasive power of biblical texts, which was 
challenged during the Renaissance. Throughout the Enlightenment, rhetoric’s 
importance waned in the face of poetics, but its importance was reified in the eighteenth 
century by Hugh Blair and George Campbell, who renewed rhetoric’s connection with 
Ancient Greek philosophy and added a psychological component to rhetoric’s persuasive 
power. Blair and Campbell’s theories influenced the development of rhetoric in the US, 
which begin in 1806 when Harvard created the first chair of Rhetoric and Oratory. The 
underlying logic in this explanation reveals a great deal of information about my view of 
rhetoric’s disciplinary origins. By focusing on the lineage solely, I align the 
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contemporary field of RC directly with Ancient Greece, indicating that RC today is a 
seemingly natural evolution of rhetoric as Greek philosophers theorized it. However, I 
could tell the story in another way and reveal a different view of RC’s disciplinary origin. 
For example, I could begin with the actual development of RC proper in the United 
States: Rhetoric and composition as a discipline emerged from literary studies in the 
1950s after the first Conference on College Composition and Communication was held in 
1949 in an effort to meet the demands of changing student demographics that resulted 
from the GI Bill. Throughout the 60s and 70s, many literary scholars turned their 
attention away from poetics to student writers/texts, a trend that continued well into the 
80s and 90s, during which degree programs for RC were developed. In this version, 
lineage is still present, but it is attached to literary studies, as opposed to Ancient Greece. 
Further, the story, as it is constructed, reveals a different logical progression: RC is a very 
new field that is devoted to the study of student writers and was developed from the study 
of literature. The way I explain the origin of RC determines how my narrative may be 
interpreted and also reveals my own sense of rhetoric’s disciplinary origins. 
 In each of these accounts, the telling of the story reveals the logical progression I 
attribute to rhetoric’s development. In the first instance, I link rhetoric to a reputable 
lineage that garners institutional authority and respect. After all, although Plato is often 
contested, his authority as a philosopher remains unchallenged. In the second instance, I 
divorce RC from its ancient roots, positing the field as a new development. The way I tell 
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the story of RC, then, reflects my disciplinary understanding of the field. In the act of 
telling the story, I reveal the logic that led me to draw a conclusion.   
By relating this history to an audience, I offer a glimpse into the logical processes 
that shape my understanding of it. To be sure, audience largely determines how I relate 
the history, but through the act of telling of the narrative, I assemble a logical formation 
that dictates my telling. I do not simply string together the exact details of rhetoric as a 
concept; instead, I select the key details that support my logical assumptions in order to 
direct my audience’s interpretation. The selection of names and facts in each case, 
however, changes the narrative entirely. Even though I present a similar format in both 
versions—how RC was developed in the US—I end up telling two very different 
narratives.  
For an audience, the retelling of history offers the same logical exercise as it does 
for the speaker. As an audience listens to an interlocutor’s narrative, it faces the 
opportunity to be persuaded. For example, in the first instance, when I link contemporary 
RC to Ancient Greece, my interlocutor has the opportunity to reconsider her view of both 
contemporary rhetoric and classical rhetoric. If she found my narration enlightening and 
did not realize that contemporary rhetoric has its roots in Ancient Greece, she is able to 
reconstruct her own narrative understanding of rhetoric’s history, and, based on the 
presentation of new information, she could revise her understanding of the field. If my 
interlocutor found my narration credible, she would be able to conclude that 
contemporary rhetoric is, indeed, a viable field of study that should continue to have 
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influence on college curricula. In this process, my interlocutor is internalizing my 
narrative, reconciling my logical understanding with her own, and so expanding her 
overall understanding of her field, her teaching, etc. The second instance works the same 
way: my interlocutor has the opportunity to compare my narrative with her own narrative 
construction of RC. Thus, in the telling of the narrative, she is given the chance to 
reconcile my particular narrative account with her developed narrative account, which 
allows her the opportunity to construct a new way of knowing. In this way, my narrative 
affects hers, and together, we determine the effects my logical construction of RC’s 
history has on each of our understandings of the field. If I did not tell the narrative, my 
interlocutor would not have the opportunity to revise her narrative. Her narrative revision 
is contingent upon my telling of the event.  
Of course, events are not always narrated to an audience. Sometimes, we choose 
not to share our experiences with others. Sometimes our experiences, especially those 
that occur in isolation, do not prompt us to verbalize them. This scenario happens often, 
especially because we do not have the privilege of sharing our experiences all of the time. 
To relate a different example, imagine that, every semester, I assign students a rhetorical 
analysis paper. During this unit, I always teach students the rhetorical triangle, Aristotle’s 
appeals, and Burke’s pentad. Every semester, students learn the information, choose a 
relevant text, and draft papers. Some students exceed my expectations, while others do 
not attempt to reach them. The typical spread for grade assignation ends up following a 
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bell curve. As an instructor, I take note of the curve and plan my future classes 
accordingly, since my results are consistent.  
Now, during one particular semester, for a reason I do not know, a majority of my 
students fail the rhetorical analysis paper. When this happens, I make assumptions: I did 
not teach the concepts well; my expectations were too high; students struggled to find 
good texts. I decide on a tentative solution: I did not teach the concepts well. I make this 
decision because I am convinced that the anomaly is my teaching, rather than the 
students. Because students have consistently received grades according to a bell curve in 
the past, the problem must be my methods. In this formulation, I draw logical 
conclusions, and I develop a narrative account in my head of what caused my students to 
perform poorly on the rhetorical analysis assignment. I choose the account that seems 
most probable, and I base it on the way I relate my previous experiences of teaching to 
myself so that I have some kind of understanding of why my students failed during this 
particular semester.  
If the next semester arrives and I have changed my teaching style but my students 
still fail, my narrative will change again: My students are not putting forth the appropriate 
effort to complete the assignment competently. When I consider this option, I develop a 
new way of thinking about my students, one that focuses on their performance, as 
opposed to my teaching. As a result, I change the narrative account of the assignment and 
develop a logical understanding of students’ failure. I give the anomaly a narrative. I 
explore this process more thoroughly in a later section and demonstrate that we are 
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motivated to fill in narrative gaps when our expectations are disrupted, a process 
pragmatist C.S. Peirce describes as the “irritation of doubt” (“Fixation” 16). I do this 
because, as William James makes clear in Principles of Psychology, I actively desire to 
fit the students’ performance into a logical schema so that I no longer have to consider it 
(“Habit” 62). That is, I do one of two things: I become irritated by the failure and thus 
give it a story or I give it a story to avoid irritation so that I can continue with business as 
usual, so to speak. These mental processes underlie our everyday interactions.  
The narrative above is not fictional, though it appears to be. Instead, it is a 
transitory formulation of causality. When I determine this causality, however 
inaccurately, I am engaging in the process of cohering narrative with logic. I see the 
events; I make them logical. The logic, however, comes after the fact, with the sequence 
of events determining the logical possibilities. In this example, I utilize narrative as a 
means of knowing, and my narrative is supported by causal logic. But, I do not need to 
share this narrative with an audience in order for it to occur. It is perfectly fine for me to 
withhold it from others, without discounting the actual process I engaged in to create it. 
In this way, I am suggesting that the relationship between narrative and logic does not 
necessarily depend upon a verbal/written moment. Instead, the coherence of narrative and 
logic occurs regardless of whether we share it with others. It is a mental process we use to 
make sense of our world and others. It is a way of knowing, and in order to know, we 
have to have a reason for believing we know. Logic helps formulate these reasons 
because it generates the connections, causalities, anomalies, and disconnections that 
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allow us to transform a sequence of events into a sequence of events that have structure, 
significance, and continuity—that is, into a narrative.  
To return to Quintilian: if logic and narrative are inter-dependent faculties that 
condition one another, it is fair to postulate that, where there is narrative, there is also 
logic (and vice versa). Taken further, if narrative is a way to make sense of the world, and 
if we utilize logic as we create narratives, then the separation of narrative and logic as 
two distinct processes reveals a misconception about the relationships among narrative, 
knowledge, and logic. One way we understand our world is through narrative. Narrative 
has an inherent logic; logic is made explicit through narrative. In this way, we operate 
according to narrative logic, a term I will develop more fully in the next section. 
Narrative logic is means for creating knowledge about the world, others, and ourselves, 
and we enact narrative logic through the conscious selection of facts/events in the 
narrative process. These narratives, then, serve to justify our beliefs, and consequently we 
make choices as we develop them, choosing some facts over others. In this way, the 
presentation of a narrative reflects our perception and gives it force.  
2. Postmodernism’s Influence on Narrative 
As rampant as rhetoric, narrative has carved out a space in almost every 
discipline, sometimes rejected, sometimes embraced, sometimes abused, and sometimes 
glorified. Yet even though narrative is endemic to all academic fields, it is considered a 
lesser form of knowing. Partially because of its association with literary fiction and 
partially because of its subjective qualities, some scholars raise objections to narrative’s 
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capabilities for producing knowledge (Czarniawska, A Narrative Approach 7; Kreiswirth 
312). As philosopher and narrative proponent David Carr writes, for some, “[Narrative] 
leaves too many questions open,” providing explanations that are temporary, at best, and 
empirically unverifiable (23). In contrast, scientific knowledge assumes objectivity and 
provides empirical means for explaining processes (Lyotard xxiii; Fisher 244-245).  
Scholars’ tendency to view the two as divergent paradigms with opposing 
agendas stems from the misconception that narrative is fiction and scientific knowledge is 
truth. The development of narratology in the sixties and seventies set the groundwork for 
this perspective, as the field confined the study of narrative to the formal features that 
shape a fictional text. Narrative as an analytical tool for disciplines outside of literary 
criticism or for texts that are narratives in the non-literary sense has been a recent 
development in the fields of management theory, historical studies, and the social 
sciences broadly (Rimmon-Kenan 13; Kreiswirth 312). The relationship between 
narrative and knowing, then, is worth exploring, as it has prompted academic inquiry to 
operate according to a false binary whose mediation has been a slow progression.  
Psychologist Jerome Bruner fully articulates the relationship between narrative-
as-subjective and science-as-objective in Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (1986). In this 
work, Bruner positions logico-scientific knowledge and narrative knowledge as two 
modes of thought that are not mutually exclusive. For Bruner, logico-scientific 
knowledge “attempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of description 
and explanation” (12). In other words, formal processes that are empirically verifiable 
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and testable characterize logico-scientific knowledge. Narrative knowledge, however, is 
an imaginative process that grounds the particular without elevating them to universal 
status (13). Narrative knowledge is not a means for applying “principled hypotheses” to 
observable experience; instead, it is a means for describing human intention and action 
through “good stories, gripping drama, believable…historical accounts” (13). Bruner 
argues that in narrative hypotheses are still tested, but the end goal is believability, not 
empirical verification (14). From this perspective, narrative serves a vital function in 
knowledge production, and Bruner focuses specifically on quantum physics as a site 
where logico-scientific knowledge is complemented by narrative knowledge. As a result, 
the binary collapses.  
Bruner’s work makes a significant contribution to the narrative debate, but he 
does not articulate fully how both narrative knowing and logico-scientific knowing come 
together in the knowledge-making process. In order to accept his claims, we must 
contextualize the larger problem of narrative by turning our gaze back to the advent of 
the postmodern scene in which narrative took center stage in debates about the sciences, 
social sciences, and humanities. Postmodern perspectives in the 1970s and 1980s recast 
knowledge as transitory at best, and combined with a scathing critique of capitalism and 
knowledge dissemination, the turn to narrative offered scholars a new (but old) way to 
confront the limits of modernist thinking. Two primary influences of this shift are French 
philosopher Jean-François Lyotard and American theorist Thomas S. Kuhn, both of 
whom questioned the assumed objectivity of scientific discourse and its linear 
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development. Though neither writer advanced narrative as a form of knowledge to 
replace scientific knowledge, their works prompted theorists to investigate new 
understandings of how knowledge is formulated; narrative provided a vital framework for 
doing so.   
 Lyotard’s seminal text The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 
(1979) challenged academic perspectives on scientific discourse, as well as the 
relationship between narrative and knowledge. Disavowing the Enlightenment roots of 
modernist thinking, Lyotard took science to task, arguing that science is not a total 
system because it relies on the work of philosophy or history; seemingly objective, 
science depends on narrative to do its work (29). For Lyotard, modern science, “in 
conflict with narratives,” utilizes a metadiscourse of “grand narratives” to legitimate its 
own usefulness (xxiii). Citing the “dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the 
emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth” as examples of 
grand narratives that warrant scientific discourse, Lyotard argues that science appears to 
be an objective form of knowledge because it aligns with socially acceptable ideological 
narratives that support its development rather than call into question its legitimacy.  
 Put this way, Lyotard’s work both departs from and contributes to Thomas 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). For Kuhn, the development of 
science has not been a linear quest with instrumental implications for knowledge. Instead, 
Kuhn argues that changes in scientific development occur when anomalies “subvert the 
existing tradition of scientific practice” (6). These anomalies shift “professional 
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commitments” and restructure the conception of prior facts, sometimes allowing for an 
entire scientific revolution in which pre-existing paradigms are reformulated to respond 
to new data, similar to Peirce’s “irritation.” Because scientific communities are organized 
according to a set of “received beliefs,” shifts in paradigms reflect a break in consensus 
among communities (4). These breaks, for Kuhn, are necessary, and he cites the 
transition from Newtonian to Einsteinium mechanics as an example of how paradigm 
shifts actually advance a new “world view” through which the world must be 
reinterpreted (102). In this way, science gains authority through consensus, which shifts 
according to scientific discoveries and their ability to displace or replace prior 
knowledge.  
 This view of scientific knowledge helps contextualize Lyotard’s work. The legacy 
of science itself has it own grand narrative: traditionally, science is a totalizing system 
that advances true knowledge on the basis of fact, observation, and discovery. However, 
Kuhn’s discussion of paradigm loosens science from its own grand narrative; in his 
configuration, science is authorized on the basis of consensus by a group of individual 
scientists who ascribe to the same set of received beliefs, and these beliefs are open to 
change when new paradigms challenge previous assumptions and offer a different set of 
facts from which to develop new interpretations. Lyotard’s claim that “[s]cientific 
knowledge is a kind of discourse” supports Kuhn’s work because it aligns scientific 
communities with other academic communities that are equipped with their own 
investigative rules, linguistic expression, and shared values. In his 1969 postscript to The 
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Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn leaves the reader with a final thought: 
“Scientific knowledge, like language, is intrinsically the common property of a group or 
else nothing at all. To understand it we shall need to know the special characteristics of 
the groups that create and use it” (210). By connecting scientific truth with practice and 
by focusing on the ways in which received beliefs condition scientific consensus, Kuhn’s 
work exposes the relativity of scientific knowledge to its practitioners and, in the process, 
questions how beliefs are formed and legitimated.  
 On a similar path, Lyotard argues that the linear nature of scientific progression is 
fallacious, and he contrasts scientific knowledge with narrative: “scientific knowledge 
does not represent the totality of knowledge; it has always existed in addition to, and in 
competition and conflict with … narrative” (7). The conflict rests in the fact that narrative 
and science are typically viewed as unrelated entities, but Lyotard advances narrative as a 
form of “customary knowledge” that legitimizes scientific knowledge (19). The 
inseparability of the two is evident, as narrative provides the means for scientific 
knowledge to be intelligible. Expanding the definition of narrative from a literary text to 
a social mindset or “story” that justifies beliefs about institutions, Lyotard offers the 
following definition: “Narratives … determine criteria of competence and/or illustrate 
how they are to be applied. They thus define what has the right to be said and done in the 
culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, they are 
legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do” (23). In other words, narratives 
are stories that organize human behavior. They are social and ideological, and they 
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determine our beliefs about the world. In addition, they serve to legitimate knowledge, 
scientific or other, by providing a framework in which ideas make sense. When 
anomalies occur, new narratives are needed, a process he calls paralogy.  
 To demonstrate what Lyotard means, consider a classroom example. A couple of 
years ago, I taught a composition course on identity that explored the relationship 
between self and society. I assigned an excerpt from The Postmodern Condition in order 
to provide the opportunity for the class to investigate how social narratives influence their 
actions. To illustrate narrative, I asked my students to perform tasks that, upon first 
glance, did not seem related to narrative at all. I asked the students who did not complete 
the assigned reading to write a response on why they chose not to complete the reading. I 
asked the students who did read but failed to bring their reading to class to write the 
sentence “I will always come to class with a pen/pencil, paper, and the assigned reading.” 
I asked the students who completed the reading to circle every word in Lyotard’s essay 
that had implications for education. Then, I exited the classroom for ten minutes while 
students completed the assignments.  
 When I returned, I asked them a simple question: Why did you perform the tasks I 
asked you to perform? From this conversation, we generated over 25 different narratives 
that prompted students’ actions, and we divided the narratives into three sub-categories 
relating to the broader university, the teacher, and the student. The most obvious 
narratives students identified were “teachers are authorities,” and as such, “students must 
do what teachers say.” Even though the assignment appeared to have no pedagogical 
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value whatsoever, students still performed, regardless of their personal ideas about the 
assignment’s purpose. This activity demonstrated for my class that narratives do, in fact, 
influence our actions, regardless of whether we are conscious of them. Though students 
might have been skeptical of what I asked, they still completed the tasks, and they 
acquiesced to the educational narratives that demand their participation.  
 Now, if a student chose not to participate in the activity and, instead, walked out 
of the classroom (which did not happen), the student would be exercising the right to 
deviate from the educational narratives that naturalize his/her behavior, which would 
have illustrated Lyotard’s critique of grand narratives. For Lyotard, the postmodern is 
defined by its “incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv). By protesting the activity, the 
student who chose to walk out of the classroom would exemplify the postmodern by 
deliberately choosing not to participate in the narratives justifying normative behavior. 
That is, the student would be exercising what neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty defines as 
“abnormal discourse,” a deliberate response that challenges agreed-upon conventions of a 
particular community, in this case, an educational community that values the teacher-
student hierarchy (Philosophy 11).  
Because grand narratives organize individual cultures by providing a 
commonsensical framework for acting within them, they legitimate actions and produce 
an influence so widespread that narratives are almost unrecognizable. The shift of the 
1960s and 1970s, however, revealed for Lyotard that the perceived seamlessness of grand 
narratives deserved a closer look. The Postmodern Condition decried the grand narrative 
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only to replace it with petit récit, or little narratives (60). To make this case, Lyotard 
employs the term language games, borrowed from philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, to 
describe the level at which local communities form beliefs, which is similar to Kuhn’s 
description of scientists’ “professional commitments” and Rorty’s appropriation “normal 
discourse.” 
Language games are best understood with regard to discourse communities; 
within a particular discourse, agreed-upon rules organize the kind of language employed, 
the types of arguments possible, and the conditions of language use. In Lyotard’s view, 
little narratives mimic the structure of language games. The postmodern tendency to 
replace grand narratives with little narratives fulfills the quest for what Lyotard terms 
paralogy, which he sees as the postmodernist method of inquiry that responds to 
anomalies or fissures within grand narratives (60). To legitimate knowledge by paralogy 
is to understand the proliferation of language games and to honor their diversity, which 
Lyotard believes sets the groundwork for “a politics that would respect both the desire for 
justice and the desire for the unknown” (67). The quest for knowledge, according to a 
paralogical telos, would prove “inexhaustible,” calling for an outpour of little narratives. 
The goal of inquiry, then, is never knowledge proper but transitory knowledge, via little 
narratives, that is open to change, given the right circumstances.  
 The influence of Lyotard’s work cannot be overstated, and his landmark text led 
to the paralogy he advocated, though with consequences. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
postmodern theory became a field of inquiry and preoccupied academics in philosophy, 
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history, literary studies, architecture, sociology, education, and others. Drawing on the 
works of Lyotard, Louis Althusser, and Frederic Jameson, particularly, postmodernists 
challenged the quest for ultimate truth, the legitimacy of grand narratives, and the unity 
of identity. Turning attention to multifarious truths, local narratives, and fractured 
identities, postmodern theorists strove to account for epistemological complexities and to 
understand meaning and identity formation within socially contingent contexts. The 
postmodern ethos was exciting, as it opened door after door for critical exploration. The 
“narrative of [fill in the blank]” infiltrated scholarly publications and provided a new 
means for understanding old concepts. However, behind each postmodern door, the 
theorist was met with yet another form of critique: the “infinite critique” of 
postmodernism depleted its usefulness.  
 In practice, the philosophy led to a form of philosophical and linguistic nihilism, 
although unintentionally. Two major figures, Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, provided 
influential critique on the indeterminacy of context, but their ideas produced overzealous 
conclusions. To begin, Derrida argues in Margins of Philosophy that “context is never 
absolutely determinable” and provides a useful critique of J.L. Austin’s speech act theory 
(310). In How to Do Things with Words, Austin concludes that utterances (words that 
produce actions such as “I do”) perform (do something) within a context (a specific time 
and place such as a church at three o’clock). When utterances produce unintended results, 
we can recover the “total speech act” to determine why problems occurred, although 
Austin admits the approach is “piecemeal” (52). Derrida rejects “the total speech act” and 
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uses writing as an example to demonstrate that “total speech acts” are not recoverable. In 
addition, he asserts that an utterance can be “cut off … from its original … context” 
(320). For example, if a friend asked me if I wanted to go the movies, and I responded 
with “I do,” she knows that I am not saying, “I will marry you.” Thus, the utterance 
assumes a new context and breaks with its conventional one. This possibility leads 
Derrida to conclude that Austin is wrong to argue that words assume meaning within a 
particular context because the “infinity of new contexts … is absolutely illimitable.” As 
such, an utterance is not constrained by its context; an inevitable break will occur. 
Similarly, context itself is indeterminate and leads to further “contextualization,” as 
Judith Butler argues (Excitable 148). 
 Butler problematizes Derrida in Excitable Speech. She argues that Derrida’s 
account of context does not provide an account of the “social iterability of the utterance” 
because he dehistoricizes context (150). While Butler agrees that utterances break from 
the past when they enter new contexts, she goes a step further by examining injurious 
speech, suggesting that hate speech, when directed at someone, produces bodily effects. 
Racial slurs, for example, “live and thrive in … the flesh of the addressee” and these slurs 
“accumulate over time,” creating a “sedimented history” (159). By opposing the 
sedimented history of hate speech, addressees create moments for the utterances to break 
from the past, but this break relies on the history to change the future. In other words, 
derogatory names affect people bodily; coming to terms with the social stigma that 
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produces injury, people have the opportunity to re-appropriate the terms so they are no 
longer injured by them.  
In Gender Trouble, Butler explains how this is so. Advancing the notion that both 
gender and sex are linguistic constructions, rather than pre-discursive phenomena, she 
maintains that “it is only within the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of 
identity becomes possible” (185). Subversion of gender constructions (i.e., the 
dismantling of ideas that boys should do X and girls should do Y) occurs through the act 
of repetition, but this repetition draws on traditional gender norms in order to displace 
them. She continues, “The task is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat or, indeed, to 
repeat and, through a radical proliferation of gender, to displace the very gender norms 
that enable the repetition itself” (189). She terms this process parody. When gender 
norms are repeated to a degree that the original norms permitting them are displaced (i.e., 
men in dresses, women in dresses, women wearing ties, men wearing ties), the normative 
structure of gender collapses.  
Lacking in Derrida’s critique but obvious in Butler’s is the notion that there is 
hope for changing the effects of words, the injury of social norms, and, most importantly, 
the possibility for humans to determine their own identity. However, Butler does not find 
an ultimate answer. Her newest work, Giving an Account of Oneself, concludes with the 
notion that we are unknowable to ourselves because cultural scripts that precede us limit 
our self-understanding and therefore condition us. While Butler voices the complexity of 
social engagement and re-imagines the power of language to transform society, she is 
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unable to develop a successful theory for radical social transformation. Like other 
postmodernists, Butler turns to consciousness, an “internal” process, as the means for 
deliberately changing cultural practices (McGowan 22). Attempting to challenge 
authoritative forces that exclude people from culture, postmodernism only goes half way: 
it identifies oppression, reveals its power, and locates possible fissures that lead to 
liberation. However, postmodernism lacks the method.   
Consequences emerge from this philosophy. Writers such as Jean Baudrillard, 
who developed the notion of the “simulacrum,” believe that the “real” is no longer 
possible (2). Instead, humans have “hyperreal,” where signs of the “real” substitute for 
the “real.” The influence of technology and entertainment, particularly, motivate humans 
to concern themselves with anything but everyday life. Instead, humans welcome 
hyperreality because it offers intensity that “reality” does not. For Baudrillard, this shift is 
perilous. Baudrillard offers Watergate and Disney World as examples of the substitution 
of hyperreality for the real. In Disney’s Epcot, countries are simulated. One can have a 
beer in “Germany” and then eat fish and chips in “England.” Consumers experience the 
“model” of the countries, not the countries themselves, but for many, this experience is 
enough. One does not need the “real” when the “model” is an option. Baudrillard argues 
that the substitution of the “model” for the “real” “allows each time for all possible 
interpretations” (17). No “correct” or “real” interpretations exist, and so no criteria exist 
to judge interpretations. Thus, all interpretations are possible.  
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At the end of Simulacrum and Simulacra, Baudrillard advocates for new 
theoretical methods, but like other postmodernists, he does not provide an answer. Herein 
lies the problem of postmodernism. Rather than providing alternatives, postmodernist 
inquiry rests in the mode of critique, and because they stop short, they fail to move the 
debate beyond the realm of interpretation. In this way, they offer little insight for 
illuminating human action. Any attempt to explain social engagement falls suspect to 
inaccuracies, following the deconstructive misconception that “every reading is a 
misreading.” Accuracy and truth, assumed unattainable, are replaced by interpretations, 
open to infinite possibility.  
The residual effects of this formulation are plain to see: judgments, positions, 
assertions, and standpoints are always suspect and should be understood as temporally 
located and temporally fleeting. Because context and temporality are indeterminate, 
theorists have no place to stand to render judgment; judgment is particular and therefore 
un-transferable among contexts. Further, postmodern theory does not account for our 
day-to-day interactions, in which humans make decisions, believe truths, and render 
judgments. These acts occur not because humans tend toward totalization but simply 
because they understand the world by recognizing and validating structure.  
At the same time, postmodernism serves a generative function. Utterances, 
through their ability to assume new contexts, are valid only within a given context and 
thus can be viewed as part of a larger “story,” as participating in a narrative. As the 
driving force of postmodernism, narrative reorganized what we consider to be the 
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substance of knowledge. Although Lyotard attempted to invalidate the legitimacy of 
grand narratives, his work produced an alternative application: postmodernists co-opted 
the term narrative and defined it as a means of social control which provides validation 
for any understanding we might come to in a discursive moment (23). If we accept a 
particular interpretation of a discursive interaction, we are merely subscribing to a 
particular narrative, and this narrative validates our interpretation.  
Of course, these narratives are transitory and subject to change, once our context 
for the narrative changes. In this sense, the concept of narrative provides possibilities for 
understanding speech acts and discourse because the term captures the descriptive 
process we undertake when we create interpretations of discourse, both written and 
spoken. We create narratives and convince ourselves to believe those narratives, 
accepting them as validation. But, for the postmodernists, narrative itself has no 
foundation, no grounding, and thus no legitimation. From this we may conclude that, if 
we live in a world where narrative is always open to revision, our narratives ostensibly 
carry no weight. It makes no epistemological difference which narrative we subscribe to 
because it is one among many, all of which are valid. Yet, I suggest that the narratives we 
craft and choose to accept as true do have material consequences because they guide our 
decisions and we act on them. 
We can see how this works when applied to an institution. In an English 
department, for example, the following narrative circulates with regard to composition 
and literature: literary criticism is a “real” discipline that produces knowledge, while 
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composition lacks the content to be a “real” discipline since it is concerned with writing 
skills. Literature has content (texts) and a body of theoretical knowledge with which to 
examine these texts. Composition is vocational, a subject that shapes students’ writing 
skills, with no apparent “object” of study. Subscription to these narratives creates a value 
system within English departments, and we see the effects in composition programs that 
are staffed by faculty who are not afforded substantial office space, living wages, or 
voting rights. In this way, the narratives we believe have locutionary force; there are 
consequences to believing particular narratives because they guide departmental 
decisions of funding allocation, curriculum changes, and other forms of faculty 
governance. If English departments did not subscribe to the narrative of composition-as-
nondiscipline, but validated both composition and literature as legitimate disciplines, then 
marginalization would not occur. This logic, however, does very little to move us out of 
the master narrative trap. If composition advances to the status of literary studies as a 
“legitimate discipline,” then composition is not overturning the master narrative of 
“disciplinarity” more broadly but is instead is re-instantiating it.2 Postmodernism teaches 
us, then, that counter-narratives do not overturn master narratives. In many ways, 
counter-narratives, if they are successful, simply supplant the existent master narratives 
or fit into another master narrative (e.g., disciplinary formation for Composition Studies). 
In this way, they replicate the very structure they attempt to abolish. 
 As a result, postmodernism is immobilizing: it only offers alternative master 
narratives. In Postmodern Narrative Theory, Mark Currie postulates the following: 
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“Effectively the grand narrative is no more than another narrative, no different from the 
stories it analyses, and just as open to narratological analysis or deconstruction as the 
narrative it narrates” (109). The result of this view is a collapsing of “narrative and 
metanarrative” and “an elevation of the particular, fragmentary little narrative as counter-
politics of the local.” Currie’s critique captures the postmodern aporia, as the inability to 
distinguish between grand narratives and little narratives shattered the paralogic 
possibilities Lyotard advanced. Though knowledge is reformulated by postmodernism 
through the conception of data and facts as “constituted” or “constructed” and is 
described as an adherence to a particular narrative, it is still a foundational enterprise, 
albeit a temporary one.  
Without postmodern insight, narrative’s usefulness as a term for social 
participation might have been overlooked. By discarding the postmodern aporia in the 
face of master narratives, I propose a shift. If postmodernists understand narrative as a 
term that names the logic validating our perspectives, then narrative logic—using 
narrative to justify our beliefs—explains the process. The skepticism of postmodernism 
forces a loose perspective on investigating what this logic looks like, and you will not 
find an explanation of its function aside from Lyotard. I argue, however, that an 
accidental by-product of postmodernist thinking is the development of narrative logic, 
and the term serves the twenty-first century well because it paves the way for making 
sense of our current intellectual milieu. To return to my example of teaching Lyotard in 
the classroom: I was simply asking my students to explain in words the narratives that 
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prompted and justified their actions. In this way, I asked students to identify the narrative 
logic that influenced their actions, and this logic, though open to postmodern critique, 
was based on narrative.  
3. Pragmatism and Narrative Logic 
 Postmodernism teaches us that narratives are transitory and subject to change if 
our context changes. In this way, narrative is never fixed. While postmodernism would 
also tell us that the revisionary aspects of narrative are still in accordance with ideology, 
as we see in appropriations by Michel Foucault and Louis Althusser (as well as the 
conflation of grand narratives with little narratives), these ideas under-theorize the 
material implications of narrative. The narratives we believe and subscribe to produce 
consequences, a point that Judith Butler and Jaçques Derrida point to yet do not fully 
articulate. Both writers investigate how narratives are contingent upon context, and they 
each disprove the totality of context. In Giving An Account of Oneself, Butler examines 
the limits of narrative with regard to “sayability.” In the courtroom, for example, 
defendants are expected to provide a narrative account of themselves, and as they do, 
legal and cultural norms condition the possible accounts defendants can give (64). In 
effect, defendants are forced to create a coherent narrative account because that approach 
is valued in courtrooms. For Butler, the problem is that forces “beyond us and before us” 
condition narrative accounts (64). In this way, narratives are not constitutive but 
contingent upon the rhetorical situation calling for them. Context, then, largely 
determines what can and cannot be said. For Butler, the key to agency is controlling the 
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rhetorical situation by calling attention to it and by breaking its form so that new 
discursive possibilities emerge. In “Living On: Border Lines,” Derrida makes a similar 
case by investigating what happens when narratives are “demanded” (265). To demand a 
narrative account is to demand a “narrative of Narrative” in the sense that creating a 
narrative account of oneself or of a story only reveals a part of the larger narrative 
framing it.  
 In both cases, narrative’s possibility is determined by context, and interlocutors 
appropriate narratives in accordance with external pressures. While I agree with both 
Butler and Derrida in this conclusion, I argue that narrative is not determined solely by 
context. In many cases, we have a choice in the narratives we tell and the narratives we 
believe. My previous example of being late for work demonstrates the role of choice in 
narrative accounts. I chose to accept blame in the first case, whereas in the second case, I 
chose to believe I was innocent. My choice, however, is influenced by my context, which 
includes the factors leading up to the rhetorical situation. As a result, what I choose to 
accept makes a difference in my future actions. In this way, the narratives I choose to 
believe have direct consequences; it matters if I think I am wrongly accused because I 
will act on that belief. By limiting its scope to the forces conditioning narrative, 
postmodernism does not fully address this aspect of narrative.  
Here is a concrete example: if a well-published colleague of mine, who serves on 
the editorial board for a reputable journal in my field, encouraged me to submit an article 
for publication, I would formulate a way of thinking about my work. My narrative would 
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be based on self-affirmation and acceptance from a member of my discourse community, 
but if my article is rejected entirely, my narrative has to change: I am not qualified to join 
my discourse community; my colleague provided false hope. Or, I did not follow the 
right procedures; I am not a qualified professional. In both cases, I have to reformulate 
my relationship with my scholarly work, change the story of what happened and what 
will happen, in order to be resilient in the face of rejection. There are many narratives I 
can believe in the situation that would produce different effects. To begin, I could 
subscribe to the narrative that my work is not worthy of publication. Or, I could believe 
that my article was not a good fit for that particular journal. Or, I could believe that my 
colleague intentionally set me up for failure. The narrative I attach to the article’s 
rejection is going to determine how I act on the knowledge of the fact, and in this way, 
the narrative guides my beliefs and produces consequences. Thus, it matters which 
narrative I believe. One does not weigh equally against others.  
Postmodern theory, however, does not offer insight for understanding why it 
makes a difference for us to believe some narratives over others or how our subscriptions 
to particular narratives enable some outcomes and not others. Though sensitive to the fact 
that narrative produces consequences, postmodernist inquiry stops one step short in its 
attention to the delivery of narrative, as well as the conditions shaping its delivery. I 
depart from postmodern inquiry by looking at the consequences of narrative and how it 
influences action. If we understand our world through narrative, then we make decisions 
and act on the narratives we believe. In order to have agency in this process, we have to 
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be conscious of the narratives we tell ourselves so that we can anticipate their 
consequences. In doing so, we have the power to reshape our engagement with the world.  
Compared with the postmodern agenda, this argument is ideal. Obviously, 
changing our relationship with the world is not an immediate process, but we do have the 
power to shape our own beliefs. To fully understand how, we have to foreground 
narrative in a tangible framework that looks to the effects of narrative (its action), rather 
than the forces causing it. What we need in order to mobilize our thinking about action 
and to move beyond postmodern critique is a new concept of narrative based in the 
American philosophy Pragmatism. For this project, pragmatism provides a framework 
that allows us to account for both narrative logic and the consequences it produces. It is a 
means for describing how we discern available choices for action in relation to their 
consequences so that we are actively participating in our world. A pragmatist conception 
of narrative rejects the postmodern view that we are duped by ideology and recasts the 
agent as one who embodies narrative logic but controls its outcomes.  
 In general, pragmatism pushes scholars to think about belief and experience, to 
question how we form habits, and to challenge principles of certainty. Linked firmly with 
a rejection of metaphysics, pragmatism centers primarily on the present, reflecting 
backward toward what Van Wyck Brooks calls a “usable past” and forward to a possible 
future. Embedded in this usable past are temporary stances toward action, which 
determine how we act in the present (James 24). These temporary stances, which the 
pragmatists call habit, guide us in the present, providing the ground for our critical 
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determination with regard to action. However, pragmatism teaches us to consider these 
stances mutable and to be prepared to change them if our experiences offer justification 
for doing so (24). In this way, pragmatism aligns with postmodernism by considering our 
habits subject to change; however, pragmatism goes a step further, to answer the 
question, “How do we act?”  
Though C. S. Peirce1 coined the term, William James made the philosophy 
popular. In Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907), James 
explains that the word pragmatism itself derives from the Greek noun πράγµα, which 
means a deed, action, affair, state-affair, business; as James notes, we derive “practice” 
and “practical” from this Greek word (18). The term itself, then, is concerned with action, 
which James links back to the work of Aristotle. Furthermore, a pragmatist “turns away 
from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from 
fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards 
concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power” as well as 
“against dogma, artificiality and the pretence of finality in truth” (20). Bridging the 
opposition of idealism and rationalism, pragmatism is not concerned with metaphysical 
concepts that have no practical solutions, nor is it concerned with first causes. 
Pragmatism considers truth as a provisional process, not an end result. The pragmatic 
method is only “an attitude of orientation …. The attitude of looking away from first 
                                                
1 To distinguish his use of pragmatism from that of James’ and literary scholars, C.S. Peirce 
coined the term “pragmaticism” in his 1905 essay “What Pragmatism Is” (CP 5.414). Highlighting that 
pragmaticism is a method only for understanding conduct, Peirce reigned in pragmatism’s scope.  
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things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, 
fruits, consequences, facts” (22, emphasis in original). The links to postmodernism are 
plain to see: pragmatism is anti-foundational and supports the suspicion of grand 
narratives we find in postmodern thinking. But, pragmatism is not based on critique. 
Instead, pragmatism is concerned with narrative’s consequences and how these 
consequences guide future action.  
Similar to Lyotard’s employment of “language games,” pragmatism examines 
rules for conduct and the consequences those rules produce. As Peirce writes, “The word 
pragmatism was invented to express a certain maxim of logic, which … involves a whole 
system of philosophy….intended to furnish a method for the analysis of concepts” 
(Peirce, “A Definition of Pragmatism” 58). As a pragmatist, “In order to ascertain the 
meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences 
might conceivably result by necessity form the truth of that conception; and the sum of 
these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception” (CP 5.8-9). In 
other words, when we consider an idea, for example, whether global warming is real or 
not, we consider the consequences of believing one way or another. The consequences 
we consider and ultimately prefer guides our thinking and directs the position we take. If 
I believe that not believing in global warming will lead to destruction of our species, I 
would adopt the position that global warming is real because the consequences of 
believing the opposite are too risky to chance. Thus, global warming, for me, means the 
end of humanity; I accept that it is real. My acceptance has consequences in that, where 
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the environment is concerned, I will make efforts to prevent global warming because I do 
not want humanity to be eradicated. In this process, I engage in what Peirce calls 
“thought.” In “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” he defines thoughts as “actions having 
beginning, middle, and end,” which “consist in a congruence in the succession of 
sensations which flow through the mind” (28). We think when our habitual responses to 
everyday life do not apply; that is, when our normal responses do not satisfy the 
conditions of our experiences. Peirce refers to this process as the “irritation” of doubt. For 
Peirce, our beliefs dictate our actions, and when our beliefs do not guide our actions so 
that we respond appropriately, we are irritated and must question our beliefs. 
Expectations offer insight to this process. For example, earlier in this chapter, I offered a 
hypothetical example of a woman who habitually carried a red purse on her daily walks. 
On the afternoon she did not have her purse, I struggled to attain belief, to give the 
purse’s absence a story. But, I struggled to attain belief because my expectations were 
disrupted. If the woman had her purse, I would not have had pause for thought; my 
expectations would have been met.  
When our expectations are not met, we are provoked to think. It is also in this 
process that we move from doubt to belief, and our new belief should respond 
appropriately to the present experience, providing a new rule for future conduct. That 
way, we are able to act appropriately the next time we encounter that experience. By 
stating that thought has a beginning, middle, and end (BME), Peirce gives thought a 
tangible structure. For Aristotle, this structure would be considered a plot. In Poetics, 
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Aristotle defines plot as the arrangement of events with a BME (17). For me, plot is a 
necessary element of narrative, and all narratives have a BME. Thus, thought is narrative 
in form. In this way, pragmatism offers a philosophical basis for narrative logic and its 
consequences; the logic offered by narrative shapes the consequences its produces; 
therefore, action cannot be separated from the logic leading to it.  
The effects of unintentional actions support this claim. For example, say that I 
believed all university teachers deserve adequate working conditions (that would be my 
guiding principle, to borrow from Peirce). If I were an tenured professor, my actions in 
faculty meetings and on committees should reflect this belief. However, if I were faced 
with the choice of converting a classroom into offices for tenure-track faculty as opposed 
to offices for non-tenure track faculty, I would have to weigh my decisions. If I knew for 
a fact that five tenured faculty did not have offices but that ten non-tenure faculty were 
currently sharing one large classroom, I might vote for converting the classroom for 
tenure-track faculty. On the one hand, I would make this choice out of necessity; five 
people without an office hardly makes for productive working conditions. On the other 
hand, my vote appears to counter my belief because I would rather improve the working 
conditions of five people, as opposed to ten. If my vote were removed from context, my 
non-tenure track colleagues could easily accuse me of contradicting my own beliefs, and 
regardless of the fact that I ensured everyone had some kind of office space, the 
consequences of my actions would support my colleagues’ accusations. If I had voted to 
give the space to ten instructors, my tenure-track colleagues could accuse me of voting 
 
62 
against their best interests. In each case, someone loses, but the choice I make depends on 
the outcome I wish to see. My narrative directs me to vote for five offices instead of ten 
because I want all teachers to have an office. This example captures the process of 
narrative logic: as thinkers, we have to recognize that our narratives produce different 
consequences and determine which consequences we want to produce; we do this by 
considering who will be affected and how they will perceive our actions. 
In “Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning,” pragmatist George 
Herbert Mead discusses this process using different terms. For Mead, communication 
takes the form of gestures, which he considers social acts “in which one individual serves 
in his action as a stimulus to a response from another individual” (397). Individuals are 
prompted to act when others stimulate them to do so; before they can act, however, they 
internalize the roles of others to determine the most appropriate form of response. 
Anticipating what others want when they gesture, individuals internalize others’ gestures, 
reflecting on how the gestures call for a specific type of response. At the same time, 
individuals’ responses also shape others’ future responses, so individuals must remember 
that fact as they choose a response. For my project, this means imagining what effects 
one’s belief in a narrative will produce and how the effects will evoke responses from 
other people, leading to positive or negative outcomes.  
To build on Mead, we can see that narrative logic is not only a function of the 
agent but also a result of the narrative’s delivery as received by an audience. The logics 
of pre- and post- action sometimes look very different, as reception reveals the 
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consequences of our narrative logic. And, to be clear, narratives are not simply available 
for our consumption in the way that books are available for reading. Narratives are 
integral to our formation as humans, and they are often linked with our previous 
experiences, serving as what Peirce calls “guiding principles.” Imagine that two weeks 
prior to my decision to vote in favor of creating tenure-track offices, I had attended a 
meeting where the Dean explained that no more non-tenure track faculty would be hired 
for at least five years (imagine!). While deciding how to vote, I would rely on that 
experience. Such a narrative may explain how my decision was motivated by the fact that 
non-tenure track faculty would not increase in size and therefore could maintain their 
current space until new space becomes available. Even though my vote appears in one 
sense to counter my own self-beliefs, I would be acting in response to a prior experience 
that shed light on my decision.  
We do this all of the time in our everyday lives. While the notion is not radical or 
new, it does give insight to the ways we utilize narrative logic. My view emerges from 
Mead’s The Philosophy of the Present. His extraordinary critique of temporalist 
philosophy examines how new experience influences our actions, and, in the pragmatist 
spirit, he presents “emergent novelty” as a term to describe the kinds of situations that 
prompt us to change our course, an idea both James and Peirce outlined but never 
developed fully. For Mead, the present is conditioned by the past and extends toward the 
future, but isolating a particular past, present, or future does not explain the complexity of 
our temporal engagement as organisms. It is through our engagement with “emergent 
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novelty” that we recognize the ways in which the past, present, and future are connected. 
Arthur E. Murphy writes the following in Mead’s introduction: “Within experience new 
objects are continually arising and a new present reorients the settled conditions of an 
older era in the light of its discoveries” (18). This summary offers a pragmatic 
understanding of experience because it suggests that our very notion of the “emergent 
present” is largely understood or conditioned by our past experiences. However, the past 
is also reformulated based on the present, which makes the past as emergent as the 
present because our very notion of the past will be different in light of the present. This 
process underscores how knowledge grows and, in this way, mirrors Kuhn’s notion of 
paradigm shift. Mead’s work offers an explanation for how scientific communities 
reformulate beliefs based on new discoveries, and though Kuhn does not credit Mead, 
“emergent novelty” provides a helpful way to understand how knowledge changes. For 
example, when we read, we rely on our previous understanding of reading, but faced with 
a text like The Philosophy of the Present, our previous understanding of reading 
philosophy and our understanding of concepts such as time and the present are 
restructured. Thus, our past experience is made new in the present when we read Mead. If 
“[…] we are particularly interested in presenting the past which in the situation before us 
conditioned the appearance of the emergent,” then we have to understand that the past 
must be refigured in the face of the emergent, not re-instantiated (46).  
The past, however, does not necessitate the emergent: “The emergent when it 
appears is always found to follow from the past, but before it appears it does not, by 
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definition, follow from the past” (36). In other words, the emergent only follows from the 
past once we have figured out how to deal with it in the present. If the emergent departs 
radically from our past conceptions, then we have to undergo an adjustment to make the 
emergent fit in with our previous experience. Only then does the emergent result from the 
past, but this result is only retrievable after the fact.  
For example, No Child Left Behind (NCLB) was passed in 2001 with the distinct 
purpose of improving public education. Talk of money and improved literacy advanced 
positive expectations for the initiative, and many instructors felt certain the bill would be 
successful. Four years later, college-level writing instructors began teaching the first class 
of freshman fully educated under the bill, and an avid number of people posted on public 
listservs, chatted in the halls, or wrote in academic journals against the bill’s removal of 
formal grammar instruction, over-reliance on timed essay exams, and unequal 
distribution of resources. In order to handle the new problems presented by first-year 
writers, writing instructors had to develop a new method for teaching, one sensitive to the 
practices of NCLB. That is, they had to develop a narrative for understanding first-year 
writers and how to best teach them. First, they have to examine the principles of NCLB 
on their own in order to recognize the effects of the bill’s teaching. Then, they have to 
reconsider their former methods of teaching and how they may be adapted for the 
present. After doing so, they may develop an approach that will meet the demands of 
college-level writing while also addressing missing gaps in students’ education. Through 
this reflective process, instructors respond to the emergent in light of the past, but the past 
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itself is also revised. What seemed like a good bill eight years ago suddenly produces 
negative consequences for students’ writing abilities. While the emergent does not 
necessarily develop from the past, the emergent allows one to recast the past in the 
present and to make the past continuous with the present. Then and only then have 
instructors undergone an adjustment. Following from adjustment, instructors might 
choose to reconfigure their entire relationship with regard to assignments, lesson plans, or 
particular textbooks, and in this process, the emergent narrative on first-year writers 
shapes their future engagements with traditional first-year students. This novelty revises 
the past while also setting new rules for the future.  
Peirce labels this process “habit-change,” and in this process, we develop new 
rules for conduct, that is, new “guiding principles” for action (CP 5.477). New 
experiences break our expectations and require us to revise our habitual responses to 
experience. In this way, Mead’s discussion of the emergent reflects the pragmatic maxim 
as it relates to experience and belief. Applied to narrative, Mead’s thought offers a way to 
understand how narratives condition present actions and provide a framework for the 
future. Novelty also provides moments when our existing narratives do not apply, and 
only through the process of adjustment are we able to revise our past narratives to make 
sense of the present and to know how to act in the future. As a result, a change in 
experience prompts a change in narrative, which prompts a change in action, and the 
influence of the experience is not confined to the present and the future but also to the 
past. This understanding of narrative allows us to see how we have agency in the 
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narrative process. We are active participants in adjusting to new experiences, and our 
narratives for approaching novelty prompt us to invent new narratives.  
At the same time, we are not always propelled to view the emergent as emergent, 
and in these instances, our application of former narratives do not serve us as we respond 
to new situations. By re-inscribing the past into the present so that the present is 
continuous with our previous narrative understanding of it, we miss opportunities for 
discovering new ideas and for responding to new experiences in an adequate way. For 
example, in my classes, female students often profess that feminism is dead. Since 
women have received significant gains in the social world, the fight for equality is a 
fruitless enterprise. Believing in a narrative such as this prompts many women to see 
their participation in the world as equal with males’, and while some of their experiences 
might confirm gender equality, this narrative may prevent some females from 
recognizing experiences that are sexist. The importance of reflection, then, as Mead 
makes clear, cannot be under-emphasized. Postmodernists were right to highlight the 
pervasiveness of ideology in narratives, but reflective, deliberate consciousness is 
necessary for narrative logic to do more than replicate our own status quo, even though 
the option is not always available in immediate discursive moments.  
4. Applications for Institutional Engagement 
 Through the lens of pragmatism, I have grounded narrative logic in action, as it 
relates to belief and experience, because I think narrative logic is best understood as a 
corollary to the pragmatist enterprise. Emergent novelty and habit-change are useful 
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terms for explaining action, but given the residual effect of postmodernism present today, 
a pragmatist approach to narrative makes transparent the fact that narratives produce 
consequences, and it provides a framework for understanding how narrative logic 
organizes social engagement. As a result, I propose that narrative logic is an effective 
way to explain our engagement with institutions, the university particularly. Applied to 
institutional participation, we need such a theory because most of the work we engage 
in—from annual reports to grading, program assessment to strategic plans, faculty 
governance to academic freedom—requires narrative logic.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
NARRATIVE, AGENCY, AND INSTITUTIONS 
  
 
[A]n organization keenly aware of its stories can use them to make both minor daily 
changes and more radical significant changes throughout the organization. For this 
reason, stories are vital to any type of change because an organization’s stories help to 
align its internal and external identities. Stories merge the ways people inside and outside 
the organization perceive and describe their interpretation of the organization. 
–Brenton D. Faber, Community Action and Organizational Change (42) 
 
 
In the field of Rhetoric and Composition (RC), narrative primarily describes a 
textual genre assigned to students, a discursive medium for historical and disciplinary 
accounts, and a theoretical framework of postmodern thought. For example, in a recent 
2010 issue of CCC, Melissa Ianetta uses Jean-François Lyotard’s distinction between 
grand and little narratives to analyze dominant RC histories such as Gerald Graff’s 
Professing Literature and Peggy O’Neill, et al.’s A Field of Dreams. Arguing that each of 
these histories forges unnecessary divisions between labor and disciplinarity, Ianetta 
examines how these histories re-inscribe the modernist narratives Lyotard admonished 
scholars against (70). Moreover, as a discursive medium, narrative accounts of RC’s 
histories have contributed to useful scholarly work that chronicle, with complexity, the 
varied perspectives comprising the field. For example, Debra Journet, Beth Boehm, and 
Mary Rosner’s History, Reflection, and Narrative: The Professionalization of 
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Composition, 1963-1983 brings together a range of scholarly narratives that show 
different ways for studying the history of RC, while articles such as Mirtz, et al.’s “The 
Power of ‘De-positioning’,” Wendy Bishop and Gay Lynn Crossley’s “How to Tell A 
Story of Stopping,” and Patricia A. Stephens “A Move Toward ‘Academic Citizenship’” 
demonstrate how individual narratives reflect particular disciplinary values. These texts, 
while using narrative as a discursive diving board for plunging into serious conversations 
about labor and disciplinarity, fail to articulate fully narrative’s service to the field at 
large. In other words, narrative as a vehicle for describing disciplinary lineage is clear 
enough, but narrative as a framework of analysis, with the exception of The Activist 
WPA: Changing Stories about Writing and Writers (discussed later), remains 
unquestioned.   
I find this fact surprising, especially given that rhetorical scholars in 
Communication offer “narrative criticism” as a distinct methodology within the field at 
large (Burgchardt 239). Moreover, a 2009 article in the Rhetoric Society Quarterly—a 
journal that hosts scholarly publications from rhetoricians proper, regardless of the 
field—“resurrects” Walter Fisher’s narrative paradigm in an effort to clarify the theory 
and to redirect scholarly focus toward narrative. Even further, Organizational 
Communication, a subfield within Communication, shares discursive space with another 
interdisciplinary field called Organizational Studies (OS), which joins together scholars 
from Business, Management, Sociology, Economics, and Sociolinguistics, among other 
fields. In OS, “stories and narratives permeate every aspect of an organization’s 
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functioning” (Seely et al. 165). As a result, “any discussion of organizations that does not 
place narrative and storytelling at the center is bound to be misleading and incomplete” 
(166). For OS, to understand an organization is to understand the web of narratives 
shaping it.  
Because OS has developed a rich body of literature theorizing narrative as a 
powerful methodology for analyzing how institutions develop, grow, change, and expire, 
I will not attempt to re-invent the wheel. Instead, this chapter will weave together several 
lines of inquiry in order to demonstrate how a narrative perspective can help writing 
program administrators (WPAs) understand their institutional lives. Since fields outside 
of RC embrace the centrality of narrative to the study of organizations, my intention in 
this chapter is to bridge disciplinary inquiry on narrative and to expand RC’s 
understanding of narrative beyond the postmodern and historical perspectives. My goal is 
to make narrative a comprehensible framework for theorizing institutional critique. In this 
way, I follow the pragmatist tradition so humbly begun by C.S. Peirce to isolate and 
render intelligible the architecture of theories (“Architecture” 316). With regard to 
institutional theory, this architecture consists of narrative.  
Contributing to RC scholar Lisa Adler-Kassner’s recent work The Activist WPA, 
which describes how “stories” influence the way writers are viewed by constituents 
inside and outside the university, I focus specifically on the confluence of these 
narratives, paying attention to narrative’s influence on institutional identities and 
institutional change. I begin with an explanation of why RC is poised for narrative 
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analysis, offer an overview of how OS defines organizations and institutions, make the 
case for a “human” perspective of organizations, and end with a discussion of what a 
narrative approach to universities looks like. From this chapter, we derive our narrative 
methodology for the case studies explored in Chapters IV and V.  
1. Rhetoric and Composition and Institutional Critique 
Beginning in the 1970s, narrative research emerged in OS and has since been 
developed as a theoretical lens and a methodological approach to studying organizations 
(Rhodes and Brown 168). Through a narrative lens, an organization is not “an object of 
study” but a “subjectively and inter-subjectively constructed” framework of stories 
developed by an organization’s members and its researchers (168). For OS, such a 
perspective is necessary to account for the inherent complexity of organizations; as a 
result, a proliferation of narrative scholarship emerged at the end of twentieth century 
(Tsoukas and Hatch 1007). Drawing on literary theory, this scholarship invigorates the 
postmodern turn to narrative by placing narrative at the center of institutional critique. 
Consequently, assessing the university from a narrative point of view is a natural 
fit for rhetoric and composition scholars, primarily because the field is marked by its 
propensity for institutional critique.1 Devoted to both the study and teaching of RC, 
scholars in the field examine RC’s disciplinary identity, both past and present, in order to 
develop generic understandings of how the field and the institution of education influence 
one another. Since at least the sixties, RC has worked valorously to establish itself as a 
legitimate academic field. Developing both graduate and undergraduate programs, 
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circulating a robust body of scholarship, and replicating traditional processes for tenure 
and promotion, the field has, in a short amount of time historically speaking, inhabited an 
institutional niche similar to its longstanding counterparts English and Communication. 
Because the road to disciplinarity has been met with resistance at several turns by a 
number of university communities inside and outside the field, RC scholars have 
reflected on these experiences in the form of critique, in an effort to identify the 
structures that have enabled and inhibited the discipline’s growth. I will briefly 
summarize four major developments leading to these reflections in order contextualize 
my project.   
  To begin, postmodernism’s influence in the late 1980s, particularly, motivated RC 
scholars to produce a range of publications centered on institutional critique. Relying on 
French theorists such as Jean-François Lyotard, Louis Althusser, and Michel Foucault, 
writing professors began to see both their teaching practices and their disciplinary 
affiliations within the context of institutional oppression. Particularly, Michel Foucault’s 
research on discourse has equipped RC scholars with the theoretical tools for tracing the 
field’s historical lineage within an intellectual tradition that utilizes discourse as its main 
source of power.2 For RC theorists such as Brenton D. Faber, Foucault’s influence is 
hopeful: if institutions gain power through discourse, then discourse is the means for 
transforming institutional structures (Community Action 88). Who better, then, to 
research these structures than rhetoricians, scholars whose primary object of study is 
discourse? 
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In the nineties, institutional critique split in two directions, both of which 
influenced the field’s commitment to institutional critique. First, materialist analyses of 
labor began to overshadow Foucaludian analyses of power. Continuing to the twenty-first 
century, materialists such as Eileen Schell, Marc Bousquet, Chris Carter, Tony Scott, and 
David Downing have investigated the division of labor in RC in order to draw 
conclusions about the economic principles organizing university labor, to demonstrate 
how these principles intentionally marginalize particular groups of people (especially 
women, minorities, and non-tenure track faculty), and to point the way forward for those 
engage in university labor struggles. In his most recent book, How the University Works, 
Bousquet, for example, analyzes the managerial frameworks dividing labor in the 
university, and he argues that WPAs offer disingenuous advice for new faculty entering 
the profession. According to Bousquet, by suggesting that rhetoric, and rhetoric alone, 
can enact institutional change, WPAs such as Thomas Miller and James Porter promote a 
heroic vision of the WPA that willfully ignores the power structures stratifying university 
faculty (178, 162). For Bousquet, discourse cannot radically transform the institution; 
contingent faculty, through collective struggle, however, can.  
Second, critical/liberatory pedagogy developed alongside the discipline’s turn 
toward institutional critique. Viewing the composition classroom as mimetic of 
inherently oppressive institutional structures, RC scholars such as bell hooks and Ira Shor 
offered the classroom as a site for combating institutional oppression, advocating for 
pedagogical approaches that viewed education as “the practice of freedom,” an idea 
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derived from Brazilian educator Paulo Freire in the late sixties. Congruent with 
postmodern inquiry, liberatory/critical pedagogy supplanted teacher-as-authority with 
teacher-as-hero; the sole purpose of the teacher was to provoke students to recognize how 
culture, education, and language functioned as oppressive structures inhibiting students’ 
freedom (Bramblett 17). Stanley Fish, Gerald Graff, Gregory Jay, and William Thelin 
repudiate liberatory pedagogy similarly to the way Bousquet repudiates discourse as a 
method for institutional change. Although the approach led scholars to re-examine 
progressive education from the thirties and to imagine the writing classroom as a way to 
accomplish more than just the teaching of writing, it set forth unrealistic expectations for 
both professors and students: freedom, whatever that means, can not be accomplished in 
the course of a single semester.  
A final development running parallel to postmodernism, materialism, and 
liberatory pedagogy—a development that precedes all three—is the establishment of 
writing program administration as a discernible field. Although WPAs have existed since 
the late nineteenth century, at least since Harvard implemented the first-year composition 
entrance exam, the title itself did not appear until the 1970s when the Council of Writing 
Program Administrators was formed (Connors 11; McLeod 23). This organization 
professionalized the work of WPAs, hosting a scholarly journal and a professional 
conference, which provided WPAs with a venue for exchanging resources and for 
developing new approaches to WPA work. These initiatives enabled WPAs to carve a 
distinct niche in the larger field of RC. While practical solutions to WPA work comprises 
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a majority of the articles published in the sub-field, disciplinary critique is an inevitable 
topic of conversation, mostly because the “origin” of composition is fraught (McLeod 
77).  
Contingent upon individual perspectives, the disciplinary territory between 
English and RC has been contested and continues to be. For this reason, many WPAs 
have experienced what Bishop and Crossley describe as a “lack of understanding” from 
“English departments and central administration about our [WPAs] evolving field, our 
interests, our priorities, and the changes in writing instruction and program administration 
as a result of the last thirty years of evolution” (78). In fact, disciplinary critique has been 
a major source of inspiration, for better and worse, leading WPAs such as Lisa Ede, 
Sharon Crowley, Susan Miller, Christine Farris, among others, to challenge disciplinary 
formations and to assess RC’s professional identity. In this way, disciplinary critique is a 
defining characteristic of WPA work.   
Combined together, all four developments place institutional critique at the heart 
of RC. Because all students engage in the tasks of writing, reading, and language use and 
are often required to take first- and second-year writing courses in their college careers, 
the field’s exploration is vast, ranging from pedagogical strategies to theoretical 
developments. At the core, however, is a conscientious attention to the ways in which RC 
challenges traditional notions of student learning, disciplinary formation, and 
administration. Despite the impression such challenges have made on the work of WPAs, 
I have yet to encounter a convincing methodology for describing how university change 
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occurs. Although I am extraordinarily sympathetic to Bousquet’s perspective on 
composition as a management science and equally sympathetic to WPAs’ belief in 
institutional change, my goal in this project is to offer tools for analyzing power 
structures that are already in place, rather than presenting an alternative or a solution. The 
question for me is not, “What do we do?” but, “How are we doing this?” That is, how are 
we behaving in our institutions? What is driving our decision-making processes? To 
answer these questions, I draw connections between RC and OS in order to position 
narrative as an analytical framework that renders institutional structures and individual 
action intelligible.  
2. Organizations Versus Institutions  
In our everyday speech, we often refer to “the government” or “the institution” as 
ways to discuss social organizations that are, for the most part, unable to be teased out 
into identifiable parts. So many Americans today, for example, do not have the 
appropriate tools to understand how large organizations work with regard to who does 
what, where power manifests, and how to be active participants. Part of this ignorance 
results from people’s inability to make structures apparent, to give qualities to them, to be 
able to distinguish their parts. Another part of the problem is that, for many people, 
institutions—particularly the U.S. government—are not structures that can be changed. 
This view produces political apathy, and, even worse, it convinces people that change is 
impossible. As an institution, the American public university faces the same criticism, 
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and many faculty are unable to see a different path, unable to achieve what they want in 
their workplace. As a result, they do not know how to intercede in institutional processes.  
 The problem is that institutions are hard to change. Moreover, American public 
universities are complex sites for social researchers because no single methodology is 
robust enough to account for all of the relationships that comprise institutions and 
because institutions themselves do not exist in isolation from other institutions. More 
importantly, institutions develop over time, influenced by social and political changes. To 
understand an institution, one must abandon the notion of singularity, for “an institution” 
extends beyond property lines. As WPAs, we are very much aware of this fact.3 
Therefore, to develop a neat theory of organized human behavior requires great rhetorical 
footwork, as one must delineate terms clearly.  
 Words like organization or institution reside in our everyday lexicon. Most people 
are familiar with the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, the 
Brookings Institution, or the institution of marriage. On the surface, each term appears 
simplistic because the root words, organize and institute, are obvious. An organization 
requires organizing, the “systematic arrangement of elements” (OED “organization”); 
institutions require the implementation of institutes, the “giving of form or order to a 
thing” (OED “institution”). In each case, the terms refer to a systematic process through 
which objects, people, or groups are given a discernible order; contributing to this order 
are three characteristics that make institutions and organizations visible: a defined 
structure, particular actors, and distinct purpose(s).  
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For example, when we discuss the Conference on College Composition and 
Communication (CCCC), we are talking about a specific organization within a larger 
organization, the National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE). CCCC serves as the 
“professional voice of composition and rhetoric studies” and provides guidance on the 
field’s professional development (CCCC, “Newcomers”). The organization also hosts an 
annual convention that joins over 3,000 national and international graduate students and 
faculty to “converse, share, network, and learn about issues that influence the scholarship 
and teaching of composition.” The organization also publishes a quarterly journal and has 
adopted bylaws and a set of position statements that shape its “professional voice.”  
As a sub-organization of NCTE, CCCC has a defined structure. Graduate 
students, non-tenure and tenure-track faculty, WPAs, university administrators, and 
professional writers are the organization’s actors. They support the organization’s 
structure through their participation in CCCC’s governance, organized events, and the 
teaching of composition—in short, through their labor. The work performed by the 
CCCC’s actors contributes to its purpose of supporting composition and communication 
by   
 
1) sponsoring meetings and publishing scholarly materials for the exchange of 
knowledge about composition, composition pedagogy, and rhetoric; 2) supporting 
a wide range of research on composition, communication, and rhetoric; 3) 
working to enhance the conditions for learning and teaching college composition 
and to promote professional development; and 4) acting as an advocate for 
language and literacy education nationally and internationally. (“About”) 
  
82 
Thus, the best way to begin studying an organization like CCCC is to look at its overall 
structure, the people who support that structure, and the purposes that bring both together.  
 Even an institution as amorphous as the institution of marriage (IM) lends itself to 
similar characterizations. In the U.S., for example, marriage is a legally binding contract 
granted by an authorized government official, and to receive a marriage license, couples 
must fulfill particular qualifications at the state level. This process is the basic structure 
of the IM. The primary actors are the couples who wish to be married, the courts, and 
participants in a civil or religious ceremony (judges, clerks, rabbi, priests, etc.). The 
purpose of marriage is to unite two consenting individuals, usually 18 or older, in a legal 
union recognized by the state. The union allows couples to receive tax benefits, to obtain 
employer benefits such as health insurance, to have the right to hospital visits to make 
medical decisions for a spouse, to receive “tenancy by the entireties,” to by-pass paternity 
restrictions, to have joint child custody, and to obtain government protection during 
financial duress. As an institution, then, the IM has an identifiable structure, with many 
actors and purposes. In this way, the institution can be analyzed in a similar way to 
organizations.  
 Viewed through this lens, organizations and institutions appear simple. They have 
structure, actors, and purpose(s). In practice, however, they are complex because they 
traverse legal, political, social, and cultural boundaries. They coordinate with other 
organizations and institutions. They change over time. They can be open or closed. They 
resist totalization. For these reasons, John Dewey’s proclamation that “the institutional 
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life of mankind is marked by disorganization” rings true (Art as Experience 20). A 
complete account of organizations and institutions is simply unfeasible, but we have a 
starting point when we begin with the identifiable parts and then move toward 
complicating them.  
3. Complex Organizations 
The complexity of organizations and institutions motivated scholars from various 
disciplines to develop the field of Organization Studies (OS), also referred to as 
Organization Theory (OT), in the 1940s (Tsoukas and Knudsen 2). Although OS is a 
relatively new academic discipline, scholars trace its roots to the late eighteenth century 
with the work of Adam Smith and maintain that OS solidified in the early twentieth 
century through the work of Max Weber (Hatch 5). In OS, the terms organization and 
institution are distinct, even though the contemporary works of Woody Powell, Mark 
DiMaggio, Barbara Czarniawska, and Rolf Wolff place them in conversation. To 
understand what led these writers to do so, we will first look at the prevalent definitions 
of both terms and then discuss how they are mutually informing. Our goal in this section 
is to define the key terms for investigating the university-as-organization.  
 Mary Jo Hatch, in Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic, and Postmodern 
Perspectives, draws on the work of William G. Scott and defines an organization as “an 
interplay of technology, social structure, culture, and physical structure embedded in and 
contributing to an environment” (15). This definition speaks to the disorganization 
Dewey mentions. Organizations are not things we can easily point to because they are not 
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“complete” (16). Hatch’s use of the word environment is comparable to what we call 
“context.” Recognizing that an organization is embedded within a context of various laws 
(both legal and social), available technologies (forms of communication and machines), 
cultural practices (economic, religious, ideological), and physical structures (geographic 
location and actual space of organization), organizations are comprised of the 
relationships among these four fronts.  
Let us look at an example of how these fronts influence organizations and their 
environments. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP), an 
organization founded in 1915 that is now composed of 50,000 members across the 
country, with 300 local chapters at American universities, stands as an official voice on 
academic freedom (AAUP, “Mission”). When Arthur O. Lovejoy and John Dewey 
established the organization in 1915, its Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom 
and Academic Tenure was not codified until the 1940s. Beginning in the late fifties, the 
AAUP’s Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure influenced the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment rulings, expanding First Amendment rights to include 
academic freedom. Cases such as Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) and Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents (1967) relied upon the AAUP’s Statement, viewing academic freedom 
as a First Amendment right (“Protecting”). These cases set a tone for future U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions on academic freedom, demonstrating the relationship between 
organizations and political change. The Court’s upholding of academic freedom 
exemplifies the interplay Hatch sees between organizations and their environments.  
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On a more practical level, we can also consider how the AAUP responds to 
technology within its environment. The development of the Internet influenced the 
organization’s ability to share information, gather new members, and support academic 
freedom cases. More importantly, with web technology, the organization is able to house 
online publications, in addition to its official policy documents. During the Bush regime’s 
attack on civil liberties in the early twenty-first century, the AAUP’s policies were 
absolutely transparent and accessible. As a result, the organization was and continues to 
be called upon to help thousands of individuals battle academic freedom. The 
organization’s success, in part, continues because of the availability and transparency of 
its web presence. In this way, technological changes outside the organization led to new 
developments inside the organization, which created networked approaches to academic 
freedom cases.  
We can see how both culture and physical structures of the U.S. influence the 
AAUP when we examine its mission statement. The organization’s goal is “to advance 
academic freedom and shared governance, to define fundamental professional values and 
standards for higher education, and to ensure higher education’s contribution to the 
common good” (“Mission”).  Moreover, the organization works with “Congress and state 
legislators to promote effective higher education legislation, and [to promote] the 
profession and the purposes of higher education in the public eye.” In this way, the 
organization contributes to higher education’s mission of working toward the common 
good, which benefits university professors as well as society at large. As long as 
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academic freedom continues to challenge university professors, the AAUP will fight to 
protect it. The physical structures at work, then, are all sectors of society inside and 
outside the university, who attempt to violate the organization’s principles of academic 
freedom.   
This example demonstrates the interplay Hatch identifies between an organization 
and environment on all four fronts. To locate an organization, then, requires one to 
examine the relationships among the individual elements within an organization 
alongside the relationships between the organization and its environment. The actual 
“organization” is not a thing; it is defined through its relationships. For these reasons, 
organizations are marked by complexity.  
Barbara Czarniawska, in A Theory of Organizing, points to a historical shift that 
prompted scholars to investigate organizational complexity. Drawing on the work of 
Bruno Latour, Czarniawska argues that, in the 1960s and 1970s, natural science methods 
informed OT. Scholars enacting these methodologies considered organizations distinct 
units, with “properties like those of physical objects” (7). The goal of organizational 
research, then, was to “formulate principles” for evaluating those properties in order to 
advance the “correct description of an organization.” In the eighties and nineties, 
however, interpretive methodologies replaced the scientific. This shift led some theorists 
to redefine organizations as the “perceptions” of “actors” within the organization, and 
many agreed that actors “construct an organization through their actions and their 
interpretations of what they themselves and…others are doing.” That is, actors’ views of 
87 
an organization determine what an organization is, and as a result, “many descriptions of 
the same organization…can be compared.” The purpose of the researcher was to “capture 
and describe” how actors’ perceived an organization and how this perception influenced 
actors’ “practices” in an organization (7).  
For Czarniawska, this interpretive view has limitations. Actors, as she explains, 
are not fixed objects of study, and neither are organizations. Instead, actors and 
organizations are the “outcomes” of organizing (18). To investigate these outcomes fully, 
she argues that we need to consider the wider context in which organizations develop, 
similar to Hatch’s use of the term environment. For Czarniawska, a more apt term to 
describe organizations and actors is action net, a theory she bases on Kenneth Burke’s 
concept of the pentad. In Narrating the Organization: Dramas of Institutional Identity, 
she writes, “Action nets are neither people nor groups; they may be large (across several 
organizational fields) or small (a project)….It is from the action net that we deduce which 
actors are involved, not the other way around” (179). Further, she explains action nets as 
“connections between and among actions [that], when stabilized, … construct identities 
of actors” (A Theory of Organizing 19). To illustrate this concept, Czarniawska uses the 
example of publishing. In order for a professor to publish a book, she confers with a 
publisher, seeks funding from her university, engages with other writers in the process of 
writing, and establishes professional contacts (20). These connections are important 
because they place the writer in a context wider than the actual university to which she 
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belongs. In this way, action nets offer a means for thinking about the shared connections 
different organizations have, and it is within these connections that actors are defined.  
 Both Hatch’s and Czarniawska’s definitions reveal the complexity of 
organizations, and each writer resists totalizing theories for investigating them. For these 
authors, organizations are active entities engaging with many different sites, and actors 
within organizations contribute to the development, change, and sophistication of 
organizations. In each case, organizations and their actors connect with a larger net or 
environment; thus, a rich organizational theory attempts to account for these connections. 
As a result, both Hatch and Czarniawska move to narrative research as a way to account 
for organizational complexity. In RC, such an understanding of complexity is needed 
because, to date, very little scholarship attempts to understand, on a finite level, how 
institutional structures are organized, what shapes their organization, and how their 
organization provides insight to the potential for institutional change and growth.  
3. Institutions as Organizations 
  Organizational Theory (OT) and Institutional Theory (IT) are not two separate 
fields of study. In fact, IT, primarily developed by Philip Selznick in the 1950s, is 
considered a subfield within OT that represents one aspect of the concept environment 
(Hatch 64). Keeping in mind that organizations are located within an environment that 
shapes and is shaped by organizations, we should consider institutions and, more 
specifically, institutionalization a process. Building upon Selznick’s view that 
organizations respond to external pressures from society, including moral values, Richard 
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Scott investigates how organizations become “institutionalized” (117). For Scott, 
institutionalization is the “process by which actions are repeated and given similar 
meaning by self and others.” This implies that organizations (such as the university), 
rituals (such as marriage), and practices (such as voting) become institutions through 
repetition.  
According to Woody Powell and Paul DiMaggio, repetition, in this sense, creates 
isomorphism in organizations (147). To demonstrate how, the authors begin by 
addressing scholars’ desire to investigate organizational variance, and they are argue that, 
when organizations emerge as a field, they “push towards homogenization” (148). That 
is, once an organizational field, such as a developing academic discipline, “constitute[s] a 
recognized area of institutional life,” it begins with complexity and narrows to a “totality 
of relevant actors.” RC is a good example of how this process works. When RC emerged 
as a field of study, it developed its own body of publications, methods for 
professionalization, an articulated research agenda (albeit an interdisciplinary one), and, 
finally, a specialized vocabulary distinguishing it from other fields. In short, it became a 
discipline, operating according to a similar structure as that of communication, for 
example. In this way, RC, unfortunately, is a contender for institutional isomorphism, a 
point so eloquently explored in Ede’s Situating Composition.  
Further, Powell and DiMaggio articulate three distinct forms of institutional 
pressures that lead to institutional isomorphism: coercive, normative, and mimetic (147). 
Coercive pressures refer to governmental influences (150). Normative pressures refer to 
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cultural expectations (152). Mimetic pressures refer to the desire for organizations to 
mirror other organizations (151). For RC, coercive pressures such as the No Child Left 
Behind Act (2002) required writing instructors to adapt to students’ understanding of 
writing as the five-paragraph essay, appropriate for high school timed writing tests but 
not for college-level writing. Normative pressures influenced the discipline’s desire for 
professionalization as a way to gain legitimacy; with PhD programs, conferences, and 
training, RC responded to cultural expectations of rigorous academic training for 
students. Finally, mimetic pressures influenced publication processes, curricula, and 
professional conferences, all of which are similar to those in traditional literary studies.   
The ultimate suggestion DiMaggio and Powell offer is that, when the pressures of 
cultural expectations, laws, or other organizations control the development of 
organizations, their potential for reformation is hindered. Czarniawska and Rolf Wolff 
put these ideas to practice in an article titled “Constructing New Identities in Established 
Organizational Fields.” Czarniawska and Wolff examine two developing European 
universities, one of which succeeded in establishing itself as a reputable institution and 
one of which was forced to shut down. Building on the work of Powell and DiMaggio, 
the authors identify the emergence of new universities into the established field of higher 
education as a process of transforming from an organization to an institution (33). 
Czarniawska and Wolff define an institution as “a pattern of social action strengthened by 
a corresponding social norm.” To explain how this works, they apply Czarniawska’s 
theory of action net, which provides a “conceptualization of a commonsensical 
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observation that, within a given institutional order, some actions are habitually connected 
with others” (33). In other words, an institution, like the organization, is social, but it has 
a defined pattern (that they do not share) conditioned by normative frameworks, as well 
as an order that imposes habitual connections among actions, a point I later develop in 
relation to the University of North Carolina system.  
In Czarniawska and Wolff’s explanation of institutions, we can hear echoes of 
Scott’s work, as habit—a kind of repetition—is a defining characteristic of an institution. 
We can also hear echoes of pragmatism, á la Peirce and James. Organizations form 
habits, which makes them institutionalized; institutionalization, then, is the development 
of a mode of conduct. The idea of habit/repetition, for OT, then, seems to be the 
distinguishing factor between organizations and institutions. Though I agree with the 
conclusions of Powell and DiMaggio, as well as Czarniawska and Wolff, in the sense that 
I recognize how organizations become institutionalized, I am hesitant to draw such a 
distinct line. For example, Czarniawska and Wolff argue that actions, “conduct that can 
be meaningfully accounted for,” constitute both the field and its actors (35). Actors 
perform actions, but institutions also perform actions. The authors continue, “[W]e are 
born into an exiting institutional order, and not the other way around. One is not born a 
professor but becomes one by teaching at a university, although, in this process, one may 
influence the form and the content of this institutionalized action” (35). Put this way, the 
authors seem to make a temporal claim with regard to institutions that they do not make 
with organizations. Born into institutional orders, as opposed to creating institutional 
92 
orders, we are forced to consider institutional orders as timeless entities. And perhaps that 
is the point.  
For example, the Institute of Marriage has changed drastically, as what is possible 
now with regard to same-sex partners was not possible fifty years ago, but as far as most 
people in this country are concerned, marriage is a natural part of our social organization. 
In this way, the IM is an entity whose order we simply fall into, even though much 
grassroots organizing and protests created today’s conditions. Organizations, on the other 
hand, are theorized as dynamic processes that change over time. In this way, 
organizational “order” is always in flux, whereas institutional order is simply there. 
Though actors can influence that order, this view of institutions, predicated on the notion 
of repetition, closes the terms for debate. I argue, however, that the terms are 
interchangeable. An institution is an organization whose origin, flexibility, and 
development have become irrelevant to our cultural memory because their permanence is 
without question. I cannot imagine a better example than the university.  
4. Humanizing Institutions 
If an institution is defined as an entity whose origin and development has escaped 
cultural memory, which, in turn, grants the institution a sense of timelessness; and if 
organizations are defined as dynamic processes that change over time alongside their 
environments, then an organizational view of an institution, such as a university, offers a 
very different perspective than an institutional view because the latter casts the university 
as an impenetrable structure. If institutions are impenetrable structures, then the 
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curriculum and programs offered to students over the past fifty years, for example, would 
remain unchanged. However, we know this not to be the case. Accordingly, I define an 
institution as a structure that, like an organization, is a growing, developing process of 
people who share a definable purpose and who work together to achieve that purpose. In 
this way, my view of the institution is one whose codes of conduct have the potential to 
change in the same way that humans’ conduct has a potential to change. However, I am 
not suggesting that institutions be granted “corporate personhood,” in the manner of 
conservative thinking. Instead, I consider institutions at penetrable structures that, like 
humans, have the potential to change and develop new habits, rules of conduct.   
To this end, the remainder of this chapter will follow the lead of sociolinguistic 
Charlotte Linde who uses the term institution “to represent any social group which has a 
continued existence over time, whatever its degree of reification or formal status may be. 
Thus, an institution may be a nation, a corporation, the practice of medicine, a family, a 
gang, a regular Tuesday night poker game, or the class of ‘75” (“Narrative in Institutions” 
519). In Linde’s work, the basic tenets of time (continued existence) and repetition 
(reification) appear, but in this definition, they are tentative, not fixed. Linde’s view of 
institutions is more powerful than the definitions provided in OT because Linde 
acknowledges an institution’s capability to be formal or informal. More importantly, 
through the example of Tuesday night poker game, she recasts institutions as penetrable 
structures, and, more importantly, as human structures.  When we think of institutions as 
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human structures, we consider them a complex web of narratives within and at the 
“boundaries” of institutions (519).  
A similar understanding of institutions appears in RC, but the word narrative is 
not evoked. In their award-winning essay, “Institutional Critique: A Rhetorical 
Methodology for Change,” James E. Porter, Patricia Sullivan, Stuart Blythe, Jeffrey T. 
Grabill, and Libby Miles encourage rhetoricians to produce more scholarship in the form 
of “institutional critique.” Acknowledging that rhetoric and composition scholars have 
thoroughly examined the classroom, disciplinarity, and English departments (or 
programmatic location), these authors encourage new developments with regard to the 
institution as a whole. First, they identify the institution as a rhetorical construction, 
arguing that large-scale institutional change can be achieved rhetorically; that is, through 
WPAs’ participation in discourse and through efforts to combat rhetorical structures that 
impede change. Second, using an example from Mary Dieli’s success in bringing 
“usability” to the forefront of Microsoft’s agenda, the authors argue that a “simple textual 
change” led to a grant political change, and, in the process, usability reoriented 
Microsoft’s mission (610-611).  
From this example, the authors define institutional critique as “a method that 
insists that institutions, as unchangeable as they may seem…do contain spaces for 
reflection, resistance, revisions, and productive action” (613). That is, they ensure that 
there is “hope” for institutional change. Further, they posit that “sometimes 
individuals….can rewrite institutions through rhetorical action” by looking for something 
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that “will lead to change and restructuring of institutions.” This perspective of institutions 
categorizes universities, for example, as profoundly discursive structures. Rhetoric is the 
means for effecting institutional change. Thus, the authors suggest that, by changing 
discourse in the institution, rhetoricians can intervene in institutional processes. 
Holding this theory together is the following pronouncement:  
 
Though institutions are certainly powerful, they are not monoliths; they are 
rhetorically constructed human designs (whose power is reinforced by buildings, 
laws, traditions, and knowledge-making practices) and so are changeable. In other 
words, we made ‘em, we can fix ‘em. (611)   
 
 
On a guttural level, there is an unfavorable response to these bold statements: “Yeah, 
right.” If the answer to institutional problems were as easy as “fix ‘em,” then Porter, et al. 
would have valiantly earned a Nobel Peace prize by this point, and my dissertation would 
be non-existent.   
 At the same time, their argument has merit. After all, universities are human 
creations; universities do change. The problem is that the argument is too simplistic. As 
Marc Bousquet argues in How the University Works: Higher Education and the Low-
wage Nation, Porter, et al.’s methodology advocates that WPAs learn to make the right 
arguments, which supports a top-down administrative model, where the role of faculty is 
to persuade administrators to produce change, leaving the decision of change up to the 
highest-level administrators (159). To change the institution, I just need to say the right 
words. For Bousquet, this kind of agency misconstrues materialism because it insists 
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upon benevolent administrators and because it naively assumes that persuasion is 
possible in any given case. While Bousquet seeks alternatives to labor inequities in higher 
education, he deliberately challenges Porter, et al. because their viewpoint is symptomatic 
of the larger field’s acceptance of a management theory of agency, which Bousquet 
considers impractical for addressing labor issues.  
Although labor equity is something I, personally, work toward in my workplace, 
and while I agree, wholeheartedly, that “the problem of labor” will never be addressed 
through discourse alone, I am persuaded that, as a philosophical linchpin, WPAs, faculty, 
students, and administrators alike must all accept that institutions are human structures 
and that institutions are capable of changing, for without these underlying assumptions, 
institutions are lifeless, rigid structures that do not adapt to their environments and do not 
have the potential to change. Respecting Bousquet, however, I contend that Porter, et al.’s 
notion of agency as “something” available in any given case where a benevolent 
administrator reigns is too idealistic. Instead, we need to consider institutional agency as 
a result of many influences, both human and non-human, inside and outside of the 
institution itself.  
5. Institutional Agency 
Before we move on, I will briefly summarize the arguments presented so far in 
this chapter:  
1. Institutional critique is a primary concern for RC scholars; however, the field has 
yet to explore how narrative offers a valuable framework for such critique.  
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2. Organization studies theorizes organizations as dynamic entities that evolve and 
change within an environment; these structures are always in flux.  
3.  For OS, institutions are organizations that, through habitual action, have become 
timeless entities whose order is simply “there.” 
4. With regard to an institution like the American public university, I argue that an 
organizational view of institutions is necessary; institutions are dynamic entities.  
5. To accept this argument, one must accept that institutions are human structures, 
created by humans and thus able to be changed through human action.  
6. To understand where and how humans can act within the institution, we must 
develop a clear definition of agency.  
 A philosophical buzzword, agency is term that describes an actor’s potential to 
exert or exercise autonomy and power, as well as the means through which these forms of 
power are dictated by culture and history. Depending on which philosophical persuasion 
one leans toward, agency is always coupled with a determining factor. For example, 
Marxists argue that class determines agency. For neo-Marxists, ideology determines 
agency. For rhetoricians, persuasion determines agency. For Burkean rhetoricians, 
identification-before-persuasion determines agency. Necessarily reductive, these 
determinations always connect agency with a particular person—an agent—embedding 
the agent within a network of power (economic, ideological, or rhetorical) that is 
predetermined. When Bousquet criticizes Porter, et al.’s advocacy of institutional 
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critique, he criticizes the system they describe: a hierarchical set of relationships that 
places faculty below WPAs and higher-level administrators at the top of the chain.  
Organized in this way, institutional “agency” is determined by position, not by action.  
As a pragmatist, my concern with agency differs from Bousquet’s and Porter, et 
al.’s. For me, agency cannot be reduced to a particular person who has acted. The 
conditions under which one has acted—conditions that extend beyond the scope of 
observation—heavily influence an agent’s ability to act, and in this way, “agency” cannot 
be ascribed to one given thing. Instead, agency is a temporary end result, apparent only 
through reflection and inherently dependent upon the interplay between agents and their 
environments. For OS, this interplay assumes several iterations—action net, actor-
network theory, or organizational field. As mentioned earlier, Czarniawska’s theory of an 
“action net,” particularly, locates both agency and agents as by-products of organizing. 
She writes, “Usually, a study begins with the location of actors or organizations; what I 
wish to emphasize is that such entities are outcomes rather than inputs of organizing” (A 
Theory 18). To determine who has acted and in what ways, researchers should engage in 
the task of mapping out the connections or relationships among actions in order to 
understand the metaphorical net encapsulating the various people, organizations, and 
goals that worked, collectively, to organize. In order to embrace this view of agency, 
which disrobes the individual, the researcher’s gaze must extend beyond the confines of a 
coherent structure or agent. This view shapes my analysis of institutional assessment and 
university identities in the chapter to follow. For now, Czarniawska’s action net helps us 
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to stay mindful that agency cannot be isolated to the individual alone. To speak of an 
individual’s agency is to speak of the larger context in which an individual can act.  
Pragmatism offers a valuable framework for describing institutional action and for 
understanding the conditions under which one might act. To begin, for both C.S. Peirce 
and William James, human action is undoubtedly connected with habit, our “tendencies 
toward action” (Peirce, CP 5.476). In general, we are predisposed to act in particular 
ways, based on how we have acted before; for James, habit is “the enormous fly-wheel of 
society, its most precious conservative agent” (“Habit” 63). Habit is conservative because 
it maintains a pre-existent order; in this way, habit is not only a form of self-preservation, 
but also social preservation. Americans will continue to participate in capitalism because 
capitalism is the only economic system they know. The U.S. government relies on 
citizens’ continued participation to conserve the economic system. If everyone woke up 
tomorrow, for example, and did not spend a dime, the “market” would invariably suffer. 
As a result, habit is a requirement for business as usual.  
Of course, habit is not fixed; we are motivated to change our tendencies to act in 
particular ways when we are exposed to circumstances under which our typical responses 
prove inadequate. In these moments, we are confronted with the possibility of what 
Peirce terms a “habit-change” (CP 5.476). Habit-changes occur when our associations of 
an action and a sign are reformulated into “transsociations,” which is simply a way of 
saying that, when we are confronted with a situation for which our habitual responses 
have no use, we re-associate our relationship with the situation in order to develop a 
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mode for conduct. After we enact this new mode, we have undergone a habit-change. For 
Peirce, new associations cannot be formed from “involuntary experiences” (5.478). In 
this way, “habit-change” is a conscious decision. For example, as technology continues to 
develop and as American institutions continue to respond to state demands of providing 
distance education, faculty must commit to technology initiatives if they wish to fulfill 
state and national mandates to increase educational access. While this “choice” appears 
forced, it is still a choice. For faculty who refuse to participate in the changing university, 
negative consequences result, as their value as employees decreases. For faculty who 
welcome the wired institution, opportunities arise. In this way, faculty adapting to the 
increased technological demands required for accessible education undergo a habit-
change, since their normal methods of instruction no longer suffice. That is to say, in 
order to respond to their present environments adequately, faculty cannot go on with 
“business as usual” because business now requires a change. 
The university, hereafter interchangeable with institution, requires faculty to make 
habit-changes all of the time. More importantly, institutions-as-human-constructions 
undergo habit-changes themselves because, like organizations, they constantly respond to 
their environments, which includes changing student demographics, economic shifts, 
technological advancements, and political mandates. In this way, institutions are 
profoundly similar to humans because they act, change, and grow. Like humans, 
institutions are also influenced by Peirce’s notion of “guiding principles,” which 
condition institutions’ habitual responses to experiences. Thus, institutions are human 
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structures whose agency—ability to act—is governed by guiding principles and 
influenced by its interactions with people and sociopolitical factors.  
 I make this comparison because “the institution” is often described as an entity 
able to act with the same kind of logic and capability as a human. Institutions, like 
humans, “think,” “believe,” “agree,” and “disagree.” Most often, these kind of statements 
appear in newspaper articles and public statements regarding policy changes and/or 
initiatives, but they drive home an important point: precisely because humans created 
institutions, theories for understanding their change and development necessarily require 
an interpretive lens, one that recognizes the inherent connection between an institution 
and its actors, as well as the inseparability of purpose and environment. To isolate 
“agency” is simply unfeasible. A better way to discuss how institutional action occurs, 
either from the perspective of individual agents or the institution as a whole, is to discuss 
the narratives that organize the daily work of an institution, the narratives that guide 
institutional action. 
6. Narrative Institutions 
Chapter II discussed the role narrative plays in guiding everyday human 
interaction. While applying the same paradigm to the institution signals an unwarranted 
attempt to anthropomorphize an inhuman structure, I take this leap in logic because, like 
Porter, et al., I want WPAs to engage in a radical conceptual shift that will enable a new 
theoretical perspective on institutional action. Furthermore, I believe wholeheartedly that, 
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in order to understand institutional stability, fragility, growth, change, and sustainability, 
one has to develop an analytic that accounts for the messy life composing the institution.  
In order to do so, we need to recognize that institutions are inherently social. 
Furthermore, as Charlotte Linde reminds us, “Social life is created by, and reproduced by 
narrative...life within institutions is no exception” (“Narrative in Institutions” 521). In 
arguing this point, Linde suggests that narrative is an apt framework for discussing 
institutions because, like daily life, institutions are inherently social organisms that 
interact with other social organisms and, in turn, utilize narrative in the process. To 
accept this view of institutions, one must acknowledge that narrative is fundamental to 
the work of institutions and also to the identity of institutions. Narrative, in this sense, is 
the underlying structure of institutions and the mechanism for restructuring institutions.  
Linde’s argument offers perspective for this project. After all, the management 
system of the twenty-first century university utilizes narrative as its main source of 
communication within individual academic units (e.g., departments and programs), 
between academic units and the higher-level units that house them (e.g., the College of 
Arts and Sciences, the College of Business, the College of Music, etc.), and between 
higher-level university units (e.g., Academic Affairs, the Graduate School, etc.) and state 
legislatures (public universities) or boards of trustees (private universities). These 
narratives take several forms: grades and comments submitted to students, annual reports 
and observations submitted to department chairs, yearly goals and assessment plans 
submitted to deans and vice-chancellors, strategic plans submitted to state legislators or 
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boards of trustees, and, not to mention, the countless meetings and emails that make all of 
these documents possible.  
In each of these cases, the language used to communicate the work of an 
academic unit, college, or administration takes narrative form: administrators have to 
communicate their history, present status, plans, goals, and outcomes, having a sense of 
their past, present, and future. Those who engage in these forms of communication need 
to understand all of these components in order for the communications to be coherent. 
From an informal to a formal level, university communication requires an understanding 
of narrative, how to construct that narrative, and how to make it true. That truth, of 
course, hinges on the narrative’s performative capabilities. In addition, these narratives 
work “to reproduce the institution, reproduce or challenge the power structures of the 
institution, induct new members, create the identity of the institution and its members, 
adapt to change, and deal with contested or contradictory versions of the past” (518). Yet 
very few administrators are offered a manual or user’s guide for learning how to interpret 
the narratives they must use and understand in order to participate in the institution. 
Instead, most are thrown into the narrative story of their institution without the necessary 
interpretive lenses they need to make sense of an institution’s past, present, and future. 
Experience, then, becomes the teacher of narrative.  
Linda Adler-Kassner’s The Activist WPA: Changing Stories about Writing and 
Writers offers a tentative solution to this problem. Relying on activist strategies for 
organizing, Adler-Kassner argues that, if WPAs want to control and direct the narratives 
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associated with writing and writers inside and outside the institution, they need to take an 
active role in controlling the rhetorical frames shaping WPA discourse, namely the 
jeremiad that writing produces productive democratic citizens (58). To do this, Adler-
Kassner offers a straightforward set of guidelines: identify a narrative that needs to 
change; assess what information is needed to change the narrative; develop a message to 
convey the new narrative; determine the audience for the new narrative; tailor the 
message for that audience; develop a plan for transmitting that message to the intended 
audience; and finally, assess the effectiveness of the strategy (130-131).  These directives 
provide a useful blueprint for understanding the narrative work of WPAs, and, more 
importantly, they call attention to the fact that, if WPAs want to control how writing is 
discussed and practiced, then they simply need to intervene in the rhetorical frames 
controlling the narratives associated with writers and writing instruction.  
Combined with Linde’s theories, Adler-Kassner’s methodology shows how the 
narratives driving institutions are open to interpretation and disruption. Furthermore, 
these theorists help develop a narrative perspective of institutions that place institutional 
participation as a narrative act concerned with the consequences of believing and 
accepting particular narratives, with an eye toward challenging the narratives that 
produce unfavorable consequences. To flesh out these theories fully, we will turn our 
attention in the next chapter to writing program assessment, which codifies, on a finite 
level, the narratives associated with WPA work.  
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NOTES 
1. See, for example, Thomas Miller’s The Formation of College English (1998); 
Sharon Crowley’s Composition in the University: Historical and Polemical Essays 
(1998); James E. Porter, Patricia Sullivan, Stuart Blythe, Jeffrey T. Grabill, and Libby 
Miles’s “Institutional Critique: A Rhetorical Methodology for Change” (2000); James 
Slevin’s Introducing English: Essays in the Intellectual Work of Composition (2001); 
Gary A. Olson’s (Ed.) Rhetoric and Composition as Intellectual Work (2002); Lisa Ede’s 
Situating Composition: Composition Studies and the Politics of Location (2004); Linda S. 
Bergman and Edith M. Baker’s (Eds.) Composition and/or Literature: The End(s) of 
Education (2006); and Marc Bousquet’s How the University Works: Higher Education 
and the Low-wage Nation (2008).  
2. Porter, et al. offer the following: “Institutional critique is by no means 
new.…We would say that Foucault invented it, if anybody did” (613). For John Schlib, 
however, RC scholars have misappropriated Foucault’s analysis of power: “[W]hat I’d 
like to stress is this: rhetcomp scholars reference Foucault’s theory of power basically as 
a way to arrive at their actual interest, which is agency” (“Turning Composition,” 2010). 
Schlib advocates for scholarship that analyzes “sovereign power,” which he argues is 
relevant to our current political context.   
3. For a thoughtful article on the connection between individual institutions and 
“public” spaces, see Kelly Ritter’s article, “Extra-Institutional Agency and the Public 
Value of the WPA,” which argues that WPAs’ agency extends beyond the confines of 
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institutional location in (2006). In addition, see Richard P. Keeling, Ric Underhile, and 
Andrew F. Wall’s “Horizontal and Vertical Structures: The Dynamics of Organization in 
Higher Education” (2007).  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE NARRATIVE LOGIC OF ASSESSMENT 
  
 
Twenty-first century educators are familiar with the word accountability. Whether 
in the public school system or in higher education, educators are expected to participate 
in accountability measures that verifiably demonstrate quality instruction, superior 
support services, and institutional effectiveness. For primary and secondary schools, 
Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act (2001) radically changed the educational experience by 
enforcing a pedagogy centered on preparing students for standardized tests. In addition, 
the bill holds teachers and administrators accountable for student success and requires 
educators to submit a variety of assessment and planning documents that demonstrate 
institutional effectiveness at the state and national levels. While no such bill exists for 
post-secondary education, per se, institutional accreditation standards, such as those 
required by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS), demand similar 
documents from university teachers and administrators. For SACS accreditation, 
particularly, institutions and their individual academic units must develop outcomes, 
assess them, and formalize the results (Southern Association 3.3.1). More importantly, 
the Margaret Spellings Commission Report (2006), A Test of Leadership: Charting the 
Future of U.S. Higher Education, advocates for increased visibility of “quality 
assessment data,” driven by student learning and performance outcomes (24-25). As a 
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result, university accountability and assessment are beyond commonplace, as more and 
more accrediting bodies and state governing bodies, require formal agency reports on 
institutional effectiveness.  
Writing Program Administrators (WPAs) have responded more than adequately to 
the demands of course, program, and institutional assessments. Especially in the past 
thirty years, the Council of Writing Program Administrators (CWPA), the National 
Council of Teachers of English (NCTE), and the Conference on College Composition 
and Communication (CCCC) have collaborated to develop intellectually rigorous 
scholarship, committee-sanctioned position papers, and formalized guiding principles on 
the best assessment practices in the field (Yancey 495; McLeod 97). These responses 
have engendered a sense of pride in many WPAs because the task of accounting for one’s 
program and/or participating in a university-wide writing assessment initiatives places the 
WPA at the center of institutional research (O’Neill, Schendel, and Huot 24). For many 
WPAs, assessment is an “opportunity,” rather than an “obligation” (10). That statement 
depends upon, of course, whether or not WPAs are in charge of assessment initiatives or 
subject to them.  
For the former, assessment-as-opportunity provides WPAs with the chance to 
conduct institutional research for the purposes of creating new knowledge about writers 
and writing (12). Viewed from this lens, assessment is an inquiry-based, with a scholarly 
telos, rather than a bureaucratic one. For WPAs inexperienced in assessment and 
planning, the task can be intimidating because most people equate assessment with 
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quantifiable data, and as the excuse goes, “English people” do not “do math,” an 
expression I hear all too often in the field. Further, assessment appears artificial, a 
practice applied to a writing classroom/program, rather than a practice emerging from the 
writing classroom/program itself. Finally, assessment is work. To conduct a classroom-
based or programmatic assessment requires faculty and student buy-in, financial support, 
and a concrete plan. These anxieties motivated scholars such Brian Huot, Peggie O’Neill, 
and Cindy Moore to produce numerous articles and books encouraging WPAs to create a 
“culture of writing assessment” within their programs/universities and to seize the 
opportunity to develop innovative writing assessments that yield useful data for the field 
of rhetoric and composition (RC) at large.1 In this way, WPAs have been positive models 
for neighboring university departments charged with assessment and planning. In fact, 
the field’s success with assessment and planning is largely due to the collaborative and 
innovative mentorship of RC’s scholars and professional organizations.   
 In my own experience as a WPA, assessment was not a choice. Hired in 2007 as 
the assistant director of a writing center at a mid-sized liberal arts school, one of my sole 
responsibilities was to revise and then implement a three-year assessment plan generated 
by the director and the former assistant director the year before. I remember feeling 
anxious when I first learned of the task. To me, assessment meant grading student 
writing, and my only experience with formal assessment took place in two conversations 
during my TAship, when I learned that “assessment was coming.” Thankfully, when I 
entered my first WPA position, I was not alone. W-Center, the WPA listserv, numerous 
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professional journals, and my own institution’s research and planning office offered 
sound advice for my work; combined with professional conferences hosted by the 
Council of Writing Program Administrators and the Conference on College Composition, 
and Communication, I was overwhelmingly enthusiastic about writing program 
assessment. Because of these experiences, my attitude toward assessment and planning is 
optimistic, and I embrace the work of scholars such as Huot, O’Neill, and Moore because 
their perspectives are not ideal; they are applicable and, I argue, necessary. 
 I mention my experiences because not all new WPAs are fortunate enough to find 
the level of support I received my first year. Also, I share this story because, in a short 
three years, I oversaw the process of revising, implementing, and interpreting a full 
assessment cycle that included staff and client surveys, an external review of client work, 
formal staff evaluation processes, and informal day-to-day assessment activities (See 
Appendix A). As the executor of the project, I worked alongside my director, writing 
center staff, and other university administrators, and my academic unit was the first on 
campus to implement direct and indirect measures with results and a follow-up plan. 
Overall, our unit faced formal assessment with relative ease. More importantly, we 
invited our staff to participate in the project by contributing to our mission statement and 
by establishing a consultant workgroup devoted to internal assessment initiatives. 
 What made this possible, however, was not our particular institution, Appalachian 
State University, or our accrediting body, SACS. To me, our ability to navigate 
programmatic assessment had everything to do with the fact that my director and I 
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embraced assessment truly as an opportunity in the way that O’Neill, Moore, and Huot 
suggest. When reviewing the documents and considering the methods we should employ, 
I was not bogged down by the bureaucratic weight of accreditation demands. Instead, I 
was empowered to make visible our unit’s history, development, effectiveness, and 
contributions both to the university and the field of RC. During this process, I saw our 
unit fitting into a university structure that simultaneously fit into a state structure that 
ultimately fit into a national structure. From top to bottom, the U.S. Department of 
Education influenced The University of North Carolina University system (UNC), which 
influenced Appalachian State University (App State) and, finally, the University Writing 
Center (UWC).  
 Each of these units had distinct motivations, initiatives, and visions. Each unit, 
simply put, had its own story—its own narrative. Assessment was a vehicle through 
which these narratives interacted, aligned, or misaligned. Because my investment in 
assessment and planning was not preoccupied with resistance or uncertainty about where 
to begin, I placed my attention on the way assessment linked together various narratives 
from individual academic units, academic disciplines, state governing bodies, and 
national agencies. My view of assessment is simple: it is the process by which an 
individual institution develops a coherent narrative of its history, purpose, and goals that 
furthers the agenda of its accrediting body and the U.S. Department of Education (which, 
for the most part, defers to the judgment of accrediting bodies). Individual units within an 
institution perform a similar task by developing a cohesive identity that aligns with the 
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mission and goals of the institution at large and the academic discipline to which the unit 
belongs. At the basis of assessment is the narrative alignment of an institution with its 
parts and its larger governing bodies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This illustration captures what I consider the “narrative levels” of an academic 
unit within its institutional context. When an academic unit such as App State’s UWC 
develops it organizational mission and strategic plan, it cannot simply ascribe to the 
narratives of the field or the narratives of the state. Instead, academic units are positioned 
within a context influenced by the nation, state, larger institution, and their respective 
academic disciplines. These narrative levels contribute to an organization’s development. 
While this figure might appear commonsensical to the seasoned WPA, it might not be as 
obvious to new professionals in the field, especially those whose graduate experiences 
Figure 1. Narrative Levels Influencing an Academic Unit   
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did not provide them with an intimate opportunity to study university administration. In 
order to guide new WPAs through the process of institutional literacy, the remainder of 
this chapter explores the narratives governing an academic unit. I examine these 
relationships by focusing on UNC, accredited by SACS, with an emphasis on App State, 
which officially became a part of UNC in 1971 (Institutional Research, “University”). 
Even further, I will examine the assessment process of App State’s UWC, founded in 
1974, in order to develop a narrative framework for understanding assessment. My goal 
is to encourage new WPAs to view assessment as a chance to establish a cohesive 
institutional identity and to formalize an individual academic unit. More importantly, 
viewing assessment from a narrative point of view enables new WPAs to approach the 
task with an understanding of the relationships between institutions and their individual 
academic units, which will enable them to act with authority and sensitivity to the 
guiding principles underlying assessment initiatives.  
First, I will outline why narrative is a suitable framework. Then, I will create a 
taxonomy of narratives guiding institutional assessment, and finally, I will apply the 
taxonomy to App State’s UWC. If WPAs understand narrative as an analytical 
perspective on assessment, then they will be in a position to direct the narratives 
associated with assessment. This direction will provide WPAs with a chance to effect 
institutional change and to be active participants in that change. My hope is that this 
chapter lays the groundwork for further assessment research so that, after this 
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dissertation, other WPAs will contribute their own scholarship on assessment and 
narrative.  
1. Stories, Narratives, and Assessment 
  For RC scholars, the connection between narrative and assessment has been 
partially established. To begin, some institutions require that an “assessment narrative” 
accompany an individual unit’s assessment plan. These narratives provide an overview of 
a unit’s assessment measures, the results, and proposed improvements. WPAs can find 
examples of these documents on the CWPA website, which houses eight assessment 
narratives in their Assessment Gallery. Each narrative includes similar information: 
programmatic history, assessment initiatives, results, guiding principles, and proposed 
improvements. While these narratives are specifically constructed for a WPA audience, 
they connect assessment and narrative writing. Overall, the documents serve as powerful 
models for the RC community, and they offer WPAs new to the field or new to 
assessment with tangible resources. However, because individual institutions have 
different assessment and planning requirements, “assessment narratives” are not universal 
documents.  
 A second connection between narrative and assessment derives from the written 
structure of assessment plans. Utilizing the traditional definition of narrative—the 
recounting of events—assessment plans literally recount an institution’s or academic 
unit’s attempt to measure qualitatively and/or quantitatively its effectiveness. They often 
begin with a statement of need, which can include the history of the unit or institution. 
115 
Based on these needs, assessment plans present the learning outcomes and action steps 
that were developed to measure the outcomes and whether or not they have been reached. 
Then, assessment plans explain the steps taken to measure the outcomes and offer an 
analysis of the results. Finally, assessment plans make predictions for the future by either 
describing what was and was not successful or by pointing the way forward for future 
assessment initiatives. In this way, assessment plans present an institution’s or academic 
unit’s past, present, and future with regard to institutional effectiveness, giving the plans 
a beginning, middle, and end. This format is narrative.  
 Current RC scholarship on assessment, particularly the work of Linda Adler-
Kassner, establishes a third connection between assessment and narrative. In The Activist 
WPA (2008), Adler-Kassner uses Erwin Goffman’s concept of “rhetorical framing” to 
show how assessment provides WPAs with a chance to intercede in the stories circulating 
about writers and writing. This concept is further expanded in Reframing 
Writing Assessment to Improve Teaching and Learning (2010), a book she co-authors 
with Peggy O’Neill. Further, Adler-Kassner, current president of the CWPA, is so 
respected in the field that the CWPA posted a document titled “Communication 
Strategies,” which formalizes the strategies Adler-Kassner developed in The Activist 
WPA, alongside the NCTE-WPA White Paper on Writing Assessment in Colleges and 
Universities. Appropriately, this document appears as an official recommendation from 
the leading professional organizations of the field. The strategies presented encourage 
WPAs to act locally, within their institutions, by creating partnerships with stakeholders, 
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developing a common language about writing, communicating messages with clear 
principles, and delivering those messages to appropriate places such as neighboring 
institutions, local media venues, or community members (Council). By following these 
steps, WPAs can control the rhetorical frames conditioning the received stories about 
writing and writers in higher education.  
 Keeping in mind my audience—new WPAs in the field—I want to explore why 
the push toward rhetorical framing and assessment as a matter of controlling stories 
makes sense. To that end, this chapter forges a fourth connection between narrative and 
assessment, one that brings together the three I’ve already mentioned. Relying on the 
framework set up in the previous chapters—particularly the concepts of narrative logic 
and guiding principles—I argue that assessment is an institutional practice that reveals 
how narratives work to organize institutional identities, to inform institutional 
engagement, and to motivate institutional change. Furthermore, assessment creates the 
opportunity for WPAs to see the web of narratives that contribute to seemingly 
straightforward documents such as assessment and strategic plans. When WPAs 
disentangle these webs, they are in a position to recognize which narratives they can and 
cannot control.  
 Thinking about assessment-as-storytelling and, thus, as an opportunity to advance 
rhetorical agency is not particular to RC. For example, Meg Scharf, in library sciences, 
delivered a powerful paper at the 2009 Association of College and Research Libraries 
annual conference encouraging her field to develop a culture of assessment and to begin 
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exploring the “power of narrative” as a way to promote library advocacy (192). In this 
presentation, Scharf encourages libraries to make their assessment efforts and initiatives 
public by posting them on their homepages. This move, Scharf explains, will enable 
libraries to communicate directly with stakeholders at the local and national levels, 
thereby allowing librarians to tell their own stories, rather than having others tell it for 
them (195).  
For accountant Lee L. Schulman, eighth president of the Carnegie Foundation, all 
academic units involved with assessment and reporting should embrace this approach. 
Schulman argues in “Counting and Recounting: Assessment and the Quest for 
Accountability,” much like Adler-Kassner in RC, that educators need to stop viewing 
accountability as a “sinister plot” and start taking “control” of the narrative. If educators 
accomplish this task, they will be able to develop new initiatives for assessment that are 
representative of and directly correlated with their desired student outcomes. Further, this 
initiative will truly enable assessment to “improve the quality of learning in higher 
education” because experts will oversee assessment measures, rather than outside, 
disinterested parties.   
 When assessment is viewed as a means for controlling how an institution or 
academic unit’s story is told, it becomes a vehicle for power and also for change. As 
rhetorician Brenton D. Faber maintains in “Toward a Rhetoric of Change: Reconstructing 
Image and Narrative in Distressed Organizations” (1998) and further develops in 
Community Action and Organizational Change: Image, Narrative, Identity (2002), 
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narratives enable an organization “to make both minor daily changes and more radical 
significant changes throughout the organization” (Community 42). In order for this to 
happen, however, institutions and their workers must be fully conscious of the narratives 
that shape the institutions both within and without. When this kind of reflection occurs, 
narratives have the power to “merge the ways people inside and outside the organization 
perceive and describe their interpretation of the organization.” This mergence happens 
only when the narratives inside and outside of the institution are aligned. In this way, 
organizational change is the process of negotiating “narrative discordance” and working 
toward “narrative alignment,” concepts that will be explored more fully in the subsequent 
sections and Chapter V (Faber, “Toward” 220).  
 These perspectives on narrative are not exhaustive, but they suggest a scholarly 
recognition of the power of narrative to shape institutional and individual identities, as 
well as the power of narrative to influence organizational change. More importantly, 
when narrative as a means for effecting change and as a means for controlling an 
institution’s identity is linked to assessment, WPAs have the opportunity to re-imagine 
the function of assessment and to consciously investigate the “underlying assumptions” 
motivating assessment efforts (O’Neill, Moore, and Huot 10). Recognizing the 
assumptions that guide assessment is important for WPAs because it enables them to 
participate actively in the process and to generate assessment research for the discourse 
community at large. But the question remains, what does this process look like?  
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2. Narrative Logic and Guiding Principles 
The assessment documents endorsed by the NCTE, CCCC, and CWPA, which 
include the NCTE-WPA White Paper on Writing Assessment in Colleges and 
Universities (April 2008) and the CCCC Committee on Assessment’s “Writing 
Assessment: A Position Statement” (March 2009), offer WPAs clearly articulated 
guiding principles for assessment that embody the “best practices” in the field. These 
documents intend to cohere national writing assessments with the professional field of 
RC so that the narratives circulating about writers and writing, from state legislatures to 
mainstream media, directly correspond with the field’s values and overall vision of 
effective writing instruction. These guiding principles serve as the foundation upon which 
WPAs’ should structure assessment measures, and as Adler-Kassner argues, these 
principles are necessary for changing stories about writing and writers (29). That is, for 
controlling how narratives about writers and writing are perceived and interpreted.  
In Chapter II, I argued that narratives justify our beliefs and consequently provide 
us with rules for conduct. Narrative logic, then, is the use of these narratives to determine 
an appropriate response to a given situation. In this way, narratives serve as “guiding 
principles,” an understanding I developed from American pragmatism. When applied to 
assessment, this framework corresponds directly with the structure developed by the 
NCTE, CCCC, and CWPA. The working model looks like this:  
1. Writing assessment involves multiple stakeholders, which includes a number 
of non-writing specialists in education and the public at large. 
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2. Our goal, as writing professionals, is to direct the dominant conversations and 
stories circulating about writers and writing (Adler-Kassner; Council).  
3. To do so, the NCTE, CCCC, and CWPA have developed cohesive “guiding 
principles” that writing experts in this country should apply when conducting 
assessment (NCTE and CWPA; CCCC Committee on Assessment).  
4. These principles enable writing experts to develop coherent narratives about 
the best practices in the field.  
5. In short, by rooting assessment in the principles of the field, WPAs can 
deliver an authorized message about writing assessment, one that establishes a 
dominant narrative of writing assessment informed by writing specialists, 
rather than people outside of the field.  
Assessment, then, has its own narrative logic: the guiding principles of the field structure 
assessment practices and, thus, have the potential to influence the narrative of writing and 
writers in this country. In this paradigm, WPAs are poised to shape how stories about 
writing are told, and, more specifically, WPAs are agents in developing the narratives—
guiding principles—finluencing assessment. In this way, narratives differ from stories 
because narratives are the underlying principles that shape stories about writing. For the 
NCTE, CCCC, and CWPA, these narratives include the following: assessment should be 
understood within its local context, assessment improves teaching and learning, writing is 
inherently social, assessment should implement multiple measures, the criteria for 
assessing writing shapes perceptions about writing, writing assessment should be a 
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continuous conversation among stakeholders, and writing assessment should be clearly 
articulated for all interested parties (NCTE and CWPA; CCCC Committee on 
Assessment).  
 When these guiding principles support the foundation of writing assessment, they 
influence how assessment is practiced, and they establish rules for conduct. However, as 
O’Neill, Schendel, and Huot argue, these principles are not yet fully disseminated to the 
field at large, as listserv queries and conference presentations make evident (10-11). In 
response, O’Neill, Moore, and Huot developed A Guide to College Writing Assessment 
(2009) to clarify the field’s guiding principles and to offer new WPAs practical resources 
for developing assessment methods informed by the NCTE, CCCC, and CWPA agree-
upon principles. To see what these principles look like in practice, one simply needs to 
read the assessment narratives housed on the Council of Writing Program 
Administrators’ Assessment Resource Gallery. Each of these documents record, with 
incredible detail, the guiding principles driving assessment, and a careful read 
demonstrates that, for the most part, the guiding principles directly correspond with the 
official principles of NCTE, CCCC, and CWPA either by paraphrasing the principles or 
by quoting them verbatim.  
For example, Saint Joseph College’s narrative states explicitly that their 
assessment programs “mirror National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) and 
CCCC position statements on writing assessment,” specifically the use of multiple 
measures, articulate communication, and an emphasis on improving teaching and 
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learning (Artz). In Frederick Community College’s assessment narrative, the NCTE-
WPA White Paper’s guiding principles are verbatim, followed by explanations of how 
the institution practiced them (Kerr). Seattle University follows a similar pattern by 
explicitly listing the NCTE and CWPA as the major influence guiding their assessments 
(Bean). With the exception of George Mason University and the University of Kentucky, 
all posted assessment narratives, without a doubt, re-present the desired guiding 
principles accepted by the RC community.  
These guiding principles, however, are not the only narratives governing writing 
assessment. Fittingly, the NCTE-WPA White Paper advises WPAs to adapt and refine the 
organizations’ guiding principles “in accordance with local needs, issues, purposes, and 
concerns of stakeholders,” a point reiterated in the CWPA’s document “Communication 
Strategies.” In many ways, this suggestion serves as the overarching guiding principle for 
the organizations’ official position on writing assessment because, when WPAs consider 
local context, the other guiding principles are subject to revision. While discipline-
specific narratives (guiding principles) should influence assessment practices, the work of 
the WPA is to balance a range of guiding principles (hereafter referred to as narratives) as 
assessment measures are developed, which include local, state, and national narratives. 
The narrative logic of writing assessment, then, exists in a complicated web of narratives 
inside and outside an individual institution. Ideally, these narratives emerge from and are 
informed by the professional organizations of the field.   
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 Isolating these specific narratives requires a thoughtful exploration of any given 
institution’s context, including its accrediting body, state school system (if applicable), 
organizational mission, local community, and any other additional stakeholders outside of 
these categories. On the surface, it’s hard to imagine a framework in which an institution 
can adequately respond to all of these parties, but because assessment and accountability 
are processes that have evolved over time—and continue to do so—institutions have gone 
to incredible lengths to fully research, develop, and conduct in-depth assessment and 
planning projects that impressively communicate with and satisfy multiple sets of 
audience expectations and demands. In fact, when browsing college and university 
websites, especially offices related to institutional effectiveness and research, one can be 
overwhelmed by the amount of reporting documents, institutional profiles, and other data 
associated with accountability and assessment. From organizational charts to 
departmental assessment plans, the number of documents available to the public is 
unbelievable.  
 Personally, I am fascinated by higher education’s responsibility to demonstrate 
institutional effectiveness because I think the activities force institutions to set tangible 
goals and to ensure they are met. Moreover, agency reporting and assessment enable 
institutions, as well as their individual academic units, to develop a sense of institutional 
identity and to communicate that identity discursively. This process allows institutions 
and their units to establish a deep understanding of their purpose, mission, and goals. Of 
course, my description here is ideal mostly because my own experience with assessment 
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has been positive. Regardless, when institutions engage in these processes, they are in a 
position to define, on a discursive level, their mission and goals; to make transparent their 
commitment to student learning; and to recognize their relationships with higher 
education, accrediting bodies, and other organizations. Analyzing these documents 
enables researchers to see how institutions are immersed in a discursive web of narratives 
that serve to propagate the values of the Department of Education and individual state 
agendas.  
3. The University of North Carolina System 
 Chapter III noted organizational theory’s view of narrative as an integral part of 
organizational development. As Brian Pentland explains in “Building Process Theory 
with Narrative,” narratives are “central forms of expression of organizational culture” 
that are “important vehicles for socialization” (716). First, an organization’s culture is 
expressed through the narratives that the members of the organization believe and, 
therefore, act upon. These narratives are essential to organizational development because 
they provide members of the organization with a sense of purpose. Second, to develop a 
cohesive organizational culture, members of an organization must collectively adopt a set 
of narratives that shape the mission, goals, and future of the organization. This view, of 
course, is ideal, and very rarely do organizational narratives reflect the exact same 
perspective; however, in order for an institution to sustain itself as an institution, a 
collective narrative must be intact. Because of this need, narrative is linked with the daily 
life of the institution. Consequently, recognizing these narratives is essential for new 
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institutional members because, as Charlotte Linde explains in “Narrative and Social Tacit 
Knowledge,” “part of becoming a member of an institution involves learning the stories 
about that institution which everyone must know, the appropriate times and reasons to tell 
them, and the ways in which one’s own stories are shaped to fit a new institutional 
context” (161). For new WPAs, Linde’s suggestion is evident: in order to become an 
active member of an institution, one must sift through the available narratives, make 
sense of them, and determine a strategy for entering into the narrative structure. Because 
narrative work is an essential institutional activity, new workers must, over time, learn 
how to isolate the narratives at play and to find the means of participation and 
intervention. This framework provides a theoretical lens for negotiating a new workplace 
and for figuring out how to begin understanding an organization’s parts and goals. 
In the age of accountability, this notion indicates that WPAs must be cognizant of 
the narratives shaping an institution’s mission and history because these narratives 
function as organizing principles for the institution’s past, present, and future actions. 
Earlier, I referred to the NCTE-WPA and CCCC Assessment Committee’s guiding 
principles as narratives because the principles provide WPAs with a foundation for 
practicing assessment. For WPAs who value these principles, they offer a structure for 
assessment that is guided by a set of core beliefs recognized and honored by the field. 
Institutions act in the same way. Their success is largely determined by their ability to 
develop a mission, comprised of core values and principles, and to fulfill this mission 
through their daily activities. Often, these values and principles are influenced by state 
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and national bodies such as accrediting agencies and state governing boards. More 
importantly, because individual institutions are connected with other institutions, their 
core values and principles must complement their inter-institutional relationships as well. 
From this perspective, narratives are simply the guiding principles of an institution that 
provide data “organizational members use to plan, enact, interpret, and evaluate their own 
actions and those of others” (Pentland 717). To locate these narratives, we need only look 
at an institution’s mission statements, historical records, accountability and planning 
documents, and inter-institutional partnerships to discover how an institution behaves.  
The core values and principles of the University of North Carolina System 
(UNC), defined by its mission statement, were motivated, in part, by constitutional and 
statutory mandates, including Article IX of the North Carolina Constitution, which 
simply states that “The General Assembly shall maintain a public system of education” 
designed to serve North Carolina citizens and to provide education free of charge, “as far 
as practicable” (qtd. in UNC “History”). This constitutional mandate provided UNC with 
an educational mission, and aside from a series of general statutes regulating community 
and technical colleges, as well as the governing body of the system, the most profound 
legislation impacting UNC’s mission was the 1971 Higher Education Reorganization 
Act. This act unified 16 universities under the Board of Governors and provided a basic 
purpose for the system: “to foster the development of a well-planned and coordinated 
system of higher education, to improve the quality of education, to extend its benefits, 
and to encourage an economical use of the state’s resources” (“History”). Central to this 
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mission, of course, is strategic planning, which led UNC to adopt a mission statement in 
1992 that achieved statutory status in 1995. With the development of a cohesive mission, 
UNC enveloped its 16 institutions in effort to “to discover, create, transmit, and apply 
knowledge to address the needs of individuals and society...through 
instruction...research...and service” (“History”). Hence, when considering the narratives 
guiding The University of North Carolina, one must consider this fundamental mission, 
as it truly underscores the mission of all UNC institutions.  
For example, when UNC’s Board of Trustees was renamed the “Board of 
Governors of the University of North Carolina” in 1972, “continuous and flexible 
planning” became a strategic priority of UNC in response to the Higher Education 
Reorganization Act’s charge to create a “well-planned” university system. The first long-
range plan was developed in 1976 (UNC Board of Governors “Long-Range”). These 
plans, carried out incrementally over five-year periods except in cases where leadership 
was in transition, are a staple of UNC, indicating its commitment to maintaining a 
relevant and effective system of higher education. In addition, this priority is evident in 
the system’s mission statement because “addressing the needs of individuals and society” 
is a process that has to be continually assessed and updated, especially given how fast 
technology and society change. To work in UNC’s system, as a result, is to engage in a 
dynamic environment that values planning and reporting because, for UNC, these 
initiatives enable the system to stay current with the needs of its region and ever-evolving 
student demographic.  
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This core value, a sincere commitment to planning initiatives that ensure UNC 
fulfills its mission, is a fundamental narrative supporting the daily institutional life of any 
given university campus within the system. Not only does UNC implement its own long-
range planning initiatives, the system also abides by the accreditation demands of SACS, 
which requires a sophisticated set of accountability documents. Further, UNC has a 
reputation among its faculty for placing emphasis on planning and reporting, and the 
most recent instantiation of this practice was the University of North Carolina Tomorrow 
Initiative (UNCT), developed by former Board of Governors Chairman Jim Phillips in 
2007. Beginning in February of 2007 and culminating in a formal report the following 
December, UNCT studied, with great detail, the changing demographics and economic 
challenges facing North Carolina’s future, with an eye toward analyzing how UNC’s 
multi-campus system was poised (or not) to respond adequately to those changes. The 
motivation for this project, according to Phillips, was to cohere the planning initiatives of 
all UNC institutions in order to offer the Board of Governors a comprehensive view of all 
17 campuses (16 universities and one public boarding school) and to prevent the 
duplication of programs (Shaw). Along with responding to “the needs of the state,” these 
motivations offered each campus the opportunity to evaluate its current programs and to 
advocate for increased resources that would enable individual institutions to better serve 
the needs of North Carolina.  
As operating principles, the outcomes of UNCT’s official recommendations were 
presented to UNC’s Board of Governors, in order to “guide and shape current and future 
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priorities, resource allocations, and existing and future programs, and strategic plans and 
missions of the UNC, its 17 constituent institutions and its affiliated entities” so that 
UNC continues to offer quality education within a “rapidly changing, knowledge-based 
global economy and environment” (UNCT Commission 2). Following the report’s 
submission, the UNCT Commission required each individual institution within the 
system to respond to the report’s outcomes, determining how individual institutions 
worked to meet those recommendations and what obstacles prevented the institutions 
from fulfilling the outcomes (Appalachian, “UNC Tomorrow”). Two “phases” of 
reporting were required in 2008 to demonstrate institution preparedness for the 
Implementation Phase of 2009-2012. Practically, this initiative influenced individual 
institutions by creating the opportunity for them to develop new strategic initiatives that 
would fulfill UNC’s mission on the basis of UNCT’s findings. For most institutions, 
tangible differences took the shape of enhanced resources and revised strategic planning 
initiatives taking into account not only the mission of UNC but also the findings of 
UNCT (See Fig. 2 below).  
Currently undergoing the Implementation Phase of the UNCT Commission’s 
recommendations, UNC institutions are responsible for integrating the UNCT’s findings 
into their current assessment and planning practices, which adds an additional layer of 
consideration to the institutions’ already developed planning measures. Further, alongside 
UNC’s emphasis on reporting and planning and UNCT’s recommendations for future 
planning, all universities in the UNC System are accredited by the Southern Association 
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of Colleges and Schools (SACS), which offers another set of directives for university 
assessment and planning. While none of these influences are exclusive, since SACS does 
not conflict with UNC or vice versa, the layers of consideration a single institution in 
UNC must consider as its evolves are great in number. To manage these directives and to 
fully understand how they coordinate and what their purposes are, university 
administrators must have keen awareness of the intersections among UNC, UNCT, and 
SACS so that their respective institutions fulfill their stakeholder’s demands with grace 
and exceptionality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2. The University of North Carolina Mission Statement Flow Chart 
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SACS’ demands for evidence of “Institutional Effectiveness,” as outlined in its 
Core Requirements, rides tandem with UNC’s long established commitment to planning. 
Together, UNC and SACS place a great deal of pressure on UNC institutions to report 
their progress and responsiveness as institutions of higher education. An additional 
directive, of course, must be added here. In September of 2006, the Margaret Spellings 
Commission on the Future of Higher Education published a list of recommendations 
calling for a “robust culture of accountability and transparency throughout higher 
education” (21). In this report, which was fueled by Spellings’ desire to assess higher 
education’s performance with regard to access, affordability, accountability, and quality, 
the Commission argued that institutions of higher education needed to improve their 
transparency and accountability measures by making their institutional effectiveness and 
public contributions easily accessible (7, 14). For the Commission, one way to address 
this inadequacy would be to create a public database housing accountability documents, 
which would, in turn, instill greater “public trust” in institutions of higher education (14). 
This initiative, while less important for UNC, played (and continues to play) a significant 
role in university development across the country, as many institutions discovered that, 
indeed, their accountability efforts were not transparent.  
When this charge infiltrated higher education, UNC’s institutions were already 
involved in accountability measures. In January of 2006, after establishing a set of 
Strategic Directions in the 2004-2009 Long-Range Plan, which was extended to 2011 due 
to a change in leadership, UNC pushed its institutions to figure out measures for 
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implementing the directions (“Supplement”). For example, at App State, these directives, 
combined with the Spellings Commission’s findings, prompted Chancellor Kenneth 
Peacock to announce in August of 2006 that App State would create a new strategic plan 
for 2008-2012 (Appalachian State University, “Strategic Plan”). Taken together, UNC’s 
2006 charge and the Spellings Commission’s recommendations prompted App State to 
develop its strategic plan with both audiences in mind. Just one year later, in 2007, App 
State’s focus for strategic planning would be expanded, yet again, by the UNCT 
Commission’s recommendations.  
As a result, when the Board of Governors approved App State’s Strategic Plan 
2008-2012 on September 12, 2008, the document responded to UNC’s Long-Range 
Planning 2004-2009, UNCT’s Final Report, SACS’s The Principles for Accreditation, 
the Spellings Commission’s A Test of Leadership, and App State’s administration, 
faculty, students, and community members’ feedback. In one simple document, the 
voices of influence are significant. Although many faculty view assessment and planning 
documents as externally motivated and internally draining (resources, time, effort), the 
creation of such a plan as this allowed App State and its governing bodies to establish a 
relationship based on shared goals, and even though many of these goals were directed to 
UNC institutions, with regard to UNCT and UNC long-range planning generally, the 
university community at large shaped the directives through committee work, reports, 
and open forums. In this way, App State’s Strategic Plan, which appears singular, is 
actually polyphonous, synchronizing the goals and expectations of its governing system, 
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accrediting body, and national legislature. Weaving together these narratives within the 
confines of a singular planning document takes rhetorical skill and unwavering patience, 
but through the process, an institution can discursively develop a identity that aligns with 
its local, state, and national contexts. In this way, assessment and planning initiatives 
challenge institutions to form a singular and collective identity at the same time. Not only 
is App State an individual institution with its own mission and goals, but the university, 
as part of the UNC System, the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and SACS is also a 
collective entity shaped by a number of organizations that lay the foundation for its 
guiding principles.  
4. Appalachian State University’s Writing Center 
Individual academic units within an institution operate similarly to the institution 
itself. Navigating directives from national legislation, accrediting agencies, statewide 
governing bodies, and individual institutions, academic units are subject to and limited by 
the narratives shaping its home institution. When App State’s University Writing Center 
was charged, for example, in 2007 to develop, implement, and complete a three-year 
assessment cycle, in addition to developing a strategic plan for 2008-2012 alongside the 
university, we had to consider the overall mission of the university, UNC, UNCT, SACS, 
and ED. Before we could even begin to develop a formal mission statement, define our 
program and learning outcomes, and consider our strategic vision, we had to consult an 
array of institutional resources to figure out where our unit fit into the university’s 
organizational structure and how we were furthering the mission of UNC and its national 
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legislative bodies governing. That is, we had to assess the narratives influencing our 
academic unit.  
The narratives, or guiding principles, driving our assessment and planning process 
were as follows:  
1. Accreditation Narrative: The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools’ 
Core Principles 
2. National Narrative: The Spellings Commission on the Future of Higher 
Education’s Directives 
3. State Narrative: The University of North Carolina’s Strategic Directions and 
Special Initiatives 
4. Institutional Narrative: Appalachian State University’s Strategic Priorities 
and Initiatives 
5. Disciplinary Narrative: The National Council of Teachers of English, the 
Council of Writing Program Administrators, and the Conference on College 
Composition and Communication’s Guiding Principles 
Each of these narratives helped us piece together, like a puzzle, a smaller narrative that 
would reflect each of its contributors while simultaneously enabling the UWC to assert 
an autonomous mission and vision. More importantly, although these narratives were 
explicit and implicit directives, they did not hinder the development of our organization’s 
identity; instead, they shaped it. Rather than viewing our assessment efforts as isolated 
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acts, we envisioned them as thoroughly integrated, well researched, and informed by the 
best principles and practices our nation, state, and discipline.  
 The chart below succinctly organizes the foundations, directives, and principles 
motivating our assessment and planning process. I present this chart because, when one 
considers the range of voices influencing a simple practice like assessment, the  
importance of the task becomes clear. Assessment is not simply a practice that is value 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Guiding Principles for Assessment and Strategic Planning   
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by administrators but also a practice that enables an academic unit to develop “initiatives 
for institutional improvement and self-knowledge” (Welsh and Metcalf 463). Self-
knowledge, particularly, involves learning what stakeholders expect from an academic 
unit and figuring out how to balance those expectations alongside a unit’s own vision—a 
process that can be accomplished, despite what faculty and administrators new to the task 
might think. Further, assessment provides a space in which a unit can learn what it is 
capable of accomplishing while also testing the boundaries what might be possible within 
a given set of confines.2 When academic units undergo a thorough self-study during the 
process of developing a unit plan with a defined mission and vision, they begin to see 
their value within the organization and also their commitment to fulfilling the 
organization’s mission, both of which are important for the academic unit to develop a 
synergistic perspective of its relationship with the university at large.  
 The problem, of course, is that institutional contexts influence the level of synergy 
an academic unit might embrace. John F. Welsh and Jeff Metcalf, in “Faculty and 
Administrative Support for Institutional Effectiveness,” argue that administration and 
faculty tend to resist institutional effectiveness measures when external agencies enforce 
the initiatives or when forces outside of the actual institution/department undergoing 
assessment design the measures (449). These circumstances are understandable, and for 
WPAs facing similar situations, a synergistic approach to assessment must sound 
extraordinarily naïve. The only way to fix such a problem, however, is to work diligently 
within one’s context to develop a true “culture of assessment,” as many WPAs and 
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university administrators have encouraged. Luckily, at App State, a culture of assessment 
preceded our initiatives, and after researching the history of UNC, we learned that 
assessment and planning have been central to UNC’s educational mission for at least 40 
years.  
 Appropriately, when our administration announced its development of a new 
strategic plan in 2006, it simultaneously announced that all individual academic units 
would be required to submit their own assessment plans by fall of 2007 and strategic 
plans by fall of 2008. By emphasizing, from the start, that the process was “a natural 
extension of the institution’s commitment to excellence in teaching and learning” whose 
aim was “program improvement,” the administration demonstrated that, indeed, program 
administrators and faculty had something at stake in this process (Institutional Research 
and Planning, Assessment at Appalachian 3). To guide faculty and staff through this 
process, the administration held open forums, frequent faculty meetings, workshop 
opportunities, and individual conferences with the Office of Institutional Research and 
Planning (IRAP). In doing so, the administration fostered a vibrant culture of assessment 
on campus and more than adequately supported each academic unit’s participation in the 
projects.  
 In the UWC, I approached our assessment plan with the intention of improving 
the systems we had in place because I recognized that the process actually had less to do 
with the “administration” than it did with our own initiatives to contribute to the 
development and growth of our community within the university and the town of Boone.  
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Furthermore, the narratives of the field solidified my commitment to developing a 
localized approach comprised of multiple measures. As I developed our planning 
documents, I distinguished between “direct” and “indirect” measures, balanced narrative 
with quantifiable data, and challenged our unit to improve our own planning efforts. 
From creation to implementation, our academic unit initiated all planning efforts, keeping 
its focus on the ways in which our unit connected with and furthered the mission of App  
State as a whole, as well as the best practices in the field of RC (See Fig. 4 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4. Major Guiding Principles Influencing the UWC’s Assessment      
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 These experiences taught me a powerful lesson about university participation: 
institutional context matters. When I went to academic conferences touting the benefits of 
assessment, I was treated like a brainwashed bureaucrat who simply worked for a 
benevolent administrator. In the “real world” programs were being cut, positions 
eliminated, and academic identities fragmented, regardless of the craftsmanship and 
integrity of assessment and planning documents. Regardless, I am fortunate that at App 
State the UWC was privileged enough as an independent program to maintain its 
credibility and to demonstrate its necessity to the institution’s larger mission of providing 
superior curricula and instruction.  
Part of what makes my experience unique is the fact that, in the fall of 2008, App 
State implemented a brand new General Education Curriculum with a vertical writing 
model, which required students to complete a writing course throughout their college 
experience. With an increase in writing classes and a number of faculty who needed 
professional development to teach the new writing courses, the UWC had a secure 
position within the university because the General Education Program now looked to the 
UWC to assist with its mission. When writing became a university-wide priority through 
general education reform, our value as an academic unit concretized.  
Obtaining this kind of permanence, even temporarily, directly impacts what an 
academic unit deems possible within a given set of confines. For our program, 
assessment and planning provided us with the tools to recognize our place within App 
State’s institutional mission. Further, the process demonstrated that our unit’s narrative 
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absolutely contributed to the narrative of our institution, which contributed to the 
narrative of our state, and so on. While some WPAs might criticize this approach because 
it is not critical of the planning process itself, accountability and transparency are not 
going anywhere. To that end, I encourage new faculty to approach assessment and 
planning from a narrative perspective so that they find the fissures and congruencies 
within with narrative levels of their own institutional context so that, when their narrative 
is called for, a powerful and integral response will be provided.  
 While this chapter chronicled a positive relationship between institutional identity 
and narrative, the narrative logics of an institution’s individual academic units do not 
always cohere. At App State, the UWC harmoniously identified itself as a service-
oriented program furthering the mission of the university as whole, particularly the 
General Education Program. The next chapter, however, presents a case study of 
competing narrative logics between two programs within one department. Division and 
fragmentation replace words like synergy and cohesion, as I examine how a proposal to 
relocate the Composition Program at App State from the English Department to 
University College called into question the relationship between departmental and 
disciplinary narratives. While the contrast might appear stark to the onlooker, these case 
studies map out at least two ways that narrative logic provides a useful perspective for 
institutional engagement.  
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NOTES 
1. For a vibrant and useful discussion on how to create a culture of writing 
assessment, see Brian Huot’s “Toward a New Theory of Writing Assessment” (1996) and 
“Toward A New Discourse of Assessment for the College Writing Classroom” (2002); 
Peggy O’Neill, Ellen Schendel, and Brian Huot’s “Defining Assessment as Research: 
Moving from Obligations to Opportunities” (2002); and Cindy Moore, Peggy O’Neill, 
and Brian Huot’s “Creating a Culture of Assessment in Writing Programs and Beyond” 
(2009) and A Guide to College Writing Assessment (2009). These writers, more so than 
other scholars in the field, provide incredible guidance on assessment by explaining the 
guiding principles and assumptions WPAs need to develop and execute successful 
writing and program assessments.  
 2. See Chris W. Gallagher’s Reclaiming Assessment: A Better Alternative to the 
Accountability Agenda (2007).  
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CHAPTER V 
 
THE NARRATIVE LOGIC OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
 
[N]arratives are internal constructions that distinguish and politicize what 
members of an organization value....these narratives denote the various identities 
members claims and provide the framework from within which new members 
may choose their own organizational identity. –Brenton D. Faber, Community 
Action and Organizational Change (33)  
 
 
Writing program administrators (WPAs) fulfill a variety of roles within an 
institution, often serving as both program directors and tenure-track or full-time faculty 
members (McLeod 7-11). This dual responsibility—teaching and directing—presents a 
unique set of opportunities and challenges for WPAs, as the narratives governing 
departmental and programmatic behaviors and beliefs have the potential to cohere, 
compete, or misalign. These potentials, of course, are contingent upon a variety of factors 
related to curricular collaborations, reporting lines, staffing, and institutional location. To 
add an additional complication, the organizational and labor structures of any given 
writing program vary across institutions. Even within the same state system, WPAs fulfill 
different roles, and the programs they oversee provide different kinds of services for their 
home institutions. Within The University of North Carolina (UNC), for example, each 
institution’s composition or first-year writing program has a defined goal, set of core 
classes, and reporting line(s) that differentiate them. Further, additional writing programs 
such as writing centers or writing/communication across the curriculum programs lack 
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uniformity from school to school, as do the responsibilities and autonomy of WPAs. 
These differences prevent a systematic, straightforward analysis of the narratives 
governing writing program administration, requiring a research methodology that is, 
fundamentally, location specific.  
Adhering to these principles and following the vibrant tradition in the field of 
rhetoric and composition (RC) to share local stories about programmatic development, 
this chapter focuses specifically on the Rhetoric and Composition Program’s (RC 
Program) attempt at Appalachian State University (App State) to relocate from the 
College of Arts and Sciences to University College (UC) in the 2009-2010 academic 
school year. While the previous chapter explored how assessment initiatives positively 
revealed the confluence of narratives between App State’s University Writing Center 
(UWC) and its stakeholders, this chapter examines how this particular institutional 
change effort challenged the synergistic possibilities among disciplinary, departmental, 
programmatic, and institutional narratives guiding the RC Program at App State. More 
importantly, this local example problematizes a simplistic view of institutional change by 
making transparent the nexus of narratives guiding departmental decision-making 
processes. For new WPAs, this example will question a number of idealistic narratives 
inundating WPA scholarship, especially those that position the WPA as an uninhibited 
change agent/hero leading his/her program toward liberation, in addition to the narrative 
that institutional change is simply a matter of making the right arguments.  
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As I mentioned at the start of this project, my first position as a WPA introduced 
me to the politics of university administration and departmental governance, an 
experience that I was wholly unprepared for and an experience that revised the romantic 
narratives I had associated with the “power” of a WPA. Firsthand, I had to identify, at 
least on an informal level, the system at work within a university department in order to 
figure out my role in that system. In other words, when I began my position, I did not 
know initially how to interpret the arguments presented in faculty meetings, how to 
research institutional history in order to present informed contributions to the discussions, 
or even how to follow Robert’s Rules of Order. Needless to say, my entire first year as 
the Assistant Writing Center Director and Adjunct Faculty in English was relatively 
silent, without any kind of rhetorical sophistication.  
Despite the academic remarkability of my graduate experiences, I expected to be 
better equipped to handle higher-level conversations regarding placement, course design, 
or labor practices. I also expected to encounter a fully collegial environment where all 
faculty, regardless of affiliation within the field of English studies, embraced the common 
pursuit of guiding student writers through the literacy process. Finally, I expected to reap 
the benefits of RC’s legitimacy battles of the 90s and early aughts by earning collegial 
respect and recognition as an expert in the field. While my experiences were not the 
antithesis of these expectations, they definitely challenged what I believed to be true 
about institutional engagement at that point. Accordingly, the tenor of this chapter 
contrasts with that of Chapter IV because my institutional position as a WPA conflicted 
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so drastically with my institutional position as a faculty. Moreover, the Rhetoric and 
Composition Relocation Proposal (hereafter, Proposal) forced me into an interstitial 
space within which my institutional identities conflicted. In the UWC, the narratives 
guiding my work cohered; in English, they tended toward dis-unification. Piecing 
together the best possible solutions, consequently, proved difficult.  
What follows in this chapter is an account of the RC Program’s Proposal to 
relocate to UC, and I investigate the range of narratives underscoring the major debates. 
My intention in this chapter is to show how a narrative framework equipped me with the 
analytical tools I needed to figure out when and how to act. By isolating the narrative 
logic at work in the initiative, I obtained a rich understanding of the interplay among 
university structures, interested stakeholders, and faculty governance. Further, I felt 
confident in my role as WPA-Adjunct Faculty and recognized the degree to which my 
institutional authority was conditioned by my dual identity. Had I entered the position 
with this framework in mind, my initial participation might have looked very different. 
However, part of what it takes to enter an institution is an adjustment of our expectations 
and prior experiences in the face of new relationships, new guiding principles, and new 
narrative dynamics. I have no intention in this analysis of negatively or unfairly 
representing App State. Instead, my goal is to encourage novice WPAs to identify the 
frameworks they discovered and to make these visible to other WPAs who may feel 
overwhelmed by their first professional experience.  
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To develop this analysis, I rely heavily on primary research, particularly the 
Provost-appointed Rhetoric and Composition Relocation Task Force Report, which was 
published in April of 2010. This document presents the Task Force’s recommendations, a 
history of the proposal, and a considerable number of appendices that reveal the 
polyphonous underbelly of the relocation effort. In addition, I draw from a collection of 
institutional research documents I created and subsequently distributed during a half-day 
workshop at the 2010 Conference on College Composition and Communication in 
Louisville, KY (session AW.6). The documents formalize the structure of our programs, 
faculty positions and rank, university-wide collaborations and partnerships, curricular 
changes since 2007, and task delegation among WPAs. I also incorporate secondary 
research on institutional change in order to connect my analysis with current scholarship 
that is attentive to the relationship between narrative and change. Finally, I argue that the 
Proposal offers a powerful example of the fragility of institutional structures because, 
when viewed from a narrative lens, the document reveals the ways in which university 
structures are always evolving alongside a dynamic range of national, institutional, 
disciplinary, departmental, and personal narratives that are indeterminate. These 
narratives influence an institution’s, as well as its individual academic units’, abilities to 
maintain a stable, transitional, or transformative identity. In other words, the narrative 
levels guiding an institution have the power to cohere but also to conflict; because of this, 
institutions are never fixed structures.  
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Before I begin this discussion, however, I must make the following admission: in 
May of 2005, I received my MA in English from App State, and my major areas of study 
included Eighteenth Century British Literature, Post-WWII American Literature, and 
Rhetoric and Composition. During this program, I fulfilled a two-year TAship in the 
UWC and the English Department. In 2005, I left App State to pursue my PhD in 
English, with a concentration on Rhetoric and Composition, at the University of North 
Carolina Greensboro. After completing my doctoral work in the spring of 2007, a full-
time position opened at App State that was designated 3/4-time Assistant Writing Center 
Director and 1/4-time Adjunct Faculty in English. I applied and accepted this position 
with enthusiasm. When I began the job in August of 2007, I was an alumna-turned-
colleague to English faculty, and without a doubt, this subject position complicated my 
ability to enter the department with confidence, especially because my former teacher-
student relationships had to be reconfigured, some for the better and some for the worse.  
I have no doubt that my perspective on the relocation initiative is mired in my 
past experiences; however, as a pragmatist, I see this chapter as my attempt to formalize a 
contingent truth about narrative and institutions, grounded in experience, that I can 
continue to apply to new contexts after this project’s completion. As Kate Ronald and 
Hephzibah advocate in Reason to Believe: Romanticism, Pragmatism, and the Teaching 
of Writing, systems are not immutable, and we need to apply pragmatist principles that 
enable us to imagine alternatives within a seemingly fixed structure. These principles 
value the role of lived experience and observation to inquiry, and they honor the 
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importance of fallibility to any conclusion and/or judgment. Ronald and Roskelly term 
this practice “romantic/pragmatist rhetoric,” which is a method for “systematizing...belief 
so that it becomes continually tested and rethought and continually responsive to 
changing contexts” (137). The narrative logic of institutional change is such an endeavor, 
and after this single iteration, within the context of a dissertation, I intend to continue 
finding additional locations where my method may be retested and reformulated. As a 
pragmatist, I recognize that I can only offer a contingent understanding of narrative logic 
within a departmental context. Knowing that this understanding has the potential to 
evolve, I consider this chapter as a conversation starter with my audience.  
1. Writing Programs at Appalachian State University 
Appalachian State University houses three writing programs: the Rhetoric and 
Composition (RC) Program, the Writing Across the Curriculum Program (WAC), and the 
University Writing Center (UWC). WAC and the UWC are located within a relatively 
new academic structure called University College (UC). Founded in 2007 by former 
Vice-Provost for Undergraduate Education (VPUG) Dave Haney, UC was created to 
bring together the university’s general education curriculum, student and faculty support 
services, residential learning communities, interdisciplinary degree programs, and co-
curricular programs, all of which support faculty and students both inside and outside of 
the classroom. The VPUG oversees UC and reports directly to the Provost of Academic 
Affairs. In addition to WAC and the UWC, UC houses First-year Seminar (FYS), the 
Vertical Writing Model (VWM), and the General Education Curriculum (Gen Ed). 
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Alongside the development of UC, the Provost appointed the General Education 
Task Force in 2005 to provide recommendations for an innovative general education 
model that would appropriately respond to national and state demands for improved 
college curricula. In the fall of 2007, UC implemented the Task Force’s recommendation, 
creating a sophisticated and revitalized Gen Ed curriculum. This program is divided into 
four “Perspectives,” which generates a majority of the course, but students also take FYS 
and the first two courses of the VWM (See Figure 5 below).  The Gen Ed Curriculum 
Committee designed the VWM to offer students continued support for writing throughout 
their college careers. During the first year, students take English 1000, Expository 
Writing; in the second year, English 2001, Introduction to Writing Across the 
Curriculum; in the third year, a “Writing in the Major” course; and in the fourth, a Senior 
Capstone Project. The RC Program teaches the first two courses in this sequence. Aside 
from FYS, these are the only courses required for all undergraduates.  
 Supporting the VWM, the WAC Program works with all writing faculty across 
the university, including RC faculty in the English Department. The WAC Program also 
reviews all writing course proposals and assesses writing courses for Gen Ed. WAC 
consultants are English faculty, and WID consultants teach in a range of university 
disciplines. Alongside the WAC Program, the UWC provides additional writing support 
for university students, faculty, and staff. UWC consultants are advanced undergraduates, 
graduate assistants (GA), graduate teaching assistants (GTAs), and RC faculty. In 
 
Figure 5. General Education 
consultation with the Office of Distance
center, and, in accordance with WAC, 
for WID Faculty. Both the WAC Program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 From these descriptions, the 
clear. More importantly, both programs have deep connections with the RC Program
through a variety of campus and departmental collaborations
the UWC, the RC Program is 
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Program. (Appalachian State University, 2008; web).  
 Education, the UWC provides an online writing 
UWC Consultants also serve as Writing Mentors 
and the UWC report directly to the VPUG
collaborations between WAC and the UWC are 
. However, unlike WAC and 
administratively housed in the English Department
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Figure 6 below). Reporting directly to Arts and Sciences, the English Department houses 
the RC Program and offers a range of degrees, including a BA with concentrations in 
Film Studies, Creative Writing, and Professional Writing; a BS for teachers; a “second 
major” in English Education for Education majors; an undergraduate minor for B.A. or 
B.S. teacher education majors in other disciplines; MAs in Literature (thesis required), 
Secondary Education (thesis or non-thesis), and Junior Colleges (thesis or non-thesis); 
and a RC Graduate Certificate. Overall, the faculty composition for the 2009-2010 
academic year was 42 tenured and tenure-track (TT) faculty; 38 non-tenure track (NTT) 
faculty; and 18 GTAs.   
 From this faculty pool, the RC Program is comprised of four TTs; 38 NTTs, 19 of 
which are benefitted; and 12 GTAs. GTAs and NTTs primarily teach the undergraduate 
writing courses in the VWM, in addition to English 0900, Basic Writing. WPAs, 
including the Assistant Director of the UWC, teach the undergraduate courses for the 
VWM, in addition to the advanced-level courses such as English 3400, Advanced 
Expository Writing; and English 3450, Writing Center Theory and Practice. Tenured and 
tenure-track RC faculty teach English 5100, Composition Theory, Practice, and 
Pedagogy, as well as a series of one-hour mentoring courses to accompany GTAs’ 
teaching experiences. Finally, the TT faculty oversee the RC Graduate Certificate. To 
receive the certificate, graduate students take 12 hours of coursework in RC and complete 
a thesis or capstone project. The RC Program reports to the English Department Chair but 
is assessed by Gen Ed in University College.  
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Figure 6. Writing Programs’ Reporting Structures  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The RC, WAC, and UWC Directors share a number of administrative tasks with 
regard to assessment, teaching, and mentoring (See Table 1). Additionally, all three 
WPAs occupy tenure-track lines in English and teach in the RC Program. The major 
difference is that the WAC and UWC programs are housed administratively within the 
UC, so each program director has two direct reports, one to the VPUG and one to the 
English Department Chair. Additionally, as the table below makes clear, the WAC and 
UWC program directors have the administrative authority to hire their employees and to 
oversee their budgets. In RC, the English Department Chair oversees the operational 
budget, and hiring decisions are vetted through a series of committees that, ultimately, 
recommend to the Chair. In this way, the primary difference between the programs 
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housed in UC and the program housed in English is the individual WPA’s programmatic 
autonomy.  
 
Table 1 
Administrative Comparisons of WPAs 
Tasks RC Director WAC Director UWC Director 
Teaches RC Courses   
(undergraduate and graduate)  
 
ü 
 
ü 
 
ü 
Mentors Graduate TAs  ü ü ü 
Develops Program 
Assessment for Gen Ed 
ü ü ü 
Tenured/TT line in English ü ü ü 
Controls Program Budget û ü ü 
Oversees Staff/Faculty Hires û ü ü 
Program Housed in UC û ü ü 
 
 
 With regard to staffing and daily operations, the three writing programs 
collaborate in a number of contexts. First, all three programs support the VWM and the 
Gen Ed Curriculum. The RC Program is responsible for teaching the first two writing 
courses in the VWM; the WAC Program oversees the assessment and faculty 
development for the VWM; and the UWC works with the WID faculty through the 
Writing Mentors Program. Second, all three units employ common faculty and GAs. 
Some faculty and GAs teach in two of the three writing programs, while some teach in all 
three. Third, the programs partner together to provide professional development and 
mentoring for their staff. WAC provides training and brown bags for all faculty teaching 
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in the VWM, and all three programs collaborate both financially and organizationally to 
invite leading RC scholars in the field to conduct workshops for writing faculty. These 
scholars have included Kathleen Blake Yancey, Eileen Schell, Nancy Welch, Lisa Ede, 
Peter Elbow, Elizabeth Chiseri-Strater, and Hephzibah Roskelly, among others. Fourth, 
in the English Department, all WPAs serve together on a number of committees. The RC 
Director, the RC Assistant Director, WAC Director, UWC Director, and UWC Assistant 
Director have standing positions on the Rhetoric and Composition Committee in the 
English Department. In addition to other RC faculty, the directors collaborate on 
programmatic and curricular issues, such as placement and course proposals, for the RC 
Program. A RC hiring committee also contains members from all three writing programs, 
and, finally, the RC Program holds monthly general meetings where faculty are invited to 
learn about new initiatives and to listen to teaching presentations from their peers.  
  The final point of comparison among these programs centers on institutional and 
disciplinary missions. Because the field of RC informs all three programs, the theories 
and practices guiding them overlap, particularly with regard to the best pedagogical and 
assessment practices in the field. All three programs value a process approach to the 
teaching of writing and advocate for students’ acquisition of the rhetorical skills they 
need to write in any genre and/or discipline. On the institutional level, all programs 
support the goals of UC through the VWM. WAC oversees the faculty development; the 
UWC support students and WID faculty; and the RC Program’s primary responsibility is 
to teach the first two courses in the sequence. As a result of these collaborations, faculty 
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in all three programs share pedagogical strategies, work together on course design and 
programmatic initiatives, and co-participate in professional development workshops. The 
narratives influencing all three programs, from institutional mission to disciplinary 
allegiances, overlap significantly.  
2. Rhetoric and Composition Relocation Proposal History 
 As I explained these programs, I intentionally emphasized their collaborations so 
that the reader has a vivid picture of the ways in which these programs share particular 
institutional and disciplinary narratives that, in turn, shape their organizational identities. 
All three of these programs support the mission of the Gen Ed curriculum and therefore 
are responsible for the development of a writing culture on campus. In this way, WAC, 
RC, and the UWC, in the process of serving all undergraduates, also service each other 
through their shared faculty, professional development, and institutional visions. The 
narrative of university service brings these programs together. Also, all three look to the 
Council of Writing Program Administrators and the Conference on College Composition 
and Communication for scholarly direction and expertise. The guiding principles of these 
organizations, in turn, support the curricular development of each program, in addition to 
assessment initiatives and programmatic identity. From an outside perspective, then, all 
three programs promulgate similar narratives regarding the best practices in the field and 
a sincere commitment to university service. Further, disciplinary narratives in the field, 
particularly those presented in A Field of Dreams: Independent Writing Programs and 
the Future of Composition Studies, suggest that the number of writing programs seeking 
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independence with regard to institutional location is increasing. As a result, independent 
writing programs represent a disciplinary trend.  
 These narratives prompted the Rhetoric and Composition Committee to discuss 
the possibility of program relocation in the spring of 2009 (Rhetoric and Composition 
Relocation Proposal Task Force [RCRPTF] 4). In late April, visiting scholar Nancy 
Sommers led a faculty development workshop for the WAC program, during which she, 
the WPAs from all three programs, and the VPUG brainstormed the writing programs’ 
administrative and institutional locations at App State. This conversation sparked the 
VPUG’s interest, as well as the WPAs’, which led to a series of meetings and additional 
conversations among the appropriate stakeholders, including the Provost, the English 
Department Chair, the Vice-Provost for Faculty Affairs, and the Dean of Arts and 
Sciences (4). These meetings prepared all invested parties for the development of a 
proposal, scheduled for fall 2009. During the summer of 2009, the WPAs conducted 
research in order to investigate the legitimacy of such a proposal and its feasibility at App 
State (4).  Of course, this summary is only one piece of the whole story.  
 When the RC Committee discussed the possibility of relocation, other factors 
influenced the desire to seek an alternative location. To begin, former RC Director Dr. 
Georgia Rhoades worked consistently from 1998 to 2007 to change the culture of NTT 
writing instructors at App State. Prior to her leadership, the balance of TT to NTT ratios 
for the teaching of composition shifted considerably; so much that, by 1998, nearly all 
composition courses were taught by NTTs (Rhoades and Haney). Of these faculty, only 
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two were in benefitted positions (Kelly). To promote a stable work environment and to 
create a writing faculty community, Rhoades advocated for NTT living wages, and when 
Dr. Dave Haney accepted the English Department Chair position in 2001, the two worked 
together to create several 3/4 and full-time lines for NTT faculty. The university at large 
followed this lead in 2006, converting over 39 NTTs to 3/4-time benefitted positions. On 
a university level, the work initiated by Rhoades and Haney set a tone for the entire 
campus, which changed NTT culture campus-wide (Rhoades and Haney). By 2009, 19 
RC faculty held 3/4-time or full-time benefitted positions, a considerable improvement 
from 1998 (Hassell, “Reporting”).  
 These changes did more than improve working conditions for RC faculty at App 
State. They developed a culture of permanence that improved faculty retention and 
morale. To supplement their labor advancements, Rhoades also established incredible 
relationships with publishing companies and local RC scholars within UNC. Through 
these partnerships, Rhoades invited speakers from the field to work with RC faculty at 
App State; in doing so, she transformed RC faculty into highly trained, specialized 
writing faculty whose contributions to the RC program were not only welcomed but also 
crucial to the program’s success (Rhoades and Haney). A final piece to Rhoades’ legacy 
occurred in 2002 when the department hired Dr. Beth Carroll to implement a writing 
center, which provided NTT faculty with another site for improving their professional 
quality. These combined efforts transformed, dramatically, the commitment and rigor RC 
faculty invested into their program. With two TT faculty in RC and nearly thirty faculty 
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who were well professionalized, the RC Program at App State became a cohesive 
program with a clearly defined mission and vision.  
 Of course, these cultures shifted again in 2006 when Dave Haney accepted the 
Vice-Provost of Academic Affairs position, and yet again in 2007 when Georgia Rhoades 
accepted the WAC Director position in UC and the new Gen Ed Curriculum was 
implemented. In the 2007-2008 academic year, the RC Program hired a new RC Director, 
Kim Gunter, and prepared for the new Gen Ed curriculum, which would go into effect in 
the fall of 2008. Charging the RC Program with staffing and developing the first two 
courses in the new VWM, the Gen Ed Curriculum offered additional opportunities for RC 
faculty, and this charge required RC faculty to engage in an extraordinarily lengthy 
professional development process, which begin in 2007 and is still ongoing. More 
specifically, this process invited RC faculty to directly shape their own program and to 
invent their curriculum (Kelly). Appropriately, this experience engaged RC faculty in 
meaningful professional development that empowered their teaching and enriched their 
institutional lives (Kelly). The end result of this experience, however, demonstrated for 
many RC faculty that their institutional purpose was to serve Gen Ed, as opposed to 
English. The institutional location of and intense collaborations with the UWC and WAC 
compounded this perspective (RCRPTF 4).  
When Kim Gunter took over the program in 2008, the RC program was cohesive, 
dynamic, and self-assured. There was only one problem: the program’s success had 
created tenuous relationships within the English Department as a whole, beginning with a 
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departmental decision in 2007 to remove the voting rights of NTT faculty in benefitted 
positions (RCRPTF 8). The Departmental Personnel Committee (DPC), which is a 
committee structure unique to App State that makes recommendations on tenure and 
promotion, decided in the spring of 2007 that, since the Faculty Handbook allowed 
faculty with the title of “Lecturer” to serve and vote on the DPC, which makes 
recommendations on tenure and promotion, all English NTTs in benefitted positions who 
had the title should be re-contracted with the title “Adjunct” (8). This decision passed, 
forging an unalterable line between the TT faculty and the NTT faculty and thereby 
changing inter-departmental relationships permanently. At this point, RC faculty who had 
been empowered to invest in their program could not vote on any departmental decisions 
influencing their work, from course descriptions to textbook policies (8). Instead, 38 RC 
faculty had to rely on the votes of their three WPAs. The DPC decision was no small 
matter in the English Department, as it “heightened the feelings of disrespect, created 
inefficiencies and obstructions in decision-making” (8). These inefficiencies are best 
illustrated in the chart below (Figure 7), which reveals the complicated web of 
committees outside of RC that have the power to make decisions for RC. Regardless of 
one’s affiliations within the department, after the 2007 DPC meeting, palpable tensions 
alienated English faculty, and resentment began to build on both sides. For the next three 
years, NTT voting rights continually appeared on the departmental meetings agendas, and 
the item was continually tabled due to a “lack of clarity” in the Faculty Handbook (8). 
Readers familiar with Barry Maid’s contribution to A Field of Dreams will notice that 
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these mirror, almost to a T, the events leading to the University of Arkansas Little Rock’s 
relocation from English.  
A final motivation for the Proposal that ran parallel to departmental governance 
issues was the physical working environment for NTT faculty. Only two full-time NTTs 
were secured individual offices, which were actually converted storage closets (62-63). 
Additionally, the other 36 NTTs were offered one large office with 14 desks and three 
computers and a smaller office with six desks and two computers. The larger office 
vibrated continually (known as the “shaky room”), and in both communal offices, faculty 
did not have privacy for student conferences and often met in other locations. 
The tensions with voting rights, working conditions, and departmental decision-
making procedures demonstrated to the RC Program that their collaborations with the 
UWC and the WAC Program would be better served if all three writing programs were 
housed in the same administrative unit with one direct report to the VPUG. In addition, 
the RC Program continually aligned itself more and more with the Gen Ed vision, and the 
program agreed that a structural shift to UC would strengthen the campus writing 
programs by centralizing their missions, increasing their hiring flexibility, and enabling 
their development of a vibrant writing culture at App State. Finally, the RC Program saw 
possibility in such a move because disciplinary visions would also be aligned. As 
resentment concerning faculty representation and governance within English hindered the 
 
 
 
 161
Figure 7. Decision-Making Influences on RC Initiatives. Rhetoric and Composition Relocation 
Proposal Task Force Recommendation (Appalachian State University, 29 Apr. 2010; web; 9).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                 
strength of the writing programs’ collaborative efforts to create new initiatives, such as 
self-directed placement, the internal divisions within English worsened (59).  
 All of these factors led the 2009-2010 RC Committee to create a proposal to 
relocate from the English Department to University College. And, because the larger field 
of RC had its own collection of “divorce narratives” from various programs the relocated, 
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the WPAs felt confident that they were making the best decision. After a series of 
committee meetings and countless email exchanges, the proposal was submitted to the 
Provost, Vice-Provost for Undergraduate Education, the Dean of Arts and Sciences, and 
the English Department Chair, all of whom were the primary administrators influencing 
the decision, on September 28, 2009 (RCRPTF 4). Because the Provost and VPUG 
agreed that the deliberation be “as transparent as possible,” the Provost decided to 
appoint a Task Force in the spring of 2010 to review the case and to submit formal 
recommendations. The Task Force met for the first time on January 22nd and submitted 
its final recommendations on April 28th. Between these dates, the Task Force Chair spent 
over 20 hours holding anonymous faculty meetings, the Task Force held three open 
forums for all university members, and the Task Force conducted considerable research 
on independent writing programs.  
 In addition, three formal votes were conducted to gauge faculty responses. First, 
the NTT RC Faculty participated in a straw poll; 31 supported the proposal, 4 opposed, 
and 1 person abstained. The voter turnout was 36/38. Second, the TT faculty conducted a 
straw pole as well; 9 supported the proposal, 17 opposed the proposal, and 2 people 
abstained. The voter turnout was 28/42. The composite votes from the English 
Department were 40 in favor, 21 opposed, and 3 abstentions (45). The final formal vote 
conducted on the proposal was by University College Council, who voted on whether or 
not the UC was an appropriate institutional location for the RC Program; 10 voted in 
favor, 2 opposed, and 4 abstained.  
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 The final recommendations (not ranked) were as follows, and I quote at length in 
order to offer the full justification: 
 
1. Combine the Rhetoric and Composition Program with the Writing Center and 
Writing Across the Curriculum to create a single unit (e.g. “ASU Writing”), 
with one direct report to Academic Affairs or the head of University College, 
or  
2. Create a Rhetoric and Composition Program as a separate unit with a direct 
report to Academic Affairs or the head of University College.  
   The Task Force strongly recommends against delaying this decision. Structural 
problems are increasingly interfering with the department’s ability to function, 
and postponement of a resolution will exacerbate the problems.  
   The primary factors supporting this recommendation, based on the overarching 
criterion of what would be best for students, are as follows:  
• Benefits gained across the university by giving greater autonomy to 
Rhetoric and Composition and locating it in a multidisciplinary structure,  
• Evidence of significant morale problems that have the potential to impact 
teaching and job performance throughout the department, and  
• Increased potential for effectiveness and development of Rhetoric and 
Composition and the other programs in the English Department by 
decreasing bureaucratic inefficiencies and wasted energies. (3) 
 
 
These recommendations are straightforward, and if we examine the language, we can see 
that the Task Force presents the recommendations with a sense of urgency, encouraging 
the administration to act quickly. However, two significant changes happened during the 
Task Force’s final stages: the Provost announced that he would return to his faculty 
position in the fall of 2010, reporting directly to the Dean of Arts and Sciences, and the 
VPUG announced that he had accepted a provost position at another institution (5). At 
this point, my narrative ends. I left the position in July of 2010, and this document was 
not published until the fall of 2010. For the inquisitive, however, I must state that the RC 
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Program continues to be housed in the English Department, despite the Task Force’s 
warning that “Leaving the situation as it is will be detrimental to all faculty members 
involved” (3). Further, the Dean has imposed an indefinite hiring freeze on the 
department due to its inability to foster a productive and safe work environment.  
3. The Rhetoric of Institutional Change 
 Even in a 15-page history, discourse proves its limitations, as I cannot account for 
all of the complexities influencing this process. More specifically, the finer points of 
contention and possibility simply cannot be re-presented for the reader, despite my best 
efforts. Personally, this struggle for change was the most academically challenging 
experience I have ever faced. When I left the institution, faculty who would invite me for 
coffee no longer spoke to me; administrators that I had good relationships with prior to 
this experience publicly chastised me; and TT faculty on both sides of the debate 
published, through the departmental listserv, personally scathing remarks about one 
another. These statements found their way to English graduate students’ inboxes, as well 
as the Task Force Report. Indelibly etched in cyberspace, these statements offer 
discursive proof that organizational change can be messy, frightening, and profoundly 
human. And, we don’t always have winners.  
 The question that must be asked, then, is what can we learn from this experience? 
Rhetorician Brenton D. Faber offers tentative answers. In Community Action and 
Organizational Change, Faber advances a thorough analysis of organization change that 
focuses on the role of narrative and image. For Faber, organizational change occurs when 
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conflict emerges between an organization’s internal narratives and its external images 
(33). That is, between the narratives organizational members believe and the images non-
organizational members perceive. When this happens, Faber argues, organizations 
become distressed. The process of change involves realigning the discordance between 
narrative and image, which results in stability (39). In this analysis, we can hear echoes of 
Linda Adler-Kassner’s work on writing program administration and how rhetorical 
framing conditions the narrative possibilities for telling our stories about writing. While 
both writers are right to acknowledge that “If those of us who believe in higher education 
do not produce the narratives that build up and sustain our educational structures, other 
people will start telling our stories for us” (Faber 107), neither writer offers an 
ameliorative solution for narrative discordance within a supposedly cooperative 
organization, especially the kind revealed by the RC Proposal. 
 By all intents and purposes, English faculty inside and outside the RC Program 
should have been able to agree on whether or not to relocate the program, given the 
longevity of both programs and how closely they have evolved over the past thirty years 
particularly. Several committee responses to the Proposal, including the Undergraduate 
Studies Committee and the General Education Committee, attempted to reach this goal, 
but various groups within the department could not agree on what Faber terms the “core 
narratives” (104). Core narratives are the discursive foundations of an organization, the 
bottom line guiding principles that, no matter what, everyone believes. In many respects, 
the core narratives of an English department should emerge from disciplinarity, but 
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disciplinarity itself served as a major stumbling block to clear communication. The 
“inherent connection between reading and writing” offered no discursive recourse. And 
perhaps rightfully so. After all, RC has worked extraordinarily hard in the second half of 
the twentieth century to develop a cohesive disciplinary identity. To hear, then, that RC is 
merely a subfield of English studies, as opposed to an “official discipline,” is to 
experience a form of verbal abuse that directly impacts self-identification and reinforces a 
colonizing mentality where English owns RC, a well-investigated topic in the field.  
 In the absence of core narratives centered on shared connections and possibilities, 
the English Department cannot experience true organizational change, at least not in the 
way Faber understands it. Since the process of change results in the realignment of image 
and narrative or, in our case, of interdepartmental narratives alone, the Task Force’s 
recommendations, had they been successfully implemented, would have exerted the 
change needed for realignment. For example, if an outside party, such as the Provost, 
imposed a set of principles, “The RC Program will stay because of X” or “The RC 
Program will relocate because of Y,” the English Department, more than likely, would 
have been forced into the position of adjusting to the new story, in whatever form that 
took. Instead, no story was imposed, and no principles were assigned; the only item 
reinforced was narrative discordance.   
 Examining Foucault’s theory on discourse, Faber notes that,  
 
 
in contexts of change, old discursive structures are erased by the new discourse. 
Each organization is a constant site of discursive struggle. But in the midst of this 
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struggle, the organization must recognize and assert its core narratives. 
Employees must learn these core values. (103) 
 
 
 The reason that App State’s English Department did not complete the process of 
organizational change as defined by Faber is due the fact that “core narratives” were 
never established, even before the Proposal process. If one examines the departmental 
history during the approval of the English Department mission, evidence of conflict 
regarding core narratives are abound. Unfortunately, this lack of cohesion does not bode 
well for the department, and it seems that the only solution to resolve its stress is the 
imposition of a core narrative from an external influence. To date, I have no knowledge if 
this is even possible within that context.  
 For this particular example, the narrative logic of institutional change drastically 
differs from the narrative logic of assessment I presented in the last chapter. Clearly 
articulated missions, goals, and identifications with the larger narratives of the institution, 
such as Gen Ed, UC, the UWC, etc., did not provide the RC Program with any leverage 
for relocating their program. If anything, the more research the program conducted, the 
farther away it moved from its end goal. The more inter- and extra-institutional data the 
program collected, the less grounded the program became in its own struggle. On a 
discursive level, the overall English vote, with RC faculty included, was in support of the 
proposal, as was the UC vote. More importantly, the RC Task Force Recommendations 
clearly stated that the program should be relocated. The inactivity of the Provost and the 
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lack of support or advocacy for units outside of the English Department impeded the 
change process, bringing it to a halt—at least for the time being.  
 What we can glean from this example is commentary on the tumultuous nature of 
institutional change and the absolute uncertainty of university structures. Resulting in a 
stalemate, the Proposal revealed that the English Department did not have a set of core 
narratives shaping the identity of its faculty. Instead, factions within the department had 
their own core narratives that were pitted against other groups’ core narratives, and these 
interactions resulted in extreme fragmentation, political hysteria, and dis-unification. In 
this way, although no resolution was reached, the process highlights the instability of 
university departments, especially in circumstances where narrative discordance has no 
opportunity for realignment.  
4. Narrative Abundance  
 Although Faber’s framework of discordance and realignment does not fit the 
circumstances of App State precisely, his theory helps us to understand why institutional 
change proved impossible in our context. In order for core narratives to develop, 
organizational members have to work together to create them. This initiative requires 
patience, time, and a safe space. During the proposal process for the RC Program, the 
available narratives at any given time were so vast that, literally, prospects of 
achievement from one day to the next drastically varied. Keeping up with the 
proliferation of narratives was hard enough, let alone coming to a true agreement about 
fundamental principles.  
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 Although the key rhetorical moves used during the proposal process were 
narrative efforts to control the story and to intercede, where possible, in others’ stories so 
as to direct the outcomes, the narratives shifted and developed quickly, preventing a 
single person from controlling the process. More importantly, with the perpetual growth 
of circulating narratives, the end result was merely fragmentation. If forced to offer the 
“whole story” of how the Proposal developed, even I could not provide a coherent 
account, and I was one of the most active members as a WPA and the Chair of the NTT 
committee. I even co-authored the document. For example, when the proposal process 
began in August 2009, through an informal meeting between WPAs and the VPUG, the 
news of the meeting reached the ear of the Chair who then placed the proposal as an 
agenda item for the first full faculty meeting, even though the committee’s plan was to 
draft the proposal and present it to the chair before announcing to the full faculty 
(RCRPTF 4). Without warning, the RC Director had to construct, on the fly, a cohesive 
narrative of the proposal’s process, even though the process had yet to begin. 
Uninformed, the English faculty received an unintended narrative that contradicted the 
one constructed by the RC Committee the semester before. From the start, one of the 
most criticized aspects of the proposal was the process itself. Not recognizing that the 
Chair mis-stepped, the full faculty entered the change initiative suspicious and weary of 
RC’s intentions. This event was the first of many to provoke the circulation of what I will 
call “process narratives.” Because the process appeared sneaky, many faculty would not 
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even consider the proposal and, therefore, committed on day one to challenging the 
efforts RC faculty made to advance the proposal.  
 The process narratives impeded the development of the proposal, and a lot of time 
was devoted to lengthy conversations concerning how the proposal came into existence, 
who developed it, and why the English faculty was not consulted first. Despite how 
clearly this process was explained to the English faculty, the process narratives 
continually infiltrated discussions, obfuscating the merits of the proposal and directing 
attention away from the key issue: Is it pedagogically sound for the program to relocate? 
As a result, WPAs were often placed on the chopping block during faculty meetings, as 
though they were intentionally trying to damage the English Department. A familiar 
statement aimed at WPAs was “You can’t do this. You didn’t follow proper academic 
channels.” In this example, process narratives served to shut down debate. I term these 
kinds of narratives “closed narratives,” which are narratives that pose as the “final word” 
on the subject in order to deflect attention from the content of the issue under 
consideration.  
 “Policy narratives” are another form of closed narratives used to shut down 
debate. For example, during faculty discussions, a consistent narrative circulated that, 
before the administration could even consider the proposal, it had to be vetted through the 
university’s Academic Procedures and Policies Committee (AP&P). This narrative was 
presented as precedent because, in the past, another academic attempted a similar project 
and had to go through AP&P first. However, since the RC Proposal was a move from one 
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college to another, different rules applied. Regardless, the policy narrative of AP&P was 
presented repeatedly, even during the Task Force’s Open Forums. Like process 
narratives, policy narratives also function to shut down debate and to block progress.  
 A final closed narrative that inundated faculty discussions about the proposal was 
the “narrative of history.” Often presented by senior faculty, these narratives function to 
remind the faculty of the department’s intertwined history and previous unification. Like 
the nostalgic narratives associated with Women’s Rights, these narratives are meant to 
complicate and make strange the current conversation, given the prior unification and 
functionality the department may or may not have possessed. These narratives also put 
emotional strain on faculty by convincing them that the present horrors are aberrations.  
Therefore, the debate should center on recovering the past, rather than focusing on the 
actual issue at hand; in our case, the RC Proposal. 
 Throughout one given meeting, the amount of time taken to address narratives of 
process, policy, and history detracts considerably from what I call “open narratives,” 
which are narratives that foster dialogue and analysis of the guiding principles motivating 
the current object under consideration. In this category, I place narratives associated with 
institutional mission, disciplinary aims, programmatic development, and pedagogical 
visions, all of which could have fostered meaningful discussions about the proposal itself 
and the possible consequences, both good and bad, that might result from its acceptance 
or denial. Less frequently, however, did open narratives enter faculty discussions about 
the Proposal. Because of this fact, I discovered that closed narratives tend to dominate 
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decision-making processes because they distract people from considering the issue at 
hand, and they also prevent open narrative discussions that could lead to the develop of 
core narratives.  
 When faced with narrative abundance, institutional change is hindered because 
too many stories produce too many possibilities, making communal decisions almost 
impossible. While I have only named a couple of categories, open and closed, I intend to 
continue developing a narrative schema so that new WPAs have a sound framework for 
knowing when they are interpellated within a particular narrative structure. My hope is 
that this work will allow new WPAs to shift the focus away from closed narratives that 
misguide decision-making processes toward open narratives that enable all participants to 
consider the consequences and guiding principles of the actual proposal on the table. 
 Despite the perceived legitimacy that the WPAs felt from the institutional and 
disciplinary narratives that motivated the creation of the change intiative, the Proposal 
served to reify that organizational coherence and disciplinary identity are false 
constructions. While unsuccessful at the time of this publication, the Composition 
Program’s attempts to gain independence deserve critical scrutiny, particularly with 
regard to narrative’s role in the debate. By examining the effects of open and closed 
narratives, WPA scholars are poised to develop a rigorous theory of institutional change. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: WHAT NARRATIVES (UN)DO 
  
 
[W]hen narratives of organizational change become dominated by an organizationally 
legitimated plot, the narrative serves to close down the openness required by ethics. 
–Carl Rhodes, Alison Pullen, Stewart R. Clegg, “If I Should Fall From Grace” (548) 
 
 I began this project with a relatively simple idea: narratives are the guiding 
principles that influence our actions and structure our beliefs. As cognitive mechanisms 
enabling us to determine proper courses of action within a particular context, narratives 
are mutable structures that adapt when our rules for conduct cannot adequately respond to 
new contexts. At the organizational level, narratives influence decision-making 
processes, and to determine how, we need only examine the consequences to determine 
the logical guiding principles that prompted one decision over another. When we engage 
in this form of analysis—looking at the consequences to determine the guiding 
principles—we utilize narrative logic, a descriptive term I developed through my study of 
C.S. Peirce’s pragmatist philosophy.  
 For Writing Program Administrators (WPAs), narrative logic presents a useful 
framework for rendering university structures intelligible, particularly the complicated 
layers comprising an institution and its academic units. When we are motivated as WPAs 
to participate in institutional change initiatives, we need to consider, first, the 
consequences we want to produce. By imagining the end result, we develop, cognitively, 
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a mental narrative that will enable us to reach our goal. These narratives are simply 
guiding principles that prompt us to act in accordance with the consequences we desire. 
In this way, narrative is transformative and equips us to act deliberately.  
 The two case studies I presented offered contrasting perspectives on narrative 
logic. Sometimes, we have the power to direct narrative logic, while other times we are 
merely subject to the narrative logic of our co-workers or our institutions. In both cases, 
narrative logic informs institutional participation. Remaining sensitive to the fact that we 
will not always have direct control over the narratives governing our workplace, simply 
identifying the narratives we see at work is an important first step to fully understanding 
our institution and for integrating ourselves within that organizational culture. 
Accomplishing this task is not easy because, sometimes, we might not agree with the 
narratives we identify. More importantly, after negotiating the narrative logic of an 
organization, we might realize that we do not want to invest ourselves in that culture. 
Regardless, narrative logic will help us determine the level of participation we will offer 
and the intensity of the identifications we might make.  
 I had one goal with this project: to guide new WPAs through the process of 
institutional analysis from a pragmatist narrative perspective. Of course, as I revealed in 
Chapter V, narratives are not always positive constructions. Similar to rhetoric generally, 
narratives can be used for good or bad purposes. For example, when conducting our first 
direct writing assessment for the UWC three-year plan, we implemented a draft 
collection project that raised serious concerns about the ethics of reporting.  
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Because this project was our first attempt at direct writing assessment, we realized 
at the end of our process that, in the future, we had much to improve in order to generate 
accurate and useful assessment results. However, working within our institutional 
context, we made the best use of the resources we had, which included the funding to hire 
three English faculty to serve as outside readers. After collecting 35 sets of drafts, 
consisting of the rough drafts clients brought into the UWC and the final drafts they 
submitted to their professors and/or publishers, we placed the drafts in a random order 
and developed a numbering system. Then, we asked our readers to review all 70 drafts 
indiscriminately and to rate them according to a rubric.  
 The rubric was divided into four criteria: focus, organization, development, and 
style and mechanics. When the readers submitted their results, I tallied all of the ratings 
to see the level of improvement and, particularly, the highest level of improvement in the 
areas we tested. As I compiled our results, I recorded the percentage of increase or 
decrease for the whole document, as well as the individual criterion. Together, the UWC 
Director, our  Research and Handouts Group, and I analyzed the results of the 
assessment. What we found was that, in some cases, students’ improvement actually 
decreased from one area to another during the revision process. In these circumstances, 
we investigated the session logs to see what conclusions we could draw from the results. 
Not surprisingly, we noticed patterns: for students who performed worse on draft 2 than 
draft 1, most of them visited the center only an hour or two before the paper was due. 
Also, in opposition to our assumptions about grammar, we found that, when students only 
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addressed grammatical concerns, they scored higher in all categories. This pattern was 
the most fascinating discovery we made.  
 As I developed our assessment plan, which included formalizing the results, I 
realized that I had a range of options for presenting this information to a larger 
administrative audience. Depending upon the consequences I wanted our plan to produce, 
I could tell the story in a number of ways. The easiest and most beneficial way to report 
our center’s effectiveness, of course, was to average the total improvement for all papers 
which would cause the drafts that worsened to disappear into the sum total. Had we 
presented these results alone, we would have perfectly matched our criteria and 
demonstrated the level of institutional effectiveness upper-level administrators would 
deem useful. However, as writing specialists, we could not simply present one number, 
which would have erased the inconsistencies and diminished the variety of our data. We 
had to consider a couple things: if the narrative logic of assessment is the improvement of 
teaching and learning, then our report of this project had to reflect that guiding principle, 
if we were to hold true to our institutional expectations and our disciplinary values. 
Furthermore, if we were to stay true to the narratives of our field, we also had to reflect 
on the process of assessment and develop better strategies for the future. That way, the 
assessment process means learning not only about students’ writing but also about 
improved assessment practices.  
 These options fascinated me and provoked me to consider the ethics of 
institutional reporting. While many WPAs labor over the actual assessment process itself, 
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the ethics of reporting offer a unique set of challenges. When administrative audiences 
receive our assessment plans, for example, they are presented with a particular narrative 
account of our unit’s effectiveness—a narrative account we can, for the most part, 
control. Practicing an ethical approach to these narratives is necessary; otherwise, we 
send false impressions of our academic units, which compromise their integrity.  
 As I continue with the narrative logic of institutional engagement, I want to 
explore how narratives can be true and false at the same time. Had we submitted one 
percentage demonstrating client improvement, we would have shared a true value based 
on actual practice. However, this figure, while resembling the narrative logic of 
effectiveness, actually falsifies our data through the process of omission. While this 
concept might be familiar, since the presentation of “partial truths” is common, my future 
research will examine the ways in which organizations present partial narratives in order 
to reflect a profitable narrative logic that convinces interlocutors that the narrative is 
complete and does not warrant investigation.  
This process, as a complement to narrative logic, is an attempt to secure  
narrative legitimation, which I see as the specific rhetorical move organizations make to 
present narratives that appear, on the one hand, to be complete and/or to meet a set of 
expectations or goals but that, on the other hand, mask the inconsistencies of the 
organization’s activities. At stake in this investigation is the power of organizational 
structures to control public perceptions of its work through the dissemination of 
narratives that serve, on the one hand, as external signifiers supporting the structure’s 
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mission and also serve, on the other hand, as empty referents. The ability of structures, 
particularly institutional and statist structures, to hide the emptiness behind these 
narratives rests in the structure’s ability to mask the fact that the narratives are only 
narratives, not transcendental truths or accurate experiential observations. In other words, 
a structural hermeneutic posits itself; narratives both “conceal” and “do,” and they garner 
legitimacy if they are believed. I base this assertion on Jean-François Lyotard’s The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, which illuminates the crisis of 
legitimation in both the sciences and the humanities.  
 Applied to my writing center example above, assessment reveals the ways in 
which narratives can be presented and interpreted as true and false, partial and impartial, 
complete and incomplete. While the assessment document we submitted to our 
administrators shared all of our results and also included an action plan for improving our 
measures in the future, the process signaled to me that narratives should not always be 
trusted, even when they seem official or legitimate. Given the prevalence of discourse 
today via web and telephone technologies, a healthy skepticism is necessary. Combined 
with the increasing demand for organizational accountability and transparency, a critical 
narrative perspective provides scholars with a framework for interpreting the proliferation 
of discourse in the twenty-first century. Most importantly, this framework offers 
implications for how we might analyze institutional identity and communication beyond 
the university proper.  
 
179 
WORKS CITED 
 
 
Adler-Kassner, Linda. The Activist WPA: Changing Stories about Writing and Writers. 
Logan, UT: Utah State UP, 2008. Print.  
 
American Association of University Professors. “Mission and Description.” American 
Association of University Professors. 26 May 2010. Web. 18 Feb. 2011.  
 
---. “Protecting an Independent Faculty Voice: Academic Freedom after Garcetti v. 
Ceballos.” American Association of University Professors. 2009. Web. 18 Feb. 
2011.  
 
American Council on Education. “Appalachian State University.” American Council on 
Education. 27 Apr. 2005. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Ankersmit, F. R. Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian’s Language. 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983. Print. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy 
Lib. Ser. 7.  
 
Appalachian State University. “Strategic Planning Open Forum.” Appalachian State 
University, 6 Oct. 2006. PowerPoint Presentation. 
 
---. UNC Tomorrow Response: Phase I Report. University of North Carolina Tomorrow, 
1 May 2008. PDF file.  
 
Aristotle. Poetics and Rhetoric. New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2005. Print.  
 
Artz, Judy, and Kristine Barnett. “Assessment Narrative: Saint Joseph College 
Connecticut.” Assessment Gallery and Resources. Council of Writing Program 
Administrators, n.d. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Assessment and Testing Study Group of the NCTE Executive Committee. “NCTE 
Framing Statements on Assessment.” National Council of Teachers of English. 
National Council of Teachers of English, Nov. 2004. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
“The Assessment of Understanding.” Assessment: It’s Not Just for Experts Anymore. 
Lloyd Bond and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, n.d. 
Web. 8 Aug. 2010 
180 
Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1962. Print.  
 
Ayto, John. Dictionary of Word Origins. New York: Little, Brown Publishing, 1990. 
Print.  
 
Baker, Mona. Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account. New York: Routledge, 
2006. Print.  
 
Bal, Mieke. Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative. 3rd ed. Toronto: U of 
Toronto P, 2009. Print.  
 
Barthes, Roland. “An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative.” New Literary 
History 6.2 (1975): 237-272. JSTOR. Web. 8 Aug. 2008.  
 
Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. 1981. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann 
Arbor: The U of Michigan P, 1994. Print.  
 
Baxi, Upendra. The Future of Human Rights. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006. Print 
 
Bean, John C. “Assessment Narrative: Seattle University.” Assessment Gallery and 
Resources. Council of Writing Program Administrators, n.d. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Bergman, Linda S., and Edith M. Baker’s, eds. Composition and/or Literature: The 
End(s) of Education. Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of English, 2006. 
Print.  
 
Bhaba, Homi K. Nation and Narration. New York: Routledge, 1990. Print.  
 
Bird, S. Elizabeth and Robert W. Dardenne. “Myth, Chronicle, and Story: Exploring the 
Narrative Qualities of News.” Social Meanings of News: A Text-Reader. Ed. 
Daniel A. Berkowitz. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1997. 333-
347. Print. 
 
Bishop, Wendy, and Gay Lynn Crossley. “How to Tell a Story of Stopping: The 
Complexities of Narrating a WPAs Experience.” Writing Program Administration 
19.3 (1996): 70-79. Web. 12 Nov. 2010.   
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Pascalian Meditations. Trans. Richard Nice. Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1997. Print.  
 
181 
Bousquet, Marc. How the University Works: Higher Education and the Low-Wage 
Nation. New York: New York UP, 2008. Print.  
 
Bramblett, Ann. “My Imagined Community.” What to Expect When You’re Expect to 
Teach: The Anxious Craft of Teaching Composition. Ed. Anne Bramblett and 
Alison Knoblauch. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook Publishers, 2002. Print. 
 
Bruner, Jerome. Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986. Print. 
 
Burgchardt, Carl. R., ed. Readings in Rhetorical Criticism. State College, PA: Strata 
Publishing, Inc., 2005. Print.  
 
Butler, Judith. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge, 
1997. Print.  
 
---.  Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge, 
1994. Print. 
 
---. Giving An Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005. Print. 
 
Clarke, Brock. An Arsonist’s Guide to Writers’ Homes in New England. Chapel Hill: 
Algonquin, 2007. Print. 
 
Conference on College Composition and Communication. “About.” Conference on 
College Composition and Communication. National Council of Teachers of 
English, Aug. 2010. Web. 12 Feb. 2011.  
 
---. “Newcomers—Learn More!” Conference on College Composition and 
Communication. National Council of Teachers of English, Aug. 2010. Web. 12 
Feb. 2011.  
 
Conference on College Composition and Communication Committee on Assessment. 
“Writing Assessment: A Position Statement.” Conference on College 
Composition and Communication. National Council of Teachers of English, Nov. 
2006. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Connors, Robert J. Composition-Rhetoric: Backgrounds, Theory, and Pedagogy. 
Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 1997. Print.  
 
Corbett, Edward P.J., and Robert J. Connors. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student. 
4th ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print. 
182 
Council of Writing Program Administrators. “Communication Strategies.” Assessment 
Gallery and Resources. Council of Writing Program Administrators, n.d. Web. 8 
Aug. 2010.  
 
Crowley, Sharon. Composition in the University: Historical and Polemical Essays. 
Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh UP, 1998. Print.  
 
Currie, Mark. Postmodern Narrative Theory. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. Print.  
  
Czarniawska, Barbara. Narrating the Organization: Dramas of Institutional Identity. 
Chicago: The U of Chicago Press, 1997. Print.  
 
---. A Narrative Approach to Organization Studies. Qualitative Research Methods Ser. 
43. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1998. Print.  
 
---. A Theory of Organizing. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008. Print. 
 
---. Writing Management: Organization Theory as a Literary Genre. New York: Oxford 
UP, 1999. Print. 
 
Czarniawska, Barbara, and Rolf Wolff. “Constructing New Identities in Establish 
Organizational Fields.” International Studies of Management and Organization. 
28.3 (1998): 32-56. Project Muse. Web. 20 Jan. 2008.  
 
Derrida, Jacques. “Living On: Border Lines.” Trans. James Hulbert. A Derrida Reader. 
Ed. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. 254-68. Web. 13 Oct. 
2007.  
 
---. Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1985. Print.  
 
Dewey, John. Art As Experience. New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1934. Print. 
 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American 
Sociological Review 48.2 (1983): 147-160. JSTOR. Web. 15 Feb. 2010. 
Dixon, Chris Jennings. “Assessment Narrative: Tidewater Community College Virginia 
Beach Campus.” Assessment Gallery and Resources. Council of Writing Program 
Administrators, n.d. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Ede, Lisa. Situating Composition: Composition Studies and the Politics of Location. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 2004. Print.  
183 
Faber, Brenton. Community Action and Organizational Change: Image, Narrative, 
Identity. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 2002. Print.  
 
---. “Toward a Rhetoric of Change: Reconstructing Image and Narrative in Distressed 
Organizations.” Journal of Business and Technical Communication. 12.2 (1998): 
217-237. Sage Publications. Web. 20 July 2010.  
 
Fish, Stanley. “Tip to Professors: Just Do Your Job.” New York Times 22 Oct. 2006, The 
Opinion Pages: n. pag. Web. 3 Mar. 2007. 
 
Fisher, Walter R. Human Communication as Narrative: Toward A Philosophy of Reason, 
Value, and Action. Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina P, 1987. Print. 
 
Freire, Paula. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Trans. Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: 
Continuum, 2000. Print.  
 
Gallagher, Chris W. Reclaiming Assessment: A Better Alternative to the Accountability 
Agenda. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2007. Print.   
 
General Education Task Force Subcommittee for Vertical Learning Outcomes. “Vertical 
Model for Writing Skills.” Appalachian State University. Appalachian State 
University, 1 Dec. 2006. Web. 15 Feb. 2010.  
 
Graff, Gerald. Professing Literature: An Institutional History. Chicago: Chicago UP, 
1987. Print.  
 
Hassell, Tonya. “Reporting Structures for Appalachian State University’s Writing 
Programs.” Conference on College Composition and Communication. Louisville, 
KY. 17 Mar. 2010. Microsoft Word file. 
 
---. “University Writing Center Case Statement.” N.p.: n.p., 2009. Microsoft Word file. 
 
Hatch, Mary Jo. Organization Theory: Modern and Symbolic Postmodern Perspectives. 
New York: Oxford UP, 1997. Print.  
---. “The Role of the Researcher: An Analysis of Narrative Position in Organization 
Theory. Journal of Management Inquiry 5.4 (1996): 359-374. Sage Publications. 
Web. 15 Feb. 2010.  
 
hooks, bell. Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom. New York:  
Routledge, 1994. Print.  
 
184 
Huot, Brian. “Toward a New Discourse of Assessment for the College Writing 
Classroom.” College English 65.2 (2002): 163-180. JSTOR. Web. 26 Nov. 2010.  
 
---. “Toward  a New Theory of Writing Assessment.” College Composition and 
Communication 47.4 (1996): 549-566. JSTOR. Web. 26 Nov. 2010.   
 
Ianetta, Melissa. “Disciplinarity, Divorce, and the Displacement of Labor Issues: 
Rereading Histories of Composition and Literature.” College Composition and 
Communication 62.1 (2010): 53-72. JSTOR. Web. 12 Nov. 2010.  
 
“institution, n.” OED Online. Oxford UP, Dec. 2009. Web. 16 Feb. 2010.  
 
Institutional Research, Assessment, and Planning. “Appalachian Fast Facts.” 
Appalachian State University. Appalachian State University, 2009. Web. 15 Feb. 
2010.  
 
---. Appalachian State University Strategic Plan 2008-2012. Appalachian State 
University. Appalachian State University, 2008. Web. 15 Feb. 2010.  
 
---. “Assessment.” Appalachian State University. Appalachian State University, 2009. 
Web. 15 Feb. 2010.  
 
---. Assessment at Appalachian: Academic Program Assessment Handbook. Appalachian 
State University. Appalachian State University, Fall 2009. Web. 15 Feb. 2010.  
 
---. “University Mission Statement.” Appalachian State University. Appalachian State 
University, 2009. Web. 15 Feb. 2010.  
 
James, William. “Habit.” Pragmatism: A Reader. Ed. Louis Menand. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1997. 60-68. Print.  
 
Jameson, Frederic. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1981. Print.  
 
---. Pragmatism. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1995. Print. 
 
Journet, Debra, Beth Boehm, and Mary Rosner. “Introduction.” History, Reflection, and 
Narrative: The Professionalization of Composition, 1963-1983. Stamford, CT: 
Ablex Publishing Company, 1999. xiii-xxiii. Print.  
 
185 
Keeling, Richard P., Ric Underhile, and Andrew F. Wall. “Horizontal and Vertical 
Structures: The Dynamics of Organization in Higher Education.” Liberal 
Education 93.3 (2007): 22-31. Web. 5 Jan. 2011.  
 
Kelly, Rob. “Changing Roles, Improved Conditions for Non-Tenure Track Faculty.” 
Department Chair Online Resource Center. American Council on Education, 
2009. Web. 15 Sept. 2010.  
 
Kendell, Connie, Deborah Kirkman, and Darci Thoune. “Assessment Narrative: 
University of Kentucky.” Assessment Gallery and Resources. Council of Writing 
Program Administrators, n.d. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Kerr, Kenneth. “Assessment Narrative: Frederick Community College.” Assessment 
Gallery and Resources. Council of Writing Program Administrators, n.d. Web. 8 
Aug. 2010.  
 
Knight, Peter T., and Paul R. Trowler. Departmental Leadership in Higher Education. 
Philadelphia: Open UP, 2001. Print.  
 
Kreiswirth, Martin. “Mere Telling Stories? Narrative and Knowledge in the Human 
Sciences. Poetics Today 21.2 (2000): 293-318. Print.  
 
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1962. 
Print.  
 
Lee, Jenny J. “Comparing Institutional Relationships with Academic Departments: A 
Study of Five Academic Fields.” Research in Higher Education. 45.6 (2004): 
603-624. JSTOR. Web. 4 Mar. 2011. 
 
Linde, Charlotte. “Narrative and Social Tacit Knowledge.” Journal of Knowledge 
Management 5.2 (2001): 160-170. Web. 20 Jan. 2008. 
 
---. Life Stories: The Creation of Coherence. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print. 
 
---. “Narrative in Institutions.” The Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Ed. Deborah 
Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton. Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001. 518- 536. Print. 
 
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 1979. 
Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1984. Print. Theory and Hist. of Lit. 10.  
186 
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 2nd ed. Notre Dame: U of 
Notre Dame P, 1984. Print.  
 
May, Steve, and Dennis K. Mumby, eds. Engaging Organizational Communication 
Theory and Research: Multiple Perspectives. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc., 2005. Print.  
 
McClintock, Charles. “Using Narrative Methods to Link Program Evaluation and 
Organization Development.” The Evaluation Exchange 9.4 (2003/2004): 14-15. 
Web. 15 Aug. 2010.  
 
McClure, Keven. “Resurrecting the Narrative Paradigm: Identification and the Case of 
Young Earth Creationism.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 39.2 (2009): 189-2011. 
Print.  
 
McLeod, Susan. Writing Program Administration. West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press and 
The WAC Clearinghouse, 2007. Web. 8 January 2011. Ref. Guides to Rhetoric 
and Comp.  
 
Mead, George Herbert. The Philosophy of the Present. Great Books in Philosophy. 
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002. Print. 
 
---. “Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning.” Psychological Bulletin 7 
(1910): 397-405. Web. 8 Jan. 2010.  
 
Miller, Thomas. The Formation of College English: Rhetoric and Belles Letters in the 
British Cultural Provinces. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh UP, 1997. Print.  
 
Mirtz, Ruth, Keith Rhodes, Susan Taylor, and Kim van Alkemade. “The Power of ‘De-
Positioning’: Narrative Strategies in Stories of Stopping.” Writing Program 
Administration 25.3 (2002): 79-96. Web. 12 Nov. 2010.  
Moore, Cindy, Peggy O’Neill, and Brian Huot. “Creating a Culture of Assessment in 
Writing Programs and Beyond.” College Composition and Communication 61.1 
(2009): 107-132. JSTOR. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Mumby, Dennis K., ed. Narrative and Social Control: Critical Perspectives. Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1993. Print. Sage Ann. Reviews of Comm. 
Research 21.  
 
National Council of Teachers of English and Council of Writing Program Administrators. 
“NCTE-WPA White Paper on Writing Assessment in Colleges and Universities.” 
187 
Assessment Gallery and Resources. Council of Writing Program Administrators, 
Apr. 2008. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.   
 
O’Banion, John D. “Narration and Argumentation: Quintilian on Narratio as the Heart of 
Rhetorical Thinking.” Rhetorica 5.4 (1987): 325-351. JSTOR. Web. 20 Jan. 2010.  
 
Olson, Gary A. Olson, ed. Rhetoric and Composition as Intellectual Work. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois UP, 2002. Print.  
 
O’Neill, Peggy, Angela Crow, and Larry W. Burton. A Field of Dreams: Independent 
Writing Programs and the Future of Composition Studies. Logan, UT: Utah State 
UP, 2002. Print.  
 
O’Neill, Peggy, Cindy Moore, and Brian Huot. A Guide to College Writing Assessment. 
Logan, UT: Utah State UP, 2009. Print.  
 
O’Neill, Peggy, Ellen Schendel, and Brian Huot. “Defining Assessment as Research: 
Moving from Obligations to Opportunities.” Writing Program Administration 
26.1-2 (2002): 10-26. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
“organization, n.” OED Online. Oxford UP, Dec. 2009. Web. 16 Feb. 2010.  
 
Pentland, Brian T. “Building Process Theory with Narrative: From Description to 
Explanation.” The Academic of Management Review 24.4 (199): 711-724. JSTOR. 
Web. 5 Jan. 2010.  
 
Pew Research Center. “Presidential Race Draws Even: GOP Base Getting Behind 
McCain.” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Pew Research 
Center, 13 Aug. 2008. Web. 7 Sept. 2010. 
 
Peirce, Charles Sanders. “The Architecture of Theories.”  Philosophical Writings of 
Peirce. Ed. Justus Buchler. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955. 315-323. 
Print. 
 
---. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. 5. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1965. 
Print.  
 
---. “Definition of Pragmatism.” Ed. Louis Menand. Pragmatism: A Reader. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1997. 56-58. Print.  
 
188 
---. “The Fixation of Belief.” Chance, Love, and Logic: Philosophical Essays. Ed. Morris 
R. Cohen. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1998. 7-31. Print.  
 
---. “How To Make Our Ideas Clear.” Philosophical Writings of Peirce. Ed. Justus 
Buchler. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955. 23-41. Print. 
 
Policy Center on the First Year of College. “Appalachian State University.” Institutions 
of Excellence in the First College Year: Four-Year Colleges and Universities.  
John N. Gardner Institute for Excellence in Undergraduate Education, 2002. Web. 
15 Feb. 2010.  
 
Porter, James E., Patricia Sullivan, Stuart Blythe, Jeffrey T. Grabill, and Libby Miles. 
“Institutional Critique: A Rhetorical Methodology for Change.” College 
Composition and Communication 51.4 (2000): 610-642. JSTOR. Web. 20 Jan. 
2008.  
 
Quintilian, Marcus Fabius. The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian. Trans. Harold 
Edgeworth Butler. 4 Vols. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1980. Print.  
 
Rhetoric and Composition Relocation Task Force. Task Force Recommendation: 
Rhetoric and Composition Relocation Proposal. Appalachian State University, 29 
Apr. 2010. Web. 20 Sept. 2010.  
 
Rhoades, Georgia, and David P. Haney. “How Can You Teach Composition Without 
Adjuncts or Tenure Lines?” Academe Online. American Association of University 
Professors, 2006. Web. 20 Nov. 2010.  
 
Rhodes, Carl, and Andrew D. Brown. “Narrative, Organizations, and Research.” 
International Journal of Management Reviews 7.3 (2005): 167-188. Blackwell 
Publishing. Web. 20 Jan. 2008.  
 
Rhodes, Carl, Allison Pullen, and Stewart R. Clegg. “If I Should Fall From Grace’: 
Stories of Change and Organizational Ethics.” Journal of Business Ethics 91 
(2010): 535-551. Springer. Web. 20 Jan. 2008.  
 
Ricoeur, Paul. From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics. Vol. II. Trans. Kathleen 
Blamey and John B. Thompson. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1986. Print. 
 
Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith. “Concepts of Narrative.” Studies Across Disciplines in the 
Humanities and Social Sciences. 1 (2006): 10-19. Web. 3 Jan. 2008.  
 
189 
Ritter, Kelly. “Extra-Institutional Agency and the Public Value of the WPA.” Writing 
Program Administration. 29.3 (2006): 45-64. Web. 8 Nov. 2010.  
 
---. Who Owns School? Authority, Students, and Online Discourse. New Dimensions in 
Computers and Composition Series. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2010. Print. 
 
Rodden, John. “How Do Stories Convince Us? Notes Towards A Rhetoric of Narrative.” 
College Literature 35.1 (2008): 148-173. Web. 20 Jan. 2010. 
 
Ronald, Kate and Hephzibah Roskelly. Reason to Believe: Romanticism, Pragmatism, 
and the Teaching of Writing. Albany: State U of New York P, 1998. Print. 
 
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979. 
Print.  
 
Rousculp, Tiffany. “Assessment Narrative: Salt Lake Community College Writing 
Center.” Assessment Gallery and Resources. Council of Writing Program 
Administrators, n.d. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Rutz, Carol. “Assessment Narrative: Carleton College.” Assessment Gallery and 
Resources. Council of Writing Program Administrators, n.d. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Sarbin, Theodore R. Narrative Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct. 
Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group. (1986). Print. 
 
Scharf, Meg. “Tellin’ Our Story—Or Not: Assessment Results on Academic Library 
Web Sites.” Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Association of 
College and Research Libraries, March 12-15, 2009: Pushing the Edge: Explore, 
Extend, Engage. Ed. Dawn Mueller. Seattle: American Library Association, 2009. 
192-195. Web. 5 Jan. 2011.  
 
Schlib, John. “Turning Composition Toward Sovereignty.” Present Tense 1.1 (2010). 
Web. 5 Jan. 2011.  
 
Schulman, Lee S. “Counting and Recounting: Assessment and the Quest for 
Accountability.” Change 39.1 (2007): n. pag. Web. 18 Jan. 2011.  
 
Scott, W. Richard. Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests. 3rd ed. Los 
Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc., 2008. Print.   
 
Shaw, Jane S. “Asking for the Moon and Stars.” The John William Pope Center for 
Higher Education Policy, 1 Sept. 2008. Web. 15 Sept. 2010.  
190 
Seely, John, Stephen Denning, Katalina Groh, and Laurence Prusak. Storytelling in 
Organizations: Why Storytelling Is Transforming 21st Century Organizations and 
Management. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2004. Print. 
 
Seldon, Raman, ed. The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism: From Formalism to 
Poststructuralism. Vol. 8. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. Print.  
 
Spellings Commission on the Future of Higher Education. A Test of Leadership: 
Charting the Future of U.S. Higher Education. U.S. Department of Education, 26 
Sept. 2006. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
Stephens, Patricia A. “A Move Toward ‘Academic Citizenship’: Reading Emotion in the 
Narrative Structures of Part-time Faculty.” Writing Program Administration 27.3 
(2004): 35-51. Print.  
 
Slevin, James. Introducing English: Essays in the Intellectual Work of Composition. 
Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh UP, 2001. Print. 
 
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. The Principles of Accreditation: 
Foundations of Quality Enhancement. 4th ed. Commission on Colleges and the 
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, 2009. Web. 10 Aug. 2010.  
 
Tsoukas, Haridimos and Mary Jo Hatch. “Complex Thinking, Complex Practice: The 
Case for a Narrative Approach to Organizational Complexity.” Human Relations 
54.8 (2001): 979-1013. Sage Publications. Web. 20 Jan. 2008.  
 
Tsoukas, Haridimos, and Christian Knudsen, eds. The Oxford Handbook Of Organization 
Theory: Meta-Theoretical Perspectives. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. Print.  
 
University of North Carolina. “History and Mission.” University of North Carolina, n.d. 
Web. 15 Sept. 2010.  
 
University of North Carolina Board of Governors. Long-Range Planning 1994-1999. 
University of North Carolina, 1994. Web. 15 Sept. 2010.  
 
---. Supplement to Long-Range Planning 2004-2009. University of North Carolina, 2006. 
Web. 15 Sept. 2010.  
 
University of North Carolina Tomorrow Commission. University of North Carolina 
Tomorrow Commission Final Report. University of North Carolina, Dec. 2007. 
Web. 15 Sept. 2010.   
191 
University Writing Center at Appalachian State University. Assessment Plan 2007-2010. 
University Writing Center, May 2010. PDF file.  
 
---. Consultant Handbook. Appalachian State University. University Writing Center, Fall 
2010. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
---. Strategic Plan 2008-2013. Appalachian State University. University Writing Center, 
May 2010. PDF file.  
 
Welsh, John F. “Theses on College and University Administration: A Critical 
Perspective.” Workplace: A Journal for Academic Labor 16 (2009): 73-79. Web. 
10 Sept. 2010.  
 
Welsh, John F., and Jeff Metcalf. “Faculty and Administrative Support for Institutional 
Effectiveness Activities: A Bridge Across the Chasm?” The Journal of Higher 
Education 74.4 (2003): 445-468. JSTOR. Web. 10 Sept. 2010.  
 
Werder, Carmen. “Rhetoric Agency: Seeing the Ethics of It All.” Writing Program 
Administration 24.1-2 (2000): 7-26. Web. 8 Aug. 2010.  
 
White, Hayden. “The Narrativization of Real Events.” Critical Inquiry 7.4 (1981): 793-
798. JSTOR. Web. 5 Jan. 2010.  
 
---. “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality.” Critical Inquiry 7.1 
(1980): 5-27. JSTOR. Web. 5 Jan. 2010.  
 
Williams, Bernard “Life as Narrative.” European Journal of Philosophy. 17.2 (2007): 
305-314. Blackwell Publishing. Web. 5 Jan. 2008.  
Wilson, John. “Barack Obama and the Myth of Inexperience.” OpEdNews.com. Rob 
Kall, 5 Oct. 2008. Web. 7 Sept. 2010.  
 
Yancey, Kathleen Blake. “Looking Back as We Look Forward: Historicizing Writing 
Assessment as a Rhetorical Act.” College Composition and Communication 50.3 
(1999): 483-503. JSTOR. Web. 10 Sept. 2010.  
 
Zawacki, Terry Myers. “Assessment Narrative: George Mason University.” Assessment 
Gallery and Resources. Council of Writing Program Administrators, n.d. Web. 8 
Aug. 2010.  
 
 
192 
APPENDIX A 
 
WRITING CENTER ASSESSMENT PLAN 2007-2010 
 
 
 
193 
 
 
 
194 
 
 
 
195 
 
 
 
196 
 
 
 
197 
 
 
